This is from the Middle East Media Research Institute--if it is half correct, then what we are starting to do is going to cost us very dearly. I wonder if anyone in Wahington or in Afghanistan is aware of this sort of stuff?
Commander Of Taliban’s Haqqani Network Claims They Control 80 Percent Of Afghanistan, Warns: We Have Drawn Up Counter-Plans and are Waiting for Arrival of Fresh 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan to Give Them a Tough Time
A prominent commander of the Haqqani Network, a key organization that forms part of the Taliban militant movement in Afghanistan, has claimed that the Taliban control over 80 percent of Afghanistan and do not need to flee to Pakistan to take refuge, according to a Pakistani daily.
Rejecting as baseless the U.S. allegations that the Afghan Taliban have a presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas, Mullah Sangeen said that there is no truth in the U.S. charges as the Taliban are holding 80 percent of territory in Afghanistan.
In a video message which the Taliban commander claimed was recorded in one of his camps in the Paktika province of Afghanistan, he said that the Haqqani Network is active and based in Afghanistan. Mullah Sangeen is associated with the Haqqani Network, which operates in the Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, and Maidan-Wardak provinces of Afghanistan as well as in the capital city of Kabul.
The Haqqani Network led by Commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, the elder son of veteran Afghan Mujahideen leader Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, has nominated Mullah Sangeen as the shadow governor of the Paktika province, according to a report in the Pakistani daily The News.
By pressing the government of Pakistan to launch a military operation in North Waziristan, the U.S. is trying to weaken Pakistan, Mullah Sangeen said, adding that the U.S. is making all-out efforts to pit Pakistan’s armed forces and people against each other.
Mullah Sangeen claimed that the Taliban have become a strong force and are now ruling most of Afghanistan with support from the Afghan people.
“The U.S. knows that we are here in Afghanistan and are fighting against them. The U.S. always levels such allegations whenever it suffers losses at our hands,” he said, adding that the U.S. and its allies invaded their country with a claim to make it prosperous and developed.
“Instead, they turned Afghanistan into ruins. Thousands of Afghans were killed and their houses bombarded in the name of the war on terrorism. The U.S. still does not understand the complexity of the situation. It wrongly considers that the Taliban are furthering somebody else’s [Pakistan’s] agenda. Now is the time for the U.S. to understand that we are Afghans and are fighting for the freedom of our homeland,’’ he added.
The Taliban commander termed reports of secret U.S.-Taliban talks as baseless, saying that the Taliban does not want talks with the occupying forces because they have ruined their country, filled jails with innocent Afghans and made thousands of Afghan children orphans and women widows.
The Taliban have drawn up counter-plans and are waiting for the arrival of 30,000 fresh U.S. troops in Afghanistan to give them a tough time, he noted, warning: “With an increase in the number of their troops, they will suffer more casualties.”
Mullah Sangeen said that the Haqqani Network has inflicted heavy losses on the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan. “This is the reason the U.S. is putting pressure on Pakistan to launch a military operation in North Waziristan [a tribal district of Pakistan]. At a time when Pakistan is supporting the U.S. in its war against terror and U.S. drones are flying over North Waziristan round the clock, no sane person would like to live in Waziristan,” he added.
Source: The News, Pakistan, December 22, 2009
Posted at: 2009-12-22
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Afghanistan--The questions that haven't been answered
Many of you may remember Joe Galloway--he and General Hal Moore wrote, We Were Soldiers Once and Young. He and Moore have reprised this with We are Soldiers Still. I think of him as a sort of modern day Ernie Pyle. In this piece he repeats the questions that General Colin Powell asked, but in my estimation never got answered or answered himself. I wonder if these questions came up during the long debate around the White House conference table and if they did, what were the answers.
George
Afghanistan isn't worth one more American life
By Joseph L. Galloway McClatchy Newspapers
The debate over our creeping military mission in distant Afghanistan grows ever hotter, and before we march even deeper into trouble, perhaps it's time to dig out the old Powell Doctrine and answer the eight questions it poses.
Gen. Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said these questions all must be answered with a loud YES before the United States takes military action. He listed his questions in the 1990 run-up to the Persian Gulf War, drawing heavily on the Weinberger Doctrine that was laid down by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during the debate over America's ends and means in Lebanon.
•1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
•2. Do we have a clear, attainable objective?
•3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
•4. Have all non-violent policy means been exhausted?
•5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
•6. Have all the consequences of our action been fully considered?
•7. Is the action supported by the American people?
•8. Do we have broad international support?
Those questions weren't asked and answered before we invaded Afghanistan late in 2001, and by the time we invaded Iraq early in 2003, then-defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was declaring the Powell doctrine "outmoded" as he ran premature victory laps around a fleeting success in Afghanistan.
The Bush administration is gone, but both Iraq and Afghanistan are still with us, and now a new president is overseeing a slow-motion U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and a slow-motion U.S. escalation in Afghanistan.
It can fairly be argued that not a single affirmative answer can be given to Gen. Powell's eight questions with regard to the actions now planned or underway in Afghanistan. Had those questions been asked about Iraq in early 2003, not a single affirmative answer could have been given.
There was, in the beginning in Afghanistan, a vital national security interest in toppling the Taliban government and killing or capturing the Taliban’s murderous guests, Osama bin Laden’s al Qaida terrorists. We toppled the Taliban, but we let al Qaida flee over the rugged, mountainous border into Pakistan.
Even before that, we began to let Afghanistan fester, starved of U.S. manpower and money, and turned our attention to Iraq, where Rumsfeld had estimated that victory would be ours and our troops would be home in six months or so.
We no longer have a vital national security interest or a clearly attainable goal in Afghanistan. Our stated goal is to deny any future sanctuary to al Qaida in Afghanistan - but al Qaida isn't based in Afghanistan and hasn't been for years.
We've changed presidents, changed commanding generals and ambassadors, changed our tactics and changed the numbers of American boots on the ground in a buildup that's expected to reach a total of more than 70,000 U.S. troops by the end of this year.
The new U.S. military commander in Kabul, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, wants more U.S. troops — somewhere between 14,000 and 45,000 more, at least for now — to fight the newly resurgent Taliban guerrillas who control well over half the country, but he's been told that he shouldn't ask for them anytime soon.
With the country in recession, the budget deficit spinning into the trillions of dollars, American casualty rates in Afghanistan at record highs and public approval of the president and the war in Afghanistan falling like rocks, the White House desperately wants some breathing room.
That's politics, folks, and it runs counter to an important corollary to the Powell Doctrine: If you're determined to fight a war, choose a commander whom you trust and a strategy that you back, and then give your military leaders all the resources they say they need to achieve your objective.
If you can't do that, if your objective isn't clear, if the American people and the international community aren’t with you, then order a withdrawal and explain why.
For God's sake, don't ratchet up slowly, buying time with the bodies of dead and wounded American soldiers, while you try to sell the wrong war in the wrong place against the wrong enemy to the American people.
For eight years, we've heard presidents and other politicians talk about setting conditions for a democratic central government in a country — really a bunch of tribes and clans — that's never had such a thing in 2,000 years and seemingly doesn't want one now.
The national treasure we've invested in that effort has propped up an ineffective and corrupt Kabul regime. Its only economic success has been the restoration of the opium trade. Afghanistan is now the world's leading producer of opium and heroin, where under the Taliban government that was a death penalty offense.
It's time to make a decision, Mr. President, and I hope that for our sake and yours, you make the right one. Afghanistan isn't worth the life of one more American soldier, much less the hundreds and thousands that an open-ended commitment to a war that we cannot win would cost.
George
Afghanistan isn't worth one more American life
By Joseph L. Galloway McClatchy Newspapers
The debate over our creeping military mission in distant Afghanistan grows ever hotter, and before we march even deeper into trouble, perhaps it's time to dig out the old Powell Doctrine and answer the eight questions it poses.
Gen. Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said these questions all must be answered with a loud YES before the United States takes military action. He listed his questions in the 1990 run-up to the Persian Gulf War, drawing heavily on the Weinberger Doctrine that was laid down by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during the debate over America's ends and means in Lebanon.
•1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
•2. Do we have a clear, attainable objective?
•3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
•4. Have all non-violent policy means been exhausted?
•5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
•6. Have all the consequences of our action been fully considered?
•7. Is the action supported by the American people?
•8. Do we have broad international support?
Those questions weren't asked and answered before we invaded Afghanistan late in 2001, and by the time we invaded Iraq early in 2003, then-defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was declaring the Powell doctrine "outmoded" as he ran premature victory laps around a fleeting success in Afghanistan.
The Bush administration is gone, but both Iraq and Afghanistan are still with us, and now a new president is overseeing a slow-motion U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and a slow-motion U.S. escalation in Afghanistan.
It can fairly be argued that not a single affirmative answer can be given to Gen. Powell's eight questions with regard to the actions now planned or underway in Afghanistan. Had those questions been asked about Iraq in early 2003, not a single affirmative answer could have been given.
There was, in the beginning in Afghanistan, a vital national security interest in toppling the Taliban government and killing or capturing the Taliban’s murderous guests, Osama bin Laden’s al Qaida terrorists. We toppled the Taliban, but we let al Qaida flee over the rugged, mountainous border into Pakistan.
Even before that, we began to let Afghanistan fester, starved of U.S. manpower and money, and turned our attention to Iraq, where Rumsfeld had estimated that victory would be ours and our troops would be home in six months or so.
We no longer have a vital national security interest or a clearly attainable goal in Afghanistan. Our stated goal is to deny any future sanctuary to al Qaida in Afghanistan - but al Qaida isn't based in Afghanistan and hasn't been for years.
We've changed presidents, changed commanding generals and ambassadors, changed our tactics and changed the numbers of American boots on the ground in a buildup that's expected to reach a total of more than 70,000 U.S. troops by the end of this year.
The new U.S. military commander in Kabul, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, wants more U.S. troops — somewhere between 14,000 and 45,000 more, at least for now — to fight the newly resurgent Taliban guerrillas who control well over half the country, but he's been told that he shouldn't ask for them anytime soon.
With the country in recession, the budget deficit spinning into the trillions of dollars, American casualty rates in Afghanistan at record highs and public approval of the president and the war in Afghanistan falling like rocks, the White House desperately wants some breathing room.
That's politics, folks, and it runs counter to an important corollary to the Powell Doctrine: If you're determined to fight a war, choose a commander whom you trust and a strategy that you back, and then give your military leaders all the resources they say they need to achieve your objective.
If you can't do that, if your objective isn't clear, if the American people and the international community aren’t with you, then order a withdrawal and explain why.
For God's sake, don't ratchet up slowly, buying time with the bodies of dead and wounded American soldiers, while you try to sell the wrong war in the wrong place against the wrong enemy to the American people.
For eight years, we've heard presidents and other politicians talk about setting conditions for a democratic central government in a country — really a bunch of tribes and clans — that's never had such a thing in 2,000 years and seemingly doesn't want one now.
The national treasure we've invested in that effort has propped up an ineffective and corrupt Kabul regime. Its only economic success has been the restoration of the opium trade. Afghanistan is now the world's leading producer of opium and heroin, where under the Taliban government that was a death penalty offense.
It's time to make a decision, Mr. President, and I hope that for our sake and yours, you make the right one. Afghanistan isn't worth the life of one more American soldier, much less the hundreds and thousands that an open-ended commitment to a war that we cannot win would cost.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
French Arms Sales
I wonder--is this selling the hangman the rope he will use to hang you?
Proposed French arms sale to Russia faces mounting opposition on Capitol Hill Posted: 18 Dec 2009 07:26 AM PST
Have you heard of the French ship called the Mistral? Well, you're about to. Several senior members of the U.S. Congress are becoming heavily involved in trying to thwart the possible sale of the Mistral from France to Russia.
The Mistral is France's state-of-the-art amphibious assault ship, and discussions of selling it to the Russian Federation have been causing angst in European capitals for months. The sale would be the first significant arms transfer from a NATO country to Russia and what's more, the Russians have already indicated that it could be used in future operations in countries in its near abroad, such as Georgia, which it invaded last year.
Russian Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy said in September that "In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed [Russia's] Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore]."
This is just one of the concerns that prompted Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-LA, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to introduce a bill late Thursday that would express the sense of Congress that "France and other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union should decline to sell major weapons systems or offensive military equipment to the Russian Federation."
The resolution alleges that Russia remains in violation of the French-brokered ceasefire that followed the Georgia invasion. Also, Russia is expanding its military presence in a way that threatens Georgia, and has made a number of aggressive moves toward several countries in the region, according to the text. The sale of the Mistral to Russia "would enhance that country's ability to potentially wage aggression against its neighbors," the resolution states.
Ros-Lehtinen is calling on President Obama, as well as Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to urge France not to sell major offensive weapons systems to Russia until Russia completely withdraws from Georgian territory and makes broad reforms in areas ranging from rule of law to human rights.
The bill has been referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for consideration, but that's only the beginning of coming U.S. congressional involvement on the issue. Multiple Senate aides tell The Cable that several senators from both sides of the aisle are busily drafting a letter to the French Embassy calling on France to hold off on the sale. That letter is expected early next week.
There goes the neighborhood?
The 650-foot long Mistral is the second largest vessel in the French Navy and each one is capable of carrying up to 16 helicopters, tanks, land assault vehicles, and 900 troops.
In addition to Georgia, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are also concerned about the Russians buying such a ship, especially from their fellow NATO and EU member France. Serious discussions have been initiated within NATO by these states about the possible deal.
"I'll say it quite bluntly --it has implications for NATO's security, because of what we saw last year," Marko Mikhelson, chairman of the European affairs committee in Estonia's Parliament, told the New York Times.
Despite that, the French sailed a Mistral directly past these states to the port of St. Petersburg last month to show off the ship for the Russian government. And Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin refused to rule out using the ship against the Baltics on his recent trip to Paris.
"Whoever we buy it from, we will reserve the right to use it where and when we consider necessary," he said.
The Baltic states have protection as part of NATO and the EU. Georgia? Not so much. A senior Georgian government official spoke with The Cable about that country's concerns about the sale.
"We have experienced ourselves that Russia is capable of using military force against its neighbors," the official said, pointing out that Georgia has less ability to build international support for their opposition to the deal.
A French Embassy spokesman told The Cable that the sale of a Mistral-class ship to Russia is still a project and no decision has been made by either the Russians or the French.
"There is a Russian request and we see no reason to refuse considering that request, which will be examined with all the necessary precautions as part of the military equipment export control regulatory procedures and will take time," the spokesman said.
He pointed out France has used Mistral-class ships for humanitarian missions and to evacuate nationals from dangerous situations.
The French have also have made the argument that selling arms to Russia is needed for peace and stability in Europe. "It would be impossible to call for continental stability in partnership with Russia if we refuse to sell armaments to Russia. A refusal would amount to contradicting our own discourse," French Prime Minister Francois Fillon reportedly said.
And while the French have said they would sell a scaled-down version of the Mistral without some weapons and advanced-control technologies, American defense experts warn that the sale could start a chain reaction of European states selling sensitive military technologies to Russia to shore up their struggling defense industries.
"Given the shrinking defense budgets of European countries and the pressure to keep domestic defense firms from going under by expanding exports, there is little question that less and less restraint would be shown by competing governments and companies on what could be sold to Moscow," wrote Gary Schmitt, defense expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.
Moreover, "there is the signal such a sale would send Moscow about just how unserious the West is in holding Russia's feet to fire over its invasion of Georgia and the terms of the subsequent agreement," he said.
Proposed French arms sale to Russia faces mounting opposition on Capitol Hill Posted: 18 Dec 2009 07:26 AM PST
Have you heard of the French ship called the Mistral? Well, you're about to. Several senior members of the U.S. Congress are becoming heavily involved in trying to thwart the possible sale of the Mistral from France to Russia.
The Mistral is France's state-of-the-art amphibious assault ship, and discussions of selling it to the Russian Federation have been causing angst in European capitals for months. The sale would be the first significant arms transfer from a NATO country to Russia and what's more, the Russians have already indicated that it could be used in future operations in countries in its near abroad, such as Georgia, which it invaded last year.
Russian Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy said in September that "In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed [Russia's] Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore]."
This is just one of the concerns that prompted Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-LA, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to introduce a bill late Thursday that would express the sense of Congress that "France and other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union should decline to sell major weapons systems or offensive military equipment to the Russian Federation."
The resolution alleges that Russia remains in violation of the French-brokered ceasefire that followed the Georgia invasion. Also, Russia is expanding its military presence in a way that threatens Georgia, and has made a number of aggressive moves toward several countries in the region, according to the text. The sale of the Mistral to Russia "would enhance that country's ability to potentially wage aggression against its neighbors," the resolution states.
Ros-Lehtinen is calling on President Obama, as well as Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to urge France not to sell major offensive weapons systems to Russia until Russia completely withdraws from Georgian territory and makes broad reforms in areas ranging from rule of law to human rights.
The bill has been referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for consideration, but that's only the beginning of coming U.S. congressional involvement on the issue. Multiple Senate aides tell The Cable that several senators from both sides of the aisle are busily drafting a letter to the French Embassy calling on France to hold off on the sale. That letter is expected early next week.
There goes the neighborhood?
The 650-foot long Mistral is the second largest vessel in the French Navy and each one is capable of carrying up to 16 helicopters, tanks, land assault vehicles, and 900 troops.
In addition to Georgia, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are also concerned about the Russians buying such a ship, especially from their fellow NATO and EU member France. Serious discussions have been initiated within NATO by these states about the possible deal.
"I'll say it quite bluntly --it has implications for NATO's security, because of what we saw last year," Marko Mikhelson, chairman of the European affairs committee in Estonia's Parliament, told the New York Times.
Despite that, the French sailed a Mistral directly past these states to the port of St. Petersburg last month to show off the ship for the Russian government. And Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin refused to rule out using the ship against the Baltics on his recent trip to Paris.
"Whoever we buy it from, we will reserve the right to use it where and when we consider necessary," he said.
The Baltic states have protection as part of NATO and the EU. Georgia? Not so much. A senior Georgian government official spoke with The Cable about that country's concerns about the sale.
"We have experienced ourselves that Russia is capable of using military force against its neighbors," the official said, pointing out that Georgia has less ability to build international support for their opposition to the deal.
A French Embassy spokesman told The Cable that the sale of a Mistral-class ship to Russia is still a project and no decision has been made by either the Russians or the French.
"There is a Russian request and we see no reason to refuse considering that request, which will be examined with all the necessary precautions as part of the military equipment export control regulatory procedures and will take time," the spokesman said.
He pointed out France has used Mistral-class ships for humanitarian missions and to evacuate nationals from dangerous situations.
The French have also have made the argument that selling arms to Russia is needed for peace and stability in Europe. "It would be impossible to call for continental stability in partnership with Russia if we refuse to sell armaments to Russia. A refusal would amount to contradicting our own discourse," French Prime Minister Francois Fillon reportedly said.
And while the French have said they would sell a scaled-down version of the Mistral without some weapons and advanced-control technologies, American defense experts warn that the sale could start a chain reaction of European states selling sensitive military technologies to Russia to shore up their struggling defense industries.
"Given the shrinking defense budgets of European countries and the pressure to keep domestic defense firms from going under by expanding exports, there is little question that less and less restraint would be shown by competing governments and companies on what could be sold to Moscow," wrote Gary Schmitt, defense expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.
Moreover, "there is the signal such a sale would send Moscow about just how unserious the West is in holding Russia's feet to fire over its invasion of Georgia and the terms of the subsequent agreement," he said.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
We haven't heard much recently about Major Nidal Hasan what with all the other "stuff" going on to inclujde the five young Americans being held in Pakistan for their apparent attempts to join the jihad. Once again a small, home grown group who may or may not be terrorists, but they walk like a duck and quack like a duck--just may be a duck. This article is from STRATFOR. Thought you might find it interesting.
George
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
November 11, 2009 | 1841 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. The victims were in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a facility on the base where troops are prepared for deployment and where they take care of certain processing tasks such as completing insurance paperwork and receiving medical examinations and vaccinations.
Even though the targets of Hasan’s attack were soldiers, they represented a very soft target in this environment. Most soldiers on bases inside the United States are normally not armed and are only provided weapons for training. The only personnel who regularly carry weapons are the military police and the base civilian police officers. In addition to being unarmed, the soldiers at the center were closely packed together in the facility as they waited to proceed from station to station. The unarmed, densely packed mass of people allowed Hasan to kill 13 (12 soldiers and one civilian employee of the center) and wound 42 others when he opened fire.
Hasan is a U.S.-born Muslim who, according to STRATFOR sources and media accounts, has had past contact with jihadists, including the radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is a U.S.-born imam who espouses a jihadist ideology and who was discussed at some length in the 9/11 commission report for his links to 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Al-Awlaki, who is currently living in Yemen and reportedly has contacts with al Qaeda, posted a message on his Web site Nov. 9 praising Hasan’s actions. Despite Hasan’s connections to al-Awlaki and other jihadists, it is unknown at this point if he was even aware of al-Wahayshi’s recent message calling for simple attacks, and therefore it is impossible to tell if his attack was in response to it.
However, one thing that is certain is that investigators examining Hasan’s computer hard drive, e-mail traffic and Internet history will be looking into that possibility, along with other indications that Hasan was linked to radicals.
We noted last week that by their very nature, individual actors and small cells are very difficult for the government to detect. They must somehow identify themselves by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to the authorities, attend a militant training camp or conduct correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny. In the Hasan case, it now appears that Hasan did self-identify by making radical statements to people he worked with, who reported him to the authorities. It also appears that he had correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki, whom the government was monitoring. Because of this behavior, Hasan brought himself to the attention of the Department of Defense, the FBI and the CIA.
The fact that Hasan was able to commit this attack after bringing government attention to himself could be due to a number of factors. Chief among them is the fact that it is tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring militant actor and to pre-empt every act of violence. The degree of difficulty is increased greatly if an actor does indeed act alone and does not give any overt clues through his actions or his communications of his intent to attack. Because of this, the Hasan case provides an excellent opportunity to examine national security investigations and their utility and limitations.
The Nature of Intelligence Investigations
The FBI will typically open up an intelligence investigation (usually referred to as a national security investigation) in any case where there is an indication or allegation that a person is involved in terrorist activity but there is no evidence that a specific law has been broken. Many times these investigations are opened up due to a lead passed by the CIA, National Security Agency or a foreign liaison intelligence service. Other times an FBI investigation can come as a spin-off from another FBI counterterrorism investigation already under way or be prompted by a piece of information collected by an FBI informant or even by a tip from a concerned citizen — like the flight instructors who alerted the FBI to the suspicious behavior of some foreign flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks. In such a case, the FBI case agent in charge of the investigation will open a preliminary inquiry, which gives the agent a limited window of time to look into the matter. If no indication of criminal activity is found, the preliminary inquiry must be closed unless the agent receives authorization from the special agent in charge of his division and FBI headquarters to extend it.
If, during the preliminary inquiry, the investigating agents find probable cause that a crime has been committed, the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation into the case, similar to what we saw in the case of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and his followers in Detroit.
One of the large problems in national security investigations is separating the wheat from the chaff. Many leads are based on erroneous information or a misidentification of the suspect — there is a huge issue associated with the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names and the fact that there are many people bearing the same names. Jihadists also have the tendency to use multiple names and identities. And there are many cases in which people will falsely report a person to the FBI out of malice. Because of these factors, national security investigations proceed slowly and usually do not involve much (if any) contact with the suspect and his close associates. If the suspect is a real militant planning a terrorist attack, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is innocent, they do not want to sully his reputation by showing up and overtly interviewing everyone he knows. Due to its controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, the FBI has become acutely aware of its responsibility to protect privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws.
And the rights guaranteed under the Constitution do complicate these national security investigations. It is not illegal for someone to say that Muslims should attack U.S. troops due to their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that more Muslims should conduct attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark. — things that Hasan is reported to have said. Radical statements and convictions are not illegal — although they certainly would appear to be conduct unbecoming a U.S. Army officer. (We will leave to others the discussion of the difficulties in dealing with problem officers who are minorities and doctors and who owe several years of service in return for their education.)
There are also many officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army who own personal weapons and who use them for self-defense, target shooting or hunting. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal about a U.S. Army major owning personal weapons. With no articulable violation of U.S. law, the FBI would have very little to act upon in a case like Hasan’s. Instead, even if they found cause to extend their preliminary inquiry, they would be pretty much limited to monitoring his activities (and perhaps his communications, with a court order) and waiting for a law to be violated. In the Hasan case, it would appear that the FBI did not find probable cause that a law had been violated before he opened fire at Fort Hood. Although perhaps if the FBI had been watching his activities closely and with an eye toward “the how” of terrorist attacks, they might have noticed him conducting preoperational surveillance of the readiness center and even a dry run of the attack.
Of course, in addition to just looking for violations of the law, the other main thrust of a national security investigation is to determine whom the suspect is connected to and whom he is talking to or planning with. In past cases, such investigations have uncovered networks of jihadist actors working together in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere. However, if all Hasan did in his correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki was exercise his First Amendment right to hold radical convictions, and if he did not engage in any type of conspiracy to conduct an attack, he did not break the law.
Another issue that complicates national security cases is that they are almost always classified at the secret level or above. This is understandable, considering they are often opened based upon intelligence produced by sensitive intelligence programs. However, this classification means that only those people with the proper clearance and an established need to know can be briefed on the case. It is not at all unusual for the FBI to visit a high-ranking official at another agency to brief the official on the fact that the FBI is conducting a classified national security investigation involving a person working for the official’s agency. The rub is that they will frequently tell the official that he or she is not at liberty to share details of the investigation with other individuals in the agency because they do not have a clear need to know. The FBI agent will also usually ask the person briefed not to take any action against the target of the investigation, so that the investigation is not compromised. While some people will disagree with the FBI’s determination of who really needs to know about the investigation and go on to brief a wider audience, many officials are cowed by the FBI and sit on the information.
Of course, the size of an organization is also a factor in the dissemination of information. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are large organizations, and it is possible that officials at the Pentagon or the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (still known by its old acronym CID) headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., were briefed on the case and that local officials at Fort Hood were not. The Associated Press is now reporting that the FBI had alerted a Defense Criminal Investigative Service agent assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Washington about Hasan’s contacts with al-Awlaki, and ABC reports that the Defense Department is denying the FBI notified them. It would appear that the finger-pointing and bureaucratic blame-shifting normally associated with such cases has begun.
Even more severe problems would have plagued the dissemination of information from the CIA to local commanders and CID officers at Fort Hood. Despite the intelligence reforms put in place after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government still faces large obstacles when it comes to sharing intelligence information with law enforcement personnel.
Criminal Acts vs. Terrorism
So far, the Hasan shooting investigation is being run by the Army CID, and the FBI has been noticeably — and uncharacteristically — absent from the scene. As the premier law enforcement agency in the United States, the FBI will often assume authority over investigations where there is even a hint of terrorism. Since 9/11, the number of FBI/JTTF offices across the country has been dramatically increased, and the JTTFs are specifically charged with investigating cases that may involve terrorism. Therefore, we find the FBI’s absence in this case to be quite out of the ordinary.
However, with Hasan being a member of the armed forces, the victims being soldiers or army civilian employees and the incident occurring at Fort Hood, the case would seem to fall squarely under the mantle of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From a prosecutorial perspective, a homicide trial under the UCMJ should be very tidy and could be quickly concluded. It will not involve all the potential loose ends that could pop up in a federal terrorism trial, especially when those loose ends involve what the FBI and CIA knew about Hasan, when they learned it and who they told. Also, politically, there are some who would like to see the Hasan case remain a criminal matter rather than a case of terrorism. Following the shooting death of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and considering the delicate relationship between Muslim advocacy groups and the U.S. government, some people would rather see Hasan portrayed as a mentally disturbed criminal than as an ideologically driven lone wolf.
Despite the CID taking the lead in prosecuting the case, the classified national security investigation by the CIA and FBI into Hasan and his possible connections to jihadist elements is undoubtedly continuing. Senior members of the government will certainly demand to know if Hasan had any confederates, if he was part of a bigger plot and if there are more attacks to come. Several congressmen and senators are also calling for hearings into the case, and if such hearings occur, they will certainly produce an abundance of interesting information pertaining to Hasan and the national security investigation of his activities.
George
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
November 11, 2009 | 1841 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. The victims were in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a facility on the base where troops are prepared for deployment and where they take care of certain processing tasks such as completing insurance paperwork and receiving medical examinations and vaccinations.
Even though the targets of Hasan’s attack were soldiers, they represented a very soft target in this environment. Most soldiers on bases inside the United States are normally not armed and are only provided weapons for training. The only personnel who regularly carry weapons are the military police and the base civilian police officers. In addition to being unarmed, the soldiers at the center were closely packed together in the facility as they waited to proceed from station to station. The unarmed, densely packed mass of people allowed Hasan to kill 13 (12 soldiers and one civilian employee of the center) and wound 42 others when he opened fire.
Hasan is a U.S.-born Muslim who, according to STRATFOR sources and media accounts, has had past contact with jihadists, including the radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is a U.S.-born imam who espouses a jihadist ideology and who was discussed at some length in the 9/11 commission report for his links to 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Al-Awlaki, who is currently living in Yemen and reportedly has contacts with al Qaeda, posted a message on his Web site Nov. 9 praising Hasan’s actions. Despite Hasan’s connections to al-Awlaki and other jihadists, it is unknown at this point if he was even aware of al-Wahayshi’s recent message calling for simple attacks, and therefore it is impossible to tell if his attack was in response to it.
However, one thing that is certain is that investigators examining Hasan’s computer hard drive, e-mail traffic and Internet history will be looking into that possibility, along with other indications that Hasan was linked to radicals.
We noted last week that by their very nature, individual actors and small cells are very difficult for the government to detect. They must somehow identify themselves by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to the authorities, attend a militant training camp or conduct correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny. In the Hasan case, it now appears that Hasan did self-identify by making radical statements to people he worked with, who reported him to the authorities. It also appears that he had correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki, whom the government was monitoring. Because of this behavior, Hasan brought himself to the attention of the Department of Defense, the FBI and the CIA.
The fact that Hasan was able to commit this attack after bringing government attention to himself could be due to a number of factors. Chief among them is the fact that it is tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring militant actor and to pre-empt every act of violence. The degree of difficulty is increased greatly if an actor does indeed act alone and does not give any overt clues through his actions or his communications of his intent to attack. Because of this, the Hasan case provides an excellent opportunity to examine national security investigations and their utility and limitations.
The Nature of Intelligence Investigations
The FBI will typically open up an intelligence investigation (usually referred to as a national security investigation) in any case where there is an indication or allegation that a person is involved in terrorist activity but there is no evidence that a specific law has been broken. Many times these investigations are opened up due to a lead passed by the CIA, National Security Agency or a foreign liaison intelligence service. Other times an FBI investigation can come as a spin-off from another FBI counterterrorism investigation already under way or be prompted by a piece of information collected by an FBI informant or even by a tip from a concerned citizen — like the flight instructors who alerted the FBI to the suspicious behavior of some foreign flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks. In such a case, the FBI case agent in charge of the investigation will open a preliminary inquiry, which gives the agent a limited window of time to look into the matter. If no indication of criminal activity is found, the preliminary inquiry must be closed unless the agent receives authorization from the special agent in charge of his division and FBI headquarters to extend it.
If, during the preliminary inquiry, the investigating agents find probable cause that a crime has been committed, the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation into the case, similar to what we saw in the case of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and his followers in Detroit.
One of the large problems in national security investigations is separating the wheat from the chaff. Many leads are based on erroneous information or a misidentification of the suspect — there is a huge issue associated with the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names and the fact that there are many people bearing the same names. Jihadists also have the tendency to use multiple names and identities. And there are many cases in which people will falsely report a person to the FBI out of malice. Because of these factors, national security investigations proceed slowly and usually do not involve much (if any) contact with the suspect and his close associates. If the suspect is a real militant planning a terrorist attack, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is innocent, they do not want to sully his reputation by showing up and overtly interviewing everyone he knows. Due to its controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, the FBI has become acutely aware of its responsibility to protect privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws.
And the rights guaranteed under the Constitution do complicate these national security investigations. It is not illegal for someone to say that Muslims should attack U.S. troops due to their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that more Muslims should conduct attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark. — things that Hasan is reported to have said. Radical statements and convictions are not illegal — although they certainly would appear to be conduct unbecoming a U.S. Army officer. (We will leave to others the discussion of the difficulties in dealing with problem officers who are minorities and doctors and who owe several years of service in return for their education.)
There are also many officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army who own personal weapons and who use them for self-defense, target shooting or hunting. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal about a U.S. Army major owning personal weapons. With no articulable violation of U.S. law, the FBI would have very little to act upon in a case like Hasan’s. Instead, even if they found cause to extend their preliminary inquiry, they would be pretty much limited to monitoring his activities (and perhaps his communications, with a court order) and waiting for a law to be violated. In the Hasan case, it would appear that the FBI did not find probable cause that a law had been violated before he opened fire at Fort Hood. Although perhaps if the FBI had been watching his activities closely and with an eye toward “the how” of terrorist attacks, they might have noticed him conducting preoperational surveillance of the readiness center and even a dry run of the attack.
Of course, in addition to just looking for violations of the law, the other main thrust of a national security investigation is to determine whom the suspect is connected to and whom he is talking to or planning with. In past cases, such investigations have uncovered networks of jihadist actors working together in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere. However, if all Hasan did in his correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki was exercise his First Amendment right to hold radical convictions, and if he did not engage in any type of conspiracy to conduct an attack, he did not break the law.
Another issue that complicates national security cases is that they are almost always classified at the secret level or above. This is understandable, considering they are often opened based upon intelligence produced by sensitive intelligence programs. However, this classification means that only those people with the proper clearance and an established need to know can be briefed on the case. It is not at all unusual for the FBI to visit a high-ranking official at another agency to brief the official on the fact that the FBI is conducting a classified national security investigation involving a person working for the official’s agency. The rub is that they will frequently tell the official that he or she is not at liberty to share details of the investigation with other individuals in the agency because they do not have a clear need to know. The FBI agent will also usually ask the person briefed not to take any action against the target of the investigation, so that the investigation is not compromised. While some people will disagree with the FBI’s determination of who really needs to know about the investigation and go on to brief a wider audience, many officials are cowed by the FBI and sit on the information.
Of course, the size of an organization is also a factor in the dissemination of information. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are large organizations, and it is possible that officials at the Pentagon or the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (still known by its old acronym CID) headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., were briefed on the case and that local officials at Fort Hood were not. The Associated Press is now reporting that the FBI had alerted a Defense Criminal Investigative Service agent assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Washington about Hasan’s contacts with al-Awlaki, and ABC reports that the Defense Department is denying the FBI notified them. It would appear that the finger-pointing and bureaucratic blame-shifting normally associated with such cases has begun.
Even more severe problems would have plagued the dissemination of information from the CIA to local commanders and CID officers at Fort Hood. Despite the intelligence reforms put in place after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government still faces large obstacles when it comes to sharing intelligence information with law enforcement personnel.
Criminal Acts vs. Terrorism
So far, the Hasan shooting investigation is being run by the Army CID, and the FBI has been noticeably — and uncharacteristically — absent from the scene. As the premier law enforcement agency in the United States, the FBI will often assume authority over investigations where there is even a hint of terrorism. Since 9/11, the number of FBI/JTTF offices across the country has been dramatically increased, and the JTTFs are specifically charged with investigating cases that may involve terrorism. Therefore, we find the FBI’s absence in this case to be quite out of the ordinary.
However, with Hasan being a member of the armed forces, the victims being soldiers or army civilian employees and the incident occurring at Fort Hood, the case would seem to fall squarely under the mantle of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From a prosecutorial perspective, a homicide trial under the UCMJ should be very tidy and could be quickly concluded. It will not involve all the potential loose ends that could pop up in a federal terrorism trial, especially when those loose ends involve what the FBI and CIA knew about Hasan, when they learned it and who they told. Also, politically, there are some who would like to see the Hasan case remain a criminal matter rather than a case of terrorism. Following the shooting death of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and considering the delicate relationship between Muslim advocacy groups and the U.S. government, some people would rather see Hasan portrayed as a mentally disturbed criminal than as an ideologically driven lone wolf.
Despite the CID taking the lead in prosecuting the case, the classified national security investigation by the CIA and FBI into Hasan and his possible connections to jihadist elements is undoubtedly continuing. Senior members of the government will certainly demand to know if Hasan had any confederates, if he was part of a bigger plot and if there are more attacks to come. Several congressmen and senators are also calling for hearings into the case, and if such hearings occur, they will certainly produce an abundance of interesting information pertaining to Hasan and the national security investigation of his activities.
Friday, December 11, 2009
The Real Threat to Healthcare
I recently received this e-mail from MOAA and thought I would pass it along. If you are eligible to join MOAA and haven't, please consider it since they do so much for us. If you haven't written to your senators and representative, I hope you will. As veterans, you are entitled to care--this just isn't about career military personnel.
George
Dear Captain Harris,
Previously, I told you that, while we respect members’ strong opinions on both sides of the national health care reform argument, MOAA would refrain from taking a position on the social and political aspects and devote our limited resources to safeguarding military/VA beneficiaries’ health care benefits, protecting against taxation of those benefits, improving access to providers, and ensuring long-term sustainment of Medicare and TRICARE For Life (TFL).
MOAA members have generated more than 130,000 messages to Congress in support of these goals, and legislators of both parties have responded by including provisions aimed at holding military and VA beneficiaries harmless.
That said, there’s never any guarantee that Congress won’t change something about Medicare, TRICARE, TFL, or VA coverage, and we fully expect such changes could come in the future.
In that context, it’s important not to miss the forest for the trees.
It’s the next round of “adjustments” that poses the greatest concern – the ones that will be required to address the problem of the millions of baby boomers about to become eligible for Medicare, which the current legislation doesn’t address at all.
Most Medicare cuts in the pending legislation are the relatively less painful ones – $118 billion from eliminating the extra subsidy to the Medicare Advantage HMO program (which was sold to Congress as a cost-saver, but actually costs 14% more per person than Standard Medicare; DoD is cutting back on its TRICARE Prime HMO system for the same reason), cutting about $150 billion from non-rural hospitals (which the hospital associations say they can handle because expanding insurance coverage to most Americans will mean they won’t have to eat the cost of serving the uninsured), and cutting back abuses in medical equipment (under current systems, Medicare will buy you a wheelchair you might only need a few months, or allow a company to rent you one for life for a permanent condition).
These are things most of us would probably push to consider if it were our own money paying for them (which it actually is).
The real issue under national health care reform is that the money from these Medicare savings will be used to fund expansion of health insurance coverage to those who don’t have it now. It’s hard to argue that reducing the number of uninsureds would be a bad thing. But using the relatively “easy” Medicare savings initiatives to fund that means that when the baby boomers start swamping Medicare and Social Security in the next few years, Congress will be forced to look at more painful ways to fund that need.
Some in government already are pushing for a new entitlements commission to recommend ways to rein in entitlement spending. The last such commission, in 1994-95, considered a swath of changes – not just for Social Security and Medicare, but also for military and federal civilian health care, retired pay, VA disability compensation, and more.
It took years of tough battles, but we dodged most of those bullets, though we had to suffer COLA delays for several years until we won them back. We expect those reviews and threats to be renewed again – with even more force – within the next few years.
MOAA is already preparing for a major battle on those topics, to make sure our government leaders in both the Executive and Legislative Branches understand the important distinction between social insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security and earned compensation for a career of arduous military service and sacrifice.
One hundred thirty thousand messages will not be enough to win that battle. It will take millions, and that starts with one person – you. If you know someone who is not an MOAA member, please make it clear to them that MOAA is the lead organization looking out for them (there’s a reason MOAA has been named the top military or veterans lobbying association for three years in a row by The Hill). Tell them that we need all hands on deck – and we need to count them in our membership ranks now.
Having a strong, active membership equates to clout, and clout is what we will need to protect our health care entitlement. So, if you know someone who is not yet an MOAA member, forward them this e-mail and have them call our Member Service Center at (866) 739-7106 and mention this message to receive a special introductory one-year membership price of only $15.
Thank you for your continuing support.
All the best,
VADM Norb Ryan Jr., USN (Ret)
President
George
Dear Captain Harris,
Previously, I told you that, while we respect members’ strong opinions on both sides of the national health care reform argument, MOAA would refrain from taking a position on the social and political aspects and devote our limited resources to safeguarding military/VA beneficiaries’ health care benefits, protecting against taxation of those benefits, improving access to providers, and ensuring long-term sustainment of Medicare and TRICARE For Life (TFL).
MOAA members have generated more than 130,000 messages to Congress in support of these goals, and legislators of both parties have responded by including provisions aimed at holding military and VA beneficiaries harmless.
That said, there’s never any guarantee that Congress won’t change something about Medicare, TRICARE, TFL, or VA coverage, and we fully expect such changes could come in the future.
In that context, it’s important not to miss the forest for the trees.
It’s the next round of “adjustments” that poses the greatest concern – the ones that will be required to address the problem of the millions of baby boomers about to become eligible for Medicare, which the current legislation doesn’t address at all.
Most Medicare cuts in the pending legislation are the relatively less painful ones – $118 billion from eliminating the extra subsidy to the Medicare Advantage HMO program (which was sold to Congress as a cost-saver, but actually costs 14% more per person than Standard Medicare; DoD is cutting back on its TRICARE Prime HMO system for the same reason), cutting about $150 billion from non-rural hospitals (which the hospital associations say they can handle because expanding insurance coverage to most Americans will mean they won’t have to eat the cost of serving the uninsured), and cutting back abuses in medical equipment (under current systems, Medicare will buy you a wheelchair you might only need a few months, or allow a company to rent you one for life for a permanent condition).
These are things most of us would probably push to consider if it were our own money paying for them (which it actually is).
The real issue under national health care reform is that the money from these Medicare savings will be used to fund expansion of health insurance coverage to those who don’t have it now. It’s hard to argue that reducing the number of uninsureds would be a bad thing. But using the relatively “easy” Medicare savings initiatives to fund that means that when the baby boomers start swamping Medicare and Social Security in the next few years, Congress will be forced to look at more painful ways to fund that need.
Some in government already are pushing for a new entitlements commission to recommend ways to rein in entitlement spending. The last such commission, in 1994-95, considered a swath of changes – not just for Social Security and Medicare, but also for military and federal civilian health care, retired pay, VA disability compensation, and more.
It took years of tough battles, but we dodged most of those bullets, though we had to suffer COLA delays for several years until we won them back. We expect those reviews and threats to be renewed again – with even more force – within the next few years.
MOAA is already preparing for a major battle on those topics, to make sure our government leaders in both the Executive and Legislative Branches understand the important distinction between social insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security and earned compensation for a career of arduous military service and sacrifice.
One hundred thirty thousand messages will not be enough to win that battle. It will take millions, and that starts with one person – you. If you know someone who is not an MOAA member, please make it clear to them that MOAA is the lead organization looking out for them (there’s a reason MOAA has been named the top military or veterans lobbying association for three years in a row by The Hill). Tell them that we need all hands on deck – and we need to count them in our membership ranks now.
Having a strong, active membership equates to clout, and clout is what we will need to protect our health care entitlement. So, if you know someone who is not yet an MOAA member, forward them this e-mail and have them call our Member Service Center at (866) 739-7106 and mention this message to receive a special introductory one-year membership price of only $15.
Thank you for your continuing support.
All the best,
VADM Norb Ryan Jr., USN (Ret)
President
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
The Power of Ten
A few days ago I was watching the evening news when they ran a story about a group calling themselves “Secret Santas. It is not they are so “secret”, but they do go around giving gifts of at least one hundred dollars to people they feel are in need of a helping hand from a Secret Santa. They look for recipients in thrift shops, Salvation Army stores, senior centers, etc. and they are presented an unconditional gift. In one instance last night, an elderly woman who could not always afford to buy heating oil was given $400.
As I watched, I thought this was a wonderful idea, but why limit it to the holiday season? What if people would take a small amount of money and multiply it by ten and present that money to some deserving soul? What if they did this every month of the year?
The idea of The Power of Ten has been playing around in my head. What if you and nine of your friends got together and each of you gave $10. Well, you would have $100—The Power of Ten. If you did this once a month, your group could give away $1,000 in ten months—The Power of Ten. Now think about this, if each member of your group formed another group of ten, now these ten groups can provide $1,000 a month—The Power of Ten. Now a hundred dollars doesn’t seem like a lot of money, but if you don’t have enough to provide for life’s simple necessities, a hundred dollars is a fortune.
And so there is the possibility of exponential giving for a very small investment on your part. Maybe I am being a silly, but I would be interested in your feedback. If enough people agree, I would like to flesh out this idea, form a group of ten and start.
My e-mail: sailorguy@comcast.net
As I watched, I thought this was a wonderful idea, but why limit it to the holiday season? What if people would take a small amount of money and multiply it by ten and present that money to some deserving soul? What if they did this every month of the year?
The idea of The Power of Ten has been playing around in my head. What if you and nine of your friends got together and each of you gave $10. Well, you would have $100—The Power of Ten. If you did this once a month, your group could give away $1,000 in ten months—The Power of Ten. Now think about this, if each member of your group formed another group of ten, now these ten groups can provide $1,000 a month—The Power of Ten. Now a hundred dollars doesn’t seem like a lot of money, but if you don’t have enough to provide for life’s simple necessities, a hundred dollars is a fortune.
And so there is the possibility of exponential giving for a very small investment on your part. Maybe I am being a silly, but I would be interested in your feedback. If enough people agree, I would like to flesh out this idea, form a group of ten and start.
My e-mail: sailorguy@comcast.net
Monday, December 7, 2009
The High Cost of War
The following article is from McClatchy News. It has been said that the late Senator Everett Dirksen once said, "A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you are talking about real money."
Well that seems to be the case here. After President Obama spoke at West Point, the media preported that this "surge" would cost $30 billion the first year. I guess by Senator Dirksen's standard, we are talking about real money. On a national scale, $30 billion is not a lot of money, but when you are in a situation where the nation is $12 TRILLION in debt, it is significant. The old Will Rogers adage that, "If you find yourself in a hole, the first thing to do is stop digging. " applies here. We have spent nearly $90 billion in Afghanistan and Iraq and have practically nothing to show for it--a corrupt government in Afghanistan that has little or not credibility with the Afghan people and a smoldering political /religious mess in Iraq that will more than likely explode once we are gone.
While I don't know what the answers are, I am pretty sure it is time to put the shovel down.
Posted on Sunday, December 6, 2009
By David Lightman McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama insisted last week that as the nation confronts record government debt and pressing economic needs at home, it cannot afford a lengthy, ambitious nation-building effort in Afghanistan — but limiting U. S. involvement is unlikely to make much of a dent in the record federal debt.
Liberals complain that the war has been a big contributor to the nation's budget problems, and are insisting that some way be found to pay for the buildup.
But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, though they've virtually all been funded by deficit spending, are not the main reason why the publicly held national debt has more than doubled — from $3.339 trillion to $7.709 trillion — since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
"It's a small part of the deficit," said Todd Harrison, fellow in defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington research group.
That's not to say the war costs don't matter.
"Over the short term, we are certainly spending a large chunk of money of the wars, money that could be devoted to other priorities or for deficit reduction, at least once the economy improves," noted Josh Gordon, policy director at the Concord Coalition, a bipartisan research group devoted to fiscal discipline.
But over the long term, he stressed, "Our fiscal challenges are substantially larger, and just ending the wars would not change those projections — because they all assume peacetime budgets."
Obama last week said that he'd deploy an additional 30,000 to 35,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. This year's expected $30 billion to $40 billion price tag for that should boost the total cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan past $1 trillion over the last nine years, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
That spending accounts for only about one-fifth of publicly held debt accumulated in that time.
National defense spending accounted for 20.7 percent of the federal budget last year. While that's higher than peacetime lows of around 16 percent in the late 1990s, it's less than the 26-28 percent annual shares between 1975, when U.S. involvement in Vietnam ended, and 1992, when first the Cold War and then the 1991 Gulf War ended.
What's driven the bulk of this decade's deficit boom has been spending growth in programs such as Medicare and Social Security. Human resources, which include those and other domestic programs, consumed 63.8 percent of the budget last year, compared to only 49 percent as recently as 1990.
The antidote to high deficits, say independent experts, is making tough choices on domestic spending and taxes.
"The purpose of a budget is to set priorities and make tradeoffs," said Susan Tanaka, director of citizen education and engagement at the Peterson Foundation, a New York-based fiscal watchdog group.
Since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks, CBO estimates that the U.S. has spent $943.8 billion through Sept. 30, 2009, to meet war and war-related needs, and could spend another $1.6 trillion over the next decade — no small sum, indeed.
About $891 billion has been spent on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraq share, 85 percent of 2007 spending, accounted for an estimated 74 percent last year.
Most of the rest has been allocated for diplomatic operations and foreign aid to Iraq, Afghanistan and other allies in the war on terror. About $16 billion has gone to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
Other estimates put the cost higher; a 2008 study by Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard University professor Linda Bilmes dubbed the conflicts the "$3 trillion war."
That figure appears consistent with current spending levels, since it assumes that the U.S. will continue to spend on the war and related activities through 2019, a mission CBO estimates could cost $1.6 trillion.
Also adding to the cost is interest on war-related debt; that's totaled at least $100 billion. Interest on future debt and other indirect costs are difficult to calculate, such as the cost of replacing equipment and providing benefits and health care to military veterans and families.
Direct war costs dropped in 2009, to about $154 billion, after reaching $187 billion in 2008. The administration had sought $130 billion in fiscal 2010; the defense spending legislation is still pending in Congress; that figure is now likely to grow by at least $30 billion.
A small band of congressional liberals insists that too much is being spent on the war, and that it's driving up the national debt.
War spending "has contributed to our economic crisis, exploded the lid off our national debt, and diverted funds from desperately needed domestic priorities," said Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-Calif.
"We believe that if this war is to be fought, it's only fair that everyone share the burden," said House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey, D-Wis., who had pushed for a war surtax.
The surtax effort was seen as more a political than a fiscal initiative.
"Look at who's pushing this. It's people opposed to the war," said Roberton Williams, budget analyst at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., sensing scant support for the surtax, effectively killed the idea on Thursday.
The war cost will help boost a federal deficit that CBO estimates will reach $1.4 trillion this year, roughly the same as last year, and add to a total national debt that now tops $12 trillion when including debt held in government accounts. But Obama's extra $30 billion is only a drop in the $1 trillion, $400 billion deficit bucket.
CBO sees huge deficits ahead. Its latest projections show that even with stricter fiscal policies and a reviving economy, federal deficits are expected to total $7.1 trillion over the next decade, still reaching $722 billion in fiscal 2019 alone.
Those projections assume a continuation of current war policies. Should troop levels decline "significantly" over a three year period, as Obama hopes, the cost would drop to about $1.1 trillion over 10 years, or roughly $140 billion a year, which would still leave large deficits.
Democratic leaders lament that until the economy stabilizes, it could be hard to significantly dent those deficits.
"I am for paying for things that we do," said House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-Md. But, he said, trying to offset spending "is complicated by the economic crisis."
Well that seems to be the case here. After President Obama spoke at West Point, the media preported that this "surge" would cost $30 billion the first year. I guess by Senator Dirksen's standard, we are talking about real money. On a national scale, $30 billion is not a lot of money, but when you are in a situation where the nation is $12 TRILLION in debt, it is significant. The old Will Rogers adage that, "If you find yourself in a hole, the first thing to do is stop digging. " applies here. We have spent nearly $90 billion in Afghanistan and Iraq and have practically nothing to show for it--a corrupt government in Afghanistan that has little or not credibility with the Afghan people and a smoldering political /religious mess in Iraq that will more than likely explode once we are gone.
While I don't know what the answers are, I am pretty sure it is time to put the shovel down.
Posted on Sunday, December 6, 2009
By David Lightman McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama insisted last week that as the nation confronts record government debt and pressing economic needs at home, it cannot afford a lengthy, ambitious nation-building effort in Afghanistan — but limiting U. S. involvement is unlikely to make much of a dent in the record federal debt.
Liberals complain that the war has been a big contributor to the nation's budget problems, and are insisting that some way be found to pay for the buildup.
But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, though they've virtually all been funded by deficit spending, are not the main reason why the publicly held national debt has more than doubled — from $3.339 trillion to $7.709 trillion — since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
"It's a small part of the deficit," said Todd Harrison, fellow in defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington research group.
That's not to say the war costs don't matter.
"Over the short term, we are certainly spending a large chunk of money of the wars, money that could be devoted to other priorities or for deficit reduction, at least once the economy improves," noted Josh Gordon, policy director at the Concord Coalition, a bipartisan research group devoted to fiscal discipline.
But over the long term, he stressed, "Our fiscal challenges are substantially larger, and just ending the wars would not change those projections — because they all assume peacetime budgets."
Obama last week said that he'd deploy an additional 30,000 to 35,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. This year's expected $30 billion to $40 billion price tag for that should boost the total cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan past $1 trillion over the last nine years, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
That spending accounts for only about one-fifth of publicly held debt accumulated in that time.
National defense spending accounted for 20.7 percent of the federal budget last year. While that's higher than peacetime lows of around 16 percent in the late 1990s, it's less than the 26-28 percent annual shares between 1975, when U.S. involvement in Vietnam ended, and 1992, when first the Cold War and then the 1991 Gulf War ended.
What's driven the bulk of this decade's deficit boom has been spending growth in programs such as Medicare and Social Security. Human resources, which include those and other domestic programs, consumed 63.8 percent of the budget last year, compared to only 49 percent as recently as 1990.
The antidote to high deficits, say independent experts, is making tough choices on domestic spending and taxes.
"The purpose of a budget is to set priorities and make tradeoffs," said Susan Tanaka, director of citizen education and engagement at the Peterson Foundation, a New York-based fiscal watchdog group.
Since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks, CBO estimates that the U.S. has spent $943.8 billion through Sept. 30, 2009, to meet war and war-related needs, and could spend another $1.6 trillion over the next decade — no small sum, indeed.
About $891 billion has been spent on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraq share, 85 percent of 2007 spending, accounted for an estimated 74 percent last year.
Most of the rest has been allocated for diplomatic operations and foreign aid to Iraq, Afghanistan and other allies in the war on terror. About $16 billion has gone to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
Other estimates put the cost higher; a 2008 study by Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard University professor Linda Bilmes dubbed the conflicts the "$3 trillion war."
That figure appears consistent with current spending levels, since it assumes that the U.S. will continue to spend on the war and related activities through 2019, a mission CBO estimates could cost $1.6 trillion.
Also adding to the cost is interest on war-related debt; that's totaled at least $100 billion. Interest on future debt and other indirect costs are difficult to calculate, such as the cost of replacing equipment and providing benefits and health care to military veterans and families.
Direct war costs dropped in 2009, to about $154 billion, after reaching $187 billion in 2008. The administration had sought $130 billion in fiscal 2010; the defense spending legislation is still pending in Congress; that figure is now likely to grow by at least $30 billion.
A small band of congressional liberals insists that too much is being spent on the war, and that it's driving up the national debt.
War spending "has contributed to our economic crisis, exploded the lid off our national debt, and diverted funds from desperately needed domestic priorities," said Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-Calif.
"We believe that if this war is to be fought, it's only fair that everyone share the burden," said House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey, D-Wis., who had pushed for a war surtax.
The surtax effort was seen as more a political than a fiscal initiative.
"Look at who's pushing this. It's people opposed to the war," said Roberton Williams, budget analyst at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., sensing scant support for the surtax, effectively killed the idea on Thursday.
The war cost will help boost a federal deficit that CBO estimates will reach $1.4 trillion this year, roughly the same as last year, and add to a total national debt that now tops $12 trillion when including debt held in government accounts. But Obama's extra $30 billion is only a drop in the $1 trillion, $400 billion deficit bucket.
CBO sees huge deficits ahead. Its latest projections show that even with stricter fiscal policies and a reviving economy, federal deficits are expected to total $7.1 trillion over the next decade, still reaching $722 billion in fiscal 2019 alone.
Those projections assume a continuation of current war policies. Should troop levels decline "significantly" over a three year period, as Obama hopes, the cost would drop to about $1.1 trillion over 10 years, or roughly $140 billion a year, which would still leave large deficits.
Democratic leaders lament that until the economy stabilizes, it could be hard to significantly dent those deficits.
"I am for paying for things that we do," said House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-Md. But, he said, trying to offset spending "is complicated by the economic crisis."
Sunday, December 6, 2009
How President Obama Reached His Decision
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html?_r=1&th&emc=th
This is a long read but very well worth it. I was skeptical about the President's decision but I am beginning to come around to seeing that he does not intend this to be another Vietnam. I still have some doubts since we have been there eight years and have not been able to bring this war to a successful close. Our Nation has many serious financial burdens and these wars are adding to that burden. At $30 billion dollars a year, this money could solve many of our problems and make funding health care much easier. Although I say this, it seems odd that money spent on wars does not always translate to money available for other things when the wars end. At some point,the American public is going to rebel. It may happen at next year's mid-term election or it may come at the next presidential election. Only time will tell if this new war effort was the right choice...
This is a long read but very well worth it. I was skeptical about the President's decision but I am beginning to come around to seeing that he does not intend this to be another Vietnam. I still have some doubts since we have been there eight years and have not been able to bring this war to a successful close. Our Nation has many serious financial burdens and these wars are adding to that burden. At $30 billion dollars a year, this money could solve many of our problems and make funding health care much easier. Although I say this, it seems odd that money spent on wars does not always translate to money available for other things when the wars end. At some point,the American public is going to rebel. It may happen at next year's mid-term election or it may come at the next presidential election. Only time will tell if this new war effort was the right choice...
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Climbing suicide rates--what is happening?
One of the readers of this blog sent me a note a few days ago posing the following questions,
Do the military medical services still lack the capacity to adequately treat mental problems? As a PTSD sufferer myself I can certainly attest to this paucity of care in the past, but I had believed improvements had been made. Was I wrong?
Is he wrong? Sadly, I must say he is. There are many sides to this tale…
The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter Chiarelli told the Associated Press that the Army believes there have been 140 active duty soldiers who have taken their own life. He says that is the same as all of 2008, but the 2009 is not over yet.
The other important point here is that this is the fifth year in a row that the number of suicides has exceeded the previous year. There were 102 suicides in 2006, 115 in 2007 and 140 in 2008. And keep in mind these are deaths of active duty soldiers. While the numbers are somewhat “foggy”, the Centers for Disease Control say that there may be as many as 18 veterans a day who take their own lives—that’s 6,500 a year. What makes this number “foggy” is that it includes veterans from all wars. The Department of Veterans Affairs says that 144 veterans out of 500,000 who served between 2002 and 2005 have taken their lives.
Marines have not fared any better and, as a matter of fact, their numbers may be worse. As of September of this year, 38 Marines have taken their lives and if the continue doing so at this rate, the Marine Corps is facing a 20% increase in suicides. One Marine report noted that less than 42% of those killing themselves since 2001 had any history of a deployment to one of the war zones. But in the last two year, some 70% of the 80 Marines who have committed suicide had a history of a deployment. The rate of suicides in the Army was 61% in 2008.
While the Marines say they can’t pinpoint the cause for the increase in suicides, I strongly believe that the pressure of increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO are wreaking havoc on morale of our service personnel. Commander Aaron Werbel, the suicide prevention program manager for the Marine Corps says he believes increased operational tempo is a contributing factor. Commander Werbel is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer with a PhD in clinical psychology.
The Navy and Air Force suicides rates have been a little better, but even those rates, around 11 per 100,000, have resulted in the loss 38 airmen and 41 sailors in 2008.
There are two interesting documents found at these links.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_suicide_032309w/
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2009/03/t20090318a.html
The first is an article from a March 2009 edition of the Air Force Times. The second is the prepared testimony of Kathryn A. Power, Director of the Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services of the Department of Health and Human Services before the United States SenateCommittee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel. Her testimony concerns what the Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs and DHHS are doing to help reduce the numbers of suicides among active duty personnel and veterans.
While I cannot say all is well to the reader who asked me about the state of mental health care, I can say that the Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services are making many efforts. Of course, finding a way to honorably get out of Iraq and Afghanistan would perhaps go a long ways toward solving some of the problems.
Do the military medical services still lack the capacity to adequately treat mental problems? As a PTSD sufferer myself I can certainly attest to this paucity of care in the past, but I had believed improvements had been made. Was I wrong?
Is he wrong? Sadly, I must say he is. There are many sides to this tale…
The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter Chiarelli told the Associated Press that the Army believes there have been 140 active duty soldiers who have taken their own life. He says that is the same as all of 2008, but the 2009 is not over yet.
The other important point here is that this is the fifth year in a row that the number of suicides has exceeded the previous year. There were 102 suicides in 2006, 115 in 2007 and 140 in 2008. And keep in mind these are deaths of active duty soldiers. While the numbers are somewhat “foggy”, the Centers for Disease Control say that there may be as many as 18 veterans a day who take their own lives—that’s 6,500 a year. What makes this number “foggy” is that it includes veterans from all wars. The Department of Veterans Affairs says that 144 veterans out of 500,000 who served between 2002 and 2005 have taken their lives.
Marines have not fared any better and, as a matter of fact, their numbers may be worse. As of September of this year, 38 Marines have taken their lives and if the continue doing so at this rate, the Marine Corps is facing a 20% increase in suicides. One Marine report noted that less than 42% of those killing themselves since 2001 had any history of a deployment to one of the war zones. But in the last two year, some 70% of the 80 Marines who have committed suicide had a history of a deployment. The rate of suicides in the Army was 61% in 2008.
While the Marines say they can’t pinpoint the cause for the increase in suicides, I strongly believe that the pressure of increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO are wreaking havoc on morale of our service personnel. Commander Aaron Werbel, the suicide prevention program manager for the Marine Corps says he believes increased operational tempo is a contributing factor. Commander Werbel is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer with a PhD in clinical psychology.
The Navy and Air Force suicides rates have been a little better, but even those rates, around 11 per 100,000, have resulted in the loss 38 airmen and 41 sailors in 2008.
There are two interesting documents found at these links.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_suicide_032309w/
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2009/03/t20090318a.html
The first is an article from a March 2009 edition of the Air Force Times. The second is the prepared testimony of Kathryn A. Power, Director of the Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services of the Department of Health and Human Services before the United States SenateCommittee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel. Her testimony concerns what the Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs and DHHS are doing to help reduce the numbers of suicides among active duty personnel and veterans.
While I cannot say all is well to the reader who asked me about the state of mental health care, I can say that the Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services are making many efforts. Of course, finding a way to honorably get out of Iraq and Afghanistan would perhaps go a long ways toward solving some of the problems.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Hasan's Supervisor Warned Army In 2007
This article cited below is by Daniel Zwerdling of National Public Radio.
It really is necessary to read the memo at the link. In particular, read paragraph 4 very carefully. It is this paragaph that lets Major Hasan off the hook as well as the author Major Scott Moran. It equivocates, back peddles, is wishy washy, waffling or whatever name you wish to assign to someone who is protecting his 6 o'clock and is obviously concerned about possible litigation--one of the biggest crimes I believe we face in our society. It keeps us from being candid just when we need to be. It would be most interesting to see what was said in Major Hasan's Officer Evaluation Reports during his residency program. If they were as damning as some parts of Major Scott's memorandum, I have ask, "How did he get promoted to major?"
Army Regulation 623-105 Officer Evaluation Reporting System, provides detailed instructions for evaluating the performance and potential for promotion of all Army officers. There is even a special appendix regarding the evaluation of medical officers. [I have tried repeatedly to download the current version of this regulation but have not been able to do so.] The bottom line here is that equivocation on the part of Hasan's supervisors has resulted in an act of terrorism that is absolutely unforgivable. Unless Major Scott's concerns showed up in Hasan's OERs, the Army was not warned--a local academic review board was warned and that simply is NOT the answer. The reason I say this is the simple fact that Captain Hasan became MAJOR Hasan. And as many readers know, even if degorgatory comments were made, it is not unusual for senior reviewers to gloss over these comments or direct that they be rewritten.
Promoting and transferring Hasan were major leadership failures. I have said it before and I will say it again, physicians don't like to "rat out" other physicians. It is much like the Blue Wall of Silence found among police officers--fellow police officer don't "rat out" fellow police officers and physicians don't "rat out" other physicians. Does anyone remember Commander Donal (not misspelled) Billig?
There is plenty of room for blame here and I, for one, hope that is spread around on those responsible that they are appropriately disciplined. But I'm not making any bets on it--our leaders have become candy asses--always concerned about litigation and their public persona. Where are the George Pattons, Chesty Pullers, and Bull Halseys when we need them? Gone to grave yards everyone.
Read a transcript of the May 2007 memo obtained by NPR in which Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlines his concerns about Hasan:
http://www.npr.org/documents/2009/nov/hasanletter.pdf
November 18, 2009
In May of 2007 Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlined his concerns about Hasan in a memo.
Two years ago, a top psychiatrist at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was so concerned about what he saw as Nidal Hasan's incompetence and reckless behavior that he put those concerns in writing. NPR has obtained a copy of the memo, the first evaluation that has surfaced from Hasan's file.
Officials at Walter Reed sent that memo to Fort Hood this year when Hasan was transferred there.
Nevertheless, commanders still assigned Hasan — accused of killing 13 people in a mass shooting at Fort Hood on Nov. 5 — to work with some of the Army's most troubled and vulnerable soldiers.
The Damning Memo
On May 17, 2007, Hasan's supervisor at Walter Reed sent the memo to the Walter Reed credentials committee. It reads, "Memorandum for: Credentials Committee. Subject: CPT Nidal Hasan." More than a page long, the document warns that: "The Faculty has serious concerns about CPT Hasan's professionalism and work ethic. ... He demonstrates a pattern of poor judgment and a lack of professionalism." It is signed by the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, Maj. Scott Moran.
When shown the memo, two leading psychiatrists said it was so damning, it might have sunk Hasan's career if he had applied for a job outside the Army.
"Even if we were desperate for a psychiatrist, we would not even get him to the point where we would invite him for an interview," says Dr. Steven Sharfstein, who runs Sheppard Pratt's psychiatric medical center, based just outside Baltimore.
Sharfstein says it's a little hard to read the evaluation now and pretend that he doesn't know that Hasan is accused of shooting dozens of people. But he says if he had seen a memo like this about an applicant, Sharfstein would have avoided him like the plague.
The memo ticks off numerous problems over the course of Hasan's training, including proselytizing to his patients. It says he mistreated a homicidal patient and allowed her to escape from the emergency room, and that he blew off an important exam.
According to the memo, Hasan hardly did any work: He saw only 30 patients in 38 weeks. Sources at Walter Reed say most psychiatrists see at least 10 times that many patients. When Hasan was supposed to be on call for emergencies, he didn't even answer the phone.
Enlarge U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
Warning Signs
Sharfstein says the memo doesn't suggest that Hasan would end up shooting people, but it warns that Hasan was "somebody who could potentially put patients in danger."
"There are all kinds of warning signs, flashing red lights, that, in terms of just this paragraph, you'd say, 'Oh, no, this is not somebody that we would take a chance on.' "
Sharfstein says that in the 25 years he has been supervising and hiring psychiatrists, he has seen only a half-dozen evaluations this bad.
The memo does have a couple of qualifications that say something positive about Hasan. It says, "He is able to self-correct with supervision." And Moran writes, "I am not able to say he is not competent to graduate." [My emphasis]
Officials at Walter Reed told NPR that those statements were very carefully worded. What they convey is that when Hasan's supervisors read him the riot act — when they gave him intensive supervision — he would improve just enough so that they had to tell their commanders: "Hasan is capable of doing better."
But officials say nobody has the time to supervise a doctor that closely.
Alerting Fort Hood
"I would never, ever hire a physician with this kind of a record," says Judith Broder, who runs the Soldiers Project, an award-winning private therapy program for troops in Southern California.
Broder says that soldiers seeking therapy may be falling apart, filled with rage and a distrust of authority. What those soldiers need, she says, is a psychiatrist they can trust completely — not a therapist who fails to show up and abandons his patients.
"This kind of behavior could, in fact, set off a stress reaction" in a patient, she says. "It could be a trigger to a post-traumatic stress reaction."
Moran and Pentagon spokesmen declined NPR's requests for interviews for this story. Officials at Fort Hood would not comment, either.
But sources say that when the Army sent Hasan to Fort Hood earlier this year, Walter Reed sent the damning evaluation there, too. So commanders at Fort Hood would know exactly what they were getting.
It really is necessary to read the memo at the link. In particular, read paragraph 4 very carefully. It is this paragaph that lets Major Hasan off the hook as well as the author Major Scott Moran. It equivocates, back peddles, is wishy washy, waffling or whatever name you wish to assign to someone who is protecting his 6 o'clock and is obviously concerned about possible litigation--one of the biggest crimes I believe we face in our society. It keeps us from being candid just when we need to be. It would be most interesting to see what was said in Major Hasan's Officer Evaluation Reports during his residency program. If they were as damning as some parts of Major Scott's memorandum, I have ask, "How did he get promoted to major?"
Army Regulation 623-105 Officer Evaluation Reporting System, provides detailed instructions for evaluating the performance and potential for promotion of all Army officers. There is even a special appendix regarding the evaluation of medical officers. [I have tried repeatedly to download the current version of this regulation but have not been able to do so.] The bottom line here is that equivocation on the part of Hasan's supervisors has resulted in an act of terrorism that is absolutely unforgivable. Unless Major Scott's concerns showed up in Hasan's OERs, the Army was not warned--a local academic review board was warned and that simply is NOT the answer. The reason I say this is the simple fact that Captain Hasan became MAJOR Hasan. And as many readers know, even if degorgatory comments were made, it is not unusual for senior reviewers to gloss over these comments or direct that they be rewritten.
Promoting and transferring Hasan were major leadership failures. I have said it before and I will say it again, physicians don't like to "rat out" other physicians. It is much like the Blue Wall of Silence found among police officers--fellow police officer don't "rat out" fellow police officers and physicians don't "rat out" other physicians. Does anyone remember Commander Donal (not misspelled) Billig?
There is plenty of room for blame here and I, for one, hope that is spread around on those responsible that they are appropriately disciplined. But I'm not making any bets on it--our leaders have become candy asses--always concerned about litigation and their public persona. Where are the George Pattons, Chesty Pullers, and Bull Halseys when we need them? Gone to grave yards everyone.
Read a transcript of the May 2007 memo obtained by NPR in which Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlines his concerns about Hasan:
http://www.npr.org/documents/2009/nov/hasanletter.pdf
November 18, 2009
In May of 2007 Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlined his concerns about Hasan in a memo.
Two years ago, a top psychiatrist at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was so concerned about what he saw as Nidal Hasan's incompetence and reckless behavior that he put those concerns in writing. NPR has obtained a copy of the memo, the first evaluation that has surfaced from Hasan's file.
Officials at Walter Reed sent that memo to Fort Hood this year when Hasan was transferred there.
Nevertheless, commanders still assigned Hasan — accused of killing 13 people in a mass shooting at Fort Hood on Nov. 5 — to work with some of the Army's most troubled and vulnerable soldiers.
The Damning Memo
On May 17, 2007, Hasan's supervisor at Walter Reed sent the memo to the Walter Reed credentials committee. It reads, "Memorandum for: Credentials Committee. Subject: CPT Nidal Hasan." More than a page long, the document warns that: "The Faculty has serious concerns about CPT Hasan's professionalism and work ethic. ... He demonstrates a pattern of poor judgment and a lack of professionalism." It is signed by the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, Maj. Scott Moran.
When shown the memo, two leading psychiatrists said it was so damning, it might have sunk Hasan's career if he had applied for a job outside the Army.
"Even if we were desperate for a psychiatrist, we would not even get him to the point where we would invite him for an interview," says Dr. Steven Sharfstein, who runs Sheppard Pratt's psychiatric medical center, based just outside Baltimore.
Sharfstein says it's a little hard to read the evaluation now and pretend that he doesn't know that Hasan is accused of shooting dozens of people. But he says if he had seen a memo like this about an applicant, Sharfstein would have avoided him like the plague.
The memo ticks off numerous problems over the course of Hasan's training, including proselytizing to his patients. It says he mistreated a homicidal patient and allowed her to escape from the emergency room, and that he blew off an important exam.
According to the memo, Hasan hardly did any work: He saw only 30 patients in 38 weeks. Sources at Walter Reed say most psychiatrists see at least 10 times that many patients. When Hasan was supposed to be on call for emergencies, he didn't even answer the phone.
Enlarge U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
Warning Signs
Sharfstein says the memo doesn't suggest that Hasan would end up shooting people, but it warns that Hasan was "somebody who could potentially put patients in danger."
"There are all kinds of warning signs, flashing red lights, that, in terms of just this paragraph, you'd say, 'Oh, no, this is not somebody that we would take a chance on.' "
Sharfstein says that in the 25 years he has been supervising and hiring psychiatrists, he has seen only a half-dozen evaluations this bad.
The memo does have a couple of qualifications that say something positive about Hasan. It says, "He is able to self-correct with supervision." And Moran writes, "I am not able to say he is not competent to graduate." [My emphasis]
Officials at Walter Reed told NPR that those statements were very carefully worded. What they convey is that when Hasan's supervisors read him the riot act — when they gave him intensive supervision — he would improve just enough so that they had to tell their commanders: "Hasan is capable of doing better."
But officials say nobody has the time to supervise a doctor that closely.
Alerting Fort Hood
"I would never, ever hire a physician with this kind of a record," says Judith Broder, who runs the Soldiers Project, an award-winning private therapy program for troops in Southern California.
Broder says that soldiers seeking therapy may be falling apart, filled with rage and a distrust of authority. What those soldiers need, she says, is a psychiatrist they can trust completely — not a therapist who fails to show up and abandons his patients.
"This kind of behavior could, in fact, set off a stress reaction" in a patient, she says. "It could be a trigger to a post-traumatic stress reaction."
Moran and Pentagon spokesmen declined NPR's requests for interviews for this story. Officials at Fort Hood would not comment, either.
But sources say that when the Army sent Hasan to Fort Hood earlier this year, Walter Reed sent the damning evaluation there, too. So commanders at Fort Hood would know exactly what they were getting.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
The High Cost of War
This is a very interesting read from The New York Times. This is the very same problem the British faced in the years between World War I and World War II when they had a million-man army in the Middle East. The British finally decided it was just not possible to sustain this effort—they were out of money, out of men to send and the public and the military were tired of the effort. We have already spent over $230 billion in Afghanistan and over $700 billion in Iraq. As we approach the trillion-dollar mark, we don’t seem to be any closer to the end that President Obama says he is seeking. We are talking about spending roughly $1 million per year for each soldier, sailor, airman and Marine we have in these two countries. And we are doing this in one country that is corrupt beyond belief. President Hamid Karzai's election was an absolute fraud and just in the past day or so it has been reported that the Minister of Mines has taken a $30 million bribe from the Chinese for copper mining rights.
Stop and think about that for a moment—this would cover health care for every uninsured American with money left over. We could provide funding for projects in our own country that would help raise this nation out of this recession and perhaps, just perhaps, we could find a way to reduce our indebtedness to China by producing more goods here at home. Perhaps we could fund more research into making us less dependent on foreign oil. And perhaps, just perhaps, not near as many Americans would go to bed hungry each night.
Just think about it…
High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War
By CHRISTOPHER DREW
A version of this article appeared in print on November 15, 2009, on page A1 of the New York edition of The New York Times.
The latest internal government estimates place the cost of adding 40,000 American troops and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces, as favored by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan, at $40 billion to $54 billion a year, the officials said.
Even if fewer troops are sent, or their mission is modified, the rough formula used by the White House, of about $1 million per soldier a year, appears almost constant.
So even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.
Such an escalation in military spending would be a politically volatile issue for Mr. Obama at a time when the government budget deficit is soaring, the economy is weak and he is trying to pass a costly health care plan.
Senior members of the House Appropriations Committee have already expressed reservations about the potential long-term costs of expanding the war in Afghanistan. And Mr. Obama could find it difficult to win approval for the additional spending in Congress, where he would have to depend on Republicans to counter defections from liberal Democrats.
One senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to discuss the details of confidential deliberations, said these concerns had added to the president’s insistence at a White House meeting on Wednesday that each military option include the quickest possible exit strategy.
“The president focused a lot on ensuring that we were asking the difficult questions about getting to an end game here,” the official said. “He knows we cannot sustain this indefinitely.”
Sending fewer troops would lower the costs but would also place limitations on the buildup strategy. Sending 30,000 more troops, for example, would cost $25 billion to $30 billion a year while limiting how widely American forces could range. Deploying 20,000 troops would cost about $21 billion annually but would expand mainly the training of Afghans, the officials said.
The estimated $1 million a year it costs per soldier is higher than the $390,000 congressional researchers estimated in 2006.
Military analysts said the increase reflects a surge in costs for mine-resistant troop carriers and surveillance equipment that would apply to troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But some costs are unique to Afghanistan, where it can cost as much as $400 a gallon to deliver fuel to the troops through mountainous terrain.
Some administration estimates suggest it could also cost up to $50 billion over five years to more than double the size of the Afghan army and police force, to a total of 400,000. That includes recruiting, training and equipment.
At a stop at a military base in Alaska on Thursday, Mr. Obama told a gathering of soldiers that he would not risk more lives “unless it is necessary to America’s vital interests.” He added during his visit to Tokyo on Friday that he wanted to avoid taking any step that could be seen as an “open-ended commitment.”
The administration said Friday that it planned to cut up to 5 percent at domestic agencies in fiscal 2011 as part of an effort to reduce the federal budget deficit, which rose to $1.4 trillion with the economic stimulus and financial bailouts.
Several leading Republicans have criticized Mr. Obama’s willingness to spend more freely on domestic programs and urged him to provide General McChrystal with the resources he is seeking in Afghanistan.
“Keeping our country safe: Isn’t that the first job of government?” said Senator Christopher S. Bond, a Republican from Missouri and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If we have just a minimalist counterterrorism strategy, the Taliban will come back over the mountains from Pakistan, and they will be followed by their co-conspirators from the Al Qaeda organization.”
Cost is far from the only concern about escalating the war. The debate intensified last week amid disclosures that the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl W. Eikenberry, had sent cables to Washington expressing his reservations about deploying additional troops, citing weak Afghan leadership and widening corruption.
That kind of doubt could also make some in Congress hesitant to support an expansion of the war, especially with the midterm elections coming next year.
Representative David R. Obey, a Democrat from Wisconsin who heads the House Appropriations Committee, said recently that sending more troops to Afghanistan could drain the Treasury and “devour virtually any other priorities that the president or anyone in Congress had.”
Representative John Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of a subcommittee on defense appropriations, said in an interview that because of concerns about President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, he thought a majority of the 258 Democrats in the House would vote against any bill to pay for more troops. “A month ago, I would have said 60 to 70,” he said.
“Can you pass one?” Mr. Murtha said. “It depends on the Republicans.”
Mr. Murtha said he opposed sending more troops, though he would support any decision Mr. Obama made. He said he was concerned that even without a supplemental bill, total spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would surge past $1 trillion next year, which could hamper the economy for years to come.
Others said some Republicans could find it hard to justify a yes vote on troops after criticizing Mr. Obama for his spending. Some liberal Democrats said voters who had been drawn to Mr. Obama for his early opposition to the Iraq war could become disenchanted if he approved a major expansion in Afghanistan.
“In the times we’re in right now, I just totally believe that the public that elected President Obama really wants to see something different,” said Representative Lynn Woolsey, Democrat of California.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama was careful to say that he would not cut military spending while the nation was engaged in two wars. He also said it was important to shore up the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. And shortly after he took office, he approved sending an additional 21,000 soldiers there, bringing the total American force to 68,000.
Still, many of his supporters assumed that his pledges to withdraw from Iraq, and to rein in the cost overruns on high-tech weapons programs, would still produce significant savings.
But even though Mr. Obama has won battles to cancel the F-22 fighter plane and other advanced programs, the immediate savings have been offset by increased spending on the surveillance drones and mine-resistant vehicles needed in the field now.
And he recently signed a $680 billion military authorization bill for fiscal 2010 that represented a 2.7 percent increase over the 2009 spending level and a 1.9 percent increase over President Bush’s peak budget in fiscal 2008.
The administration has projected that spending on Iraq would drop by $25.8 billion in fiscal 2010, to $60.8 billion, as most of the troops withdraw.
It also expected spending on the Afghanistan war to increase by $18.5 billion in fiscal 2010, to $65.4 billion, for a net savings on the two wars of $7.3 billion, if no more troops were added.
Stop and think about that for a moment—this would cover health care for every uninsured American with money left over. We could provide funding for projects in our own country that would help raise this nation out of this recession and perhaps, just perhaps, we could find a way to reduce our indebtedness to China by producing more goods here at home. Perhaps we could fund more research into making us less dependent on foreign oil. And perhaps, just perhaps, not near as many Americans would go to bed hungry each night.
Just think about it…
High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War
By CHRISTOPHER DREW
A version of this article appeared in print on November 15, 2009, on page A1 of the New York edition of The New York Times.
The latest internal government estimates place the cost of adding 40,000 American troops and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces, as favored by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan, at $40 billion to $54 billion a year, the officials said.
Even if fewer troops are sent, or their mission is modified, the rough formula used by the White House, of about $1 million per soldier a year, appears almost constant.
So even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.
Such an escalation in military spending would be a politically volatile issue for Mr. Obama at a time when the government budget deficit is soaring, the economy is weak and he is trying to pass a costly health care plan.
Senior members of the House Appropriations Committee have already expressed reservations about the potential long-term costs of expanding the war in Afghanistan. And Mr. Obama could find it difficult to win approval for the additional spending in Congress, where he would have to depend on Republicans to counter defections from liberal Democrats.
One senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to discuss the details of confidential deliberations, said these concerns had added to the president’s insistence at a White House meeting on Wednesday that each military option include the quickest possible exit strategy.
“The president focused a lot on ensuring that we were asking the difficult questions about getting to an end game here,” the official said. “He knows we cannot sustain this indefinitely.”
Sending fewer troops would lower the costs but would also place limitations on the buildup strategy. Sending 30,000 more troops, for example, would cost $25 billion to $30 billion a year while limiting how widely American forces could range. Deploying 20,000 troops would cost about $21 billion annually but would expand mainly the training of Afghans, the officials said.
The estimated $1 million a year it costs per soldier is higher than the $390,000 congressional researchers estimated in 2006.
Military analysts said the increase reflects a surge in costs for mine-resistant troop carriers and surveillance equipment that would apply to troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But some costs are unique to Afghanistan, where it can cost as much as $400 a gallon to deliver fuel to the troops through mountainous terrain.
Some administration estimates suggest it could also cost up to $50 billion over five years to more than double the size of the Afghan army and police force, to a total of 400,000. That includes recruiting, training and equipment.
At a stop at a military base in Alaska on Thursday, Mr. Obama told a gathering of soldiers that he would not risk more lives “unless it is necessary to America’s vital interests.” He added during his visit to Tokyo on Friday that he wanted to avoid taking any step that could be seen as an “open-ended commitment.”
The administration said Friday that it planned to cut up to 5 percent at domestic agencies in fiscal 2011 as part of an effort to reduce the federal budget deficit, which rose to $1.4 trillion with the economic stimulus and financial bailouts.
Several leading Republicans have criticized Mr. Obama’s willingness to spend more freely on domestic programs and urged him to provide General McChrystal with the resources he is seeking in Afghanistan.
“Keeping our country safe: Isn’t that the first job of government?” said Senator Christopher S. Bond, a Republican from Missouri and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If we have just a minimalist counterterrorism strategy, the Taliban will come back over the mountains from Pakistan, and they will be followed by their co-conspirators from the Al Qaeda organization.”
Cost is far from the only concern about escalating the war. The debate intensified last week amid disclosures that the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl W. Eikenberry, had sent cables to Washington expressing his reservations about deploying additional troops, citing weak Afghan leadership and widening corruption.
That kind of doubt could also make some in Congress hesitant to support an expansion of the war, especially with the midterm elections coming next year.
Representative David R. Obey, a Democrat from Wisconsin who heads the House Appropriations Committee, said recently that sending more troops to Afghanistan could drain the Treasury and “devour virtually any other priorities that the president or anyone in Congress had.”
Representative John Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of a subcommittee on defense appropriations, said in an interview that because of concerns about President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, he thought a majority of the 258 Democrats in the House would vote against any bill to pay for more troops. “A month ago, I would have said 60 to 70,” he said.
“Can you pass one?” Mr. Murtha said. “It depends on the Republicans.”
Mr. Murtha said he opposed sending more troops, though he would support any decision Mr. Obama made. He said he was concerned that even without a supplemental bill, total spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would surge past $1 trillion next year, which could hamper the economy for years to come.
Others said some Republicans could find it hard to justify a yes vote on troops after criticizing Mr. Obama for his spending. Some liberal Democrats said voters who had been drawn to Mr. Obama for his early opposition to the Iraq war could become disenchanted if he approved a major expansion in Afghanistan.
“In the times we’re in right now, I just totally believe that the public that elected President Obama really wants to see something different,” said Representative Lynn Woolsey, Democrat of California.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama was careful to say that he would not cut military spending while the nation was engaged in two wars. He also said it was important to shore up the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. And shortly after he took office, he approved sending an additional 21,000 soldiers there, bringing the total American force to 68,000.
Still, many of his supporters assumed that his pledges to withdraw from Iraq, and to rein in the cost overruns on high-tech weapons programs, would still produce significant savings.
But even though Mr. Obama has won battles to cancel the F-22 fighter plane and other advanced programs, the immediate savings have been offset by increased spending on the surveillance drones and mine-resistant vehicles needed in the field now.
And he recently signed a $680 billion military authorization bill for fiscal 2010 that represented a 2.7 percent increase over the 2009 spending level and a 1.9 percent increase over President Bush’s peak budget in fiscal 2008.
The administration has projected that spending on Iraq would drop by $25.8 billion in fiscal 2010, to $60.8 billion, as most of the troops withdraw.
It also expected spending on the Afghanistan war to increase by $18.5 billion in fiscal 2010, to $65.4 billion, for a net savings on the two wars of $7.3 billion, if no more troops were added.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Hasan—Premeditated Murder, A Terrorist Act or Insanity?
Hasan—Premeditated Murder, A Terrorist Act or Insanity?
On November 12, 2009, military prosecutors charged the Army psychiatrist with 13 counts of premeditated murder in last week's rampage at Fort Hood, Tex.
In an article published in The Washington Post on Friday, November 13, 2009, Christopher Grey, a spokesman for the Armys Criminal Investigation Division stated, “We're looking at every reason for this shooting." He further stated, "We're aggressively following every possible lead."
The same article went on to say, “Investigators say they think he was the only gunman. Grey, however, left open the possibility that someone else may have helped instigate the attack. He said military prosecutors may charge Hasan with additional crimes.”
And finally,
In the same article, William Cassara, a former Army captain and lawyer who is now in private practice in Augusta, Ga., "I would fully anticipate that the charge sheet in this case will get much longer."
I would presume from this chit-chat, that the Army has not ruled out charging Major Hasan with conducting a terrorist attack. However, in the same Friday the 13th Post article, Guy Womack, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who practices military law in Houston, speculated that Hasan's defense counsel, retired Colonel John Galligan, probably will argue that Hasan was mentally unstable at the time of the shootings.
Womack postulated that, "The defense argument will be that Major Hasan knew that he would be identified, he knew that he would be captured, and he did it anyway, so clearly he was insane, that his mental defect was so severe that he couldn't control his actions from right and wrong," [My emphasis]
There is no doubt in my mind that Lieutenant Colonel Womack’s assessment as to the possible insanity plea is right on the mark.
Why?
Because we just aren’t able to wrap our mind around the idea that an individual, particularly a follower of Islam, could/would commit an act of terrorism without being part of a larger radical Islamic plot. Unless, of course, the individual was insane. Why else would someone do something as horrendous as this?
In a previous posting, I had listed an article the Scott Stewart and Fred Burton who reported that Nasir al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called on jihadists, "…to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West.” Stewart and Burton also noted “… how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.”
On November 7, 2009, The New York Times reported in an article by Nicole Bengiveno, that, “After two days of inquiry into the mass shooting at Fort Hood, investigators have tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist plot.” Ms. Bengiveno went on to report, “… the investigators, working with behavioral experts, suggested that he might have long suffered from emotional problems that were exacerbated by the tensions of his work with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who returned home with serious psychiatric problems.”
As I noted above, we just can’t get our head wrapped around the idea that Major Hasan intentionally or unintentionally followed al-Wahayshi’s advice to, “conduct simple attacks…” In this case a lone gunman, a fellow soldier, gunned down and killed 13 people and wounded another 30. This was an act of terrorism by a radical Islamist, not the act of someone who did not know what he was doing and could not distinguish right from wrong. Major Hasan thought about this; he bought two guns, he bought ammunition, he bought a laser pistol sight and, according to reports, spent time at a shooting range familiarizing himself with his newly acquired capability. And the idea that you must belong to some terrorist group like al Qaeda or some terrorist cell to commit terrorist acts is passé. Groups or cells are much easier to track; a lone terrorist is invisible to the untrained eye. The sooner we figure this out, the better off we will be.
The act of terrorist or an insane person? The line may be fine. A radical Islamist may certain seem insane to we “non-believers”, yet in at least one instance his act has been proclaimed to be the act of a hero. Surely if Major Hasan had been killed that day, he would have been proclaimed a martyr by radical Islamists.
On November 12, 2009, military prosecutors charged the Army psychiatrist with 13 counts of premeditated murder in last week's rampage at Fort Hood, Tex.
In an article published in The Washington Post on Friday, November 13, 2009, Christopher Grey, a spokesman for the Armys Criminal Investigation Division stated, “We're looking at every reason for this shooting." He further stated, "We're aggressively following every possible lead."
The same article went on to say, “Investigators say they think he was the only gunman. Grey, however, left open the possibility that someone else may have helped instigate the attack. He said military prosecutors may charge Hasan with additional crimes.”
And finally,
In the same article, William Cassara, a former Army captain and lawyer who is now in private practice in Augusta, Ga., "I would fully anticipate that the charge sheet in this case will get much longer."
I would presume from this chit-chat, that the Army has not ruled out charging Major Hasan with conducting a terrorist attack. However, in the same Friday the 13th Post article, Guy Womack, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who practices military law in Houston, speculated that Hasan's defense counsel, retired Colonel John Galligan, probably will argue that Hasan was mentally unstable at the time of the shootings.
Womack postulated that, "The defense argument will be that Major Hasan knew that he would be identified, he knew that he would be captured, and he did it anyway, so clearly he was insane, that his mental defect was so severe that he couldn't control his actions from right and wrong," [My emphasis]
There is no doubt in my mind that Lieutenant Colonel Womack’s assessment as to the possible insanity plea is right on the mark.
Why?
Because we just aren’t able to wrap our mind around the idea that an individual, particularly a follower of Islam, could/would commit an act of terrorism without being part of a larger radical Islamic plot. Unless, of course, the individual was insane. Why else would someone do something as horrendous as this?
In a previous posting, I had listed an article the Scott Stewart and Fred Burton who reported that Nasir al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called on jihadists, "…to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West.” Stewart and Burton also noted “… how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.”
On November 7, 2009, The New York Times reported in an article by Nicole Bengiveno, that, “After two days of inquiry into the mass shooting at Fort Hood, investigators have tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist plot.” Ms. Bengiveno went on to report, “… the investigators, working with behavioral experts, suggested that he might have long suffered from emotional problems that were exacerbated by the tensions of his work with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who returned home with serious psychiatric problems.”
As I noted above, we just can’t get our head wrapped around the idea that Major Hasan intentionally or unintentionally followed al-Wahayshi’s advice to, “conduct simple attacks…” In this case a lone gunman, a fellow soldier, gunned down and killed 13 people and wounded another 30. This was an act of terrorism by a radical Islamist, not the act of someone who did not know what he was doing and could not distinguish right from wrong. Major Hasan thought about this; he bought two guns, he bought ammunition, he bought a laser pistol sight and, according to reports, spent time at a shooting range familiarizing himself with his newly acquired capability. And the idea that you must belong to some terrorist group like al Qaeda or some terrorist cell to commit terrorist acts is passé. Groups or cells are much easier to track; a lone terrorist is invisible to the untrained eye. The sooner we figure this out, the better off we will be.
The act of terrorist or an insane person? The line may be fine. A radical Islamist may certain seem insane to we “non-believers”, yet in at least one instance his act has been proclaimed to be the act of a hero. Surely if Major Hasan had been killed that day, he would have been proclaimed a martyr by radical Islamists.
Friday, November 13, 2009
A look back at the Tomb of the Unknowns
I found this on the Military.com website and thought is was appropriate considering our recent celebration of Veterans' Day (Armistice Day to those of us who are old enough to remember). As Ms. Miriam Felt describes the events of the day, it certainly was one that a person would remember for the rest of their life.
The tomb and the nearby crypts contain the remains of an Unknown from World War I, World War II, and Korea. An additional crypt did hold the remains of an Unknown from Vietnam, but the remains of the Vietnam Unknown were exhumed May 14, 1998. Based on mitochondrial DNA testing, Department of Defense scientists identified the remains as those of Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie, who was shot down near An Loc, Vietnam, in 1972. The identification was announced on June 30, 1998 and on July 10, Blassie's remains arrived home to his family in St. Louis, Missouri; he was reinterred at Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery.
Interestingly enough, my great-great grandfather Lemuel Purteet is buried in this same cemetery. He was a civilian Confederate sympathizer who became a POW after a battle near St. Louis, MO. He died while a POW and was buried in this cemetery in a section set aside for the remains of Confederate soldiers and some civilians. It is an impressive cemetery just south of St. Louis well worth seeing if you are ever in that area.
I don't know if there will ever be anymore Unknowns because of the capability of DNA tracking. It would be wonderful if there never was another Unknown because there were no more wars. But that does not seem to be the nature of man who needs to continually exercise the territorial imperative.
Tomb of the Unknowns
“Here Rests In Honored Glory An American Solider Known But To God"
These words are inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery. The Tomb of the Unknowns symbolizes those of America who gave their lives in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War in defense of the Nation’s integrity, honor, and tranquility.
Numerous ceremonies are performed annually at the Tomb to honor these soldiers and to show the nation’s respect for members of the United States Armed Forces.
The most notable of such ceremonies are wreath-laying ceremonies that take place on National holidays, such as Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day, where the President or his designee lays a wreath to mark the national observance of that day. Also, held in high esteem are wreath laying ceremonies that occur during state visits. At these ceremonies, the visiting head of state will pay formal respects to the sacrifice of America’s veterans in foreign wars by placing a wreath before the Tomb.
All ceremonies performed at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, with the exception of Tomb Guard duty performed by the Army Honor Guard, are Joint Service functions led by the Military District of Washington. Therefore, the members of the Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard serve as active participants in all Joint Service ceremonies performed at the Tomb, including the highly respected wreath laying ceremonies. During these ceremonies, each service of the Armed Forces (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) provide Ceremonial Honor Guard personnel to represent their respective service to the public and to the leaders of foreign countries. The Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard strives to prepare its members for these ceremonies through hours of practice in weapons drill, uniform maintenance, and military bearing.
In the following letter, Miriam ("Mimi") Felt describes the gravity of the first ceremony for Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery in November 1921. At that time, Mimi was 23-years-old and worked in the water sanitation division of the U.S. Health Service in Washington, DC.
Sunday (Nov. 13, 1921)
Dear Family,
Well, this last week has been quite an event in history, and I certainly do wish you all could have been in Washington. It certainly is something I shall never forget. Somehow, you can talk about it and think about it, but the realization of the whole thing struck me so much more by seeing it all, and it was so impressive. Of course, Washington is alive with foreigners of all sorts, and I am turning around all the time to see something else for fear I will miss something. The crowds have been simply enormous, and I feel considerably thinner from having wedged my way through. But leave it to Clara, we are always on the front line.
Thursday night after work, Gertie and I went up to the Capitol to see the body in state there. We went up about six o'clock , thinking the crowd would not be so large. But at that time the line (four abreast) extended over two blocks, and by the time we had reached the Capitol steps and could look back at the crowd, it extended up one side of the park, down another side, then the third side of it and on beyond around the Capitol building where we could see no farther, so I don't know how much longer it was. It was perfectly beautifully managed, and there was no crowding, and everyone, strangely enough, acted as though they really were there to pay respect to the memory which that body was to represent to the country, and not there to see out of curiosity.
There were guards, of course, all up the line and then a special guard of honor around the catafalque. The flowers were simply magnificent, each state and then different organizations sent wreaths or flowers made up in some beautiful piece. President Harding's wreath of red roses was on the bier and also a white ribbon was draped over it, which Mrs. Harding had made. It was most impressive, all told.
Friday bright and early, we arose and went down on Pennsylvania Avenue to see the funeral procession. Of course, we had hysterics over Clara trying to wedge us in amidst the crowd. I'll have to leave the details of that to tell. Something on the order of Inauguration, however. It was sort of a fitting setting all around for it, because you remember I told you the day the Olympia arrived with the body, it was very rainy and dark, and in my mind sort of typified the thing itself. Then Friday, when the procession started, it was as though it were in the "gray dawn", for the sun didn't really break through until it was about all passed. And that went with that part of it, too, to me.
There were represented in the procession about every branch of service, and all the organizations, etc. President Harding and the cabinet and the Senate all walked, and we had a chance to see them all very clearly. Only I missed finding Taft until he was passed. I am going to have to see him soon, somehow. It seems that because I am specially anxious to see him, I always miss him!
Did you know that this was the first time in History that three Presidents were seen in the same procession? Wilson had to ride, of course. He looked quite well, and people that have seen him recently seem to think he is much improved. I couldn't quite understand, however, why Mrs. Wilson had to ride by his side, for she was the only lady of that sort in it. The President and cabinet etc. dropped out at the White House and rode up to Arlington. The rest marched on. We didn't attempt to go there because there was no chance of seeing anything and we figured we could read the speech. We had seen the cemetery on Wednesday and knew about what would take place. I'm glad we didn't attempt it for most people were about five hours in all getting up and back.
Then that night was the illumination of the jeweled arch. It was wonderful! When the lights first started to come on, you could see the different lines of the search lights gradually cross each other, and then finally shine out in the most beautiful colors you have ever seen. They fired twenty-one minute guns and the lights were seen through the smoke. I just can't describe to you the effect of it all.
I declare the arch was something that you cannot conceive of man making, somehow. It seemed almost superhuman. The pillars on either side of the street were made into monument effects, the tops from about half way up being covered with sequents of some sort. This all was on a larger base, and around them, on each base, was a large eagle, and incense bowls all around too, burning. In the center of the arch was a large circle composed of smaller circles, and within each of these the picture of the various flags. Then hanging from the pillars was a straight band of vari-colored glass, I guess it must have been, which positively sparkled with more beautiful colors than I have ever seen. They threw different colored search lights on it from all sides. And that wasn't all — the Washington monument was lighted so that it looked as though there were streamers of white light from the top to the bottom, and two search lights from the top crossed and were sent out over the city. Also lights were thrown from the Capitol building so far away which were visible, too.
All along the street in front of the Pan American building where the Conference will be held for the most part, there were erected tall poles with Eagles on the top and colored, lighted box effects built about them of the different shields, that is, "flag productions" of the shields. It made the whole street lighter than day, of course, and with all the various colors it certainly was a vision to behold! Course, you will see it in the movies, and maybe not recognize my description of it all, but it's the best I can do, and I thought perhaps Mother and Dad, at least, would like to hear my own description of it!
Yours,
Daughter, Sister and sweetheart.
M
(As a postscript, Ms. Felt wrote:)
Give my love to Grandpa. Sorry he isn't feeling up to par. Tell him to be a good boy. Tell him too that some of his old "cronies" marched to Arlington Friday and they looked mighty fine, I'll tell you - and I thought a lot about what he did for his country.
The Veterans Day National Committee thanks Ms. Barbara Felt, the author's niece, for sharing this letter to relatives written by her Aunt Mimi.
The tomb and the nearby crypts contain the remains of an Unknown from World War I, World War II, and Korea. An additional crypt did hold the remains of an Unknown from Vietnam, but the remains of the Vietnam Unknown were exhumed May 14, 1998. Based on mitochondrial DNA testing, Department of Defense scientists identified the remains as those of Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie, who was shot down near An Loc, Vietnam, in 1972. The identification was announced on June 30, 1998 and on July 10, Blassie's remains arrived home to his family in St. Louis, Missouri; he was reinterred at Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery.
Interestingly enough, my great-great grandfather Lemuel Purteet is buried in this same cemetery. He was a civilian Confederate sympathizer who became a POW after a battle near St. Louis, MO. He died while a POW and was buried in this cemetery in a section set aside for the remains of Confederate soldiers and some civilians. It is an impressive cemetery just south of St. Louis well worth seeing if you are ever in that area.
I don't know if there will ever be anymore Unknowns because of the capability of DNA tracking. It would be wonderful if there never was another Unknown because there were no more wars. But that does not seem to be the nature of man who needs to continually exercise the territorial imperative.
Tomb of the Unknowns
“Here Rests In Honored Glory An American Solider Known But To God"
These words are inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery. The Tomb of the Unknowns symbolizes those of America who gave their lives in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War in defense of the Nation’s integrity, honor, and tranquility.
Numerous ceremonies are performed annually at the Tomb to honor these soldiers and to show the nation’s respect for members of the United States Armed Forces.
The most notable of such ceremonies are wreath-laying ceremonies that take place on National holidays, such as Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day, where the President or his designee lays a wreath to mark the national observance of that day. Also, held in high esteem are wreath laying ceremonies that occur during state visits. At these ceremonies, the visiting head of state will pay formal respects to the sacrifice of America’s veterans in foreign wars by placing a wreath before the Tomb.
All ceremonies performed at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, with the exception of Tomb Guard duty performed by the Army Honor Guard, are Joint Service functions led by the Military District of Washington. Therefore, the members of the Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard serve as active participants in all Joint Service ceremonies performed at the Tomb, including the highly respected wreath laying ceremonies. During these ceremonies, each service of the Armed Forces (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) provide Ceremonial Honor Guard personnel to represent their respective service to the public and to the leaders of foreign countries. The Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard strives to prepare its members for these ceremonies through hours of practice in weapons drill, uniform maintenance, and military bearing.
In the following letter, Miriam ("Mimi") Felt describes the gravity of the first ceremony for Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery in November 1921. At that time, Mimi was 23-years-old and worked in the water sanitation division of the U.S. Health Service in Washington, DC.
Sunday (Nov. 13, 1921)
Dear Family,
Well, this last week has been quite an event in history, and I certainly do wish you all could have been in Washington. It certainly is something I shall never forget. Somehow, you can talk about it and think about it, but the realization of the whole thing struck me so much more by seeing it all, and it was so impressive. Of course, Washington is alive with foreigners of all sorts, and I am turning around all the time to see something else for fear I will miss something. The crowds have been simply enormous, and I feel considerably thinner from having wedged my way through. But leave it to Clara, we are always on the front line.
Thursday night after work, Gertie and I went up to the Capitol to see the body in state there. We went up about six o'clock , thinking the crowd would not be so large. But at that time the line (four abreast) extended over two blocks, and by the time we had reached the Capitol steps and could look back at the crowd, it extended up one side of the park, down another side, then the third side of it and on beyond around the Capitol building where we could see no farther, so I don't know how much longer it was. It was perfectly beautifully managed, and there was no crowding, and everyone, strangely enough, acted as though they really were there to pay respect to the memory which that body was to represent to the country, and not there to see out of curiosity.
There were guards, of course, all up the line and then a special guard of honor around the catafalque. The flowers were simply magnificent, each state and then different organizations sent wreaths or flowers made up in some beautiful piece. President Harding's wreath of red roses was on the bier and also a white ribbon was draped over it, which Mrs. Harding had made. It was most impressive, all told.
Friday bright and early, we arose and went down on Pennsylvania Avenue to see the funeral procession. Of course, we had hysterics over Clara trying to wedge us in amidst the crowd. I'll have to leave the details of that to tell. Something on the order of Inauguration, however. It was sort of a fitting setting all around for it, because you remember I told you the day the Olympia arrived with the body, it was very rainy and dark, and in my mind sort of typified the thing itself. Then Friday, when the procession started, it was as though it were in the "gray dawn", for the sun didn't really break through until it was about all passed. And that went with that part of it, too, to me.
There were represented in the procession about every branch of service, and all the organizations, etc. President Harding and the cabinet and the Senate all walked, and we had a chance to see them all very clearly. Only I missed finding Taft until he was passed. I am going to have to see him soon, somehow. It seems that because I am specially anxious to see him, I always miss him!
Did you know that this was the first time in History that three Presidents were seen in the same procession? Wilson had to ride, of course. He looked quite well, and people that have seen him recently seem to think he is much improved. I couldn't quite understand, however, why Mrs. Wilson had to ride by his side, for she was the only lady of that sort in it. The President and cabinet etc. dropped out at the White House and rode up to Arlington. The rest marched on. We didn't attempt to go there because there was no chance of seeing anything and we figured we could read the speech. We had seen the cemetery on Wednesday and knew about what would take place. I'm glad we didn't attempt it for most people were about five hours in all getting up and back.
Then that night was the illumination of the jeweled arch. It was wonderful! When the lights first started to come on, you could see the different lines of the search lights gradually cross each other, and then finally shine out in the most beautiful colors you have ever seen. They fired twenty-one minute guns and the lights were seen through the smoke. I just can't describe to you the effect of it all.
I declare the arch was something that you cannot conceive of man making, somehow. It seemed almost superhuman. The pillars on either side of the street were made into monument effects, the tops from about half way up being covered with sequents of some sort. This all was on a larger base, and around them, on each base, was a large eagle, and incense bowls all around too, burning. In the center of the arch was a large circle composed of smaller circles, and within each of these the picture of the various flags. Then hanging from the pillars was a straight band of vari-colored glass, I guess it must have been, which positively sparkled with more beautiful colors than I have ever seen. They threw different colored search lights on it from all sides. And that wasn't all — the Washington monument was lighted so that it looked as though there were streamers of white light from the top to the bottom, and two search lights from the top crossed and were sent out over the city. Also lights were thrown from the Capitol building so far away which were visible, too.
All along the street in front of the Pan American building where the Conference will be held for the most part, there were erected tall poles with Eagles on the top and colored, lighted box effects built about them of the different shields, that is, "flag productions" of the shields. It made the whole street lighter than day, of course, and with all the various colors it certainly was a vision to behold! Course, you will see it in the movies, and maybe not recognize my description of it all, but it's the best I can do, and I thought perhaps Mother and Dad, at least, would like to hear my own description of it!
Yours,
Daughter, Sister and sweetheart.
M
(As a postscript, Ms. Felt wrote:)
Give my love to Grandpa. Sorry he isn't feeling up to par. Tell him to be a good boy. Tell him too that some of his old "cronies" marched to Arlington Friday and they looked mighty fine, I'll tell you - and I thought a lot about what he did for his country.
The Veterans Day National Committee thanks Ms. Barbara Felt, the author's niece, for sharing this letter to relatives written by her Aunt Mimi.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
THE CLASSIC STATE VS DEFENSE BATTLE--WHO IS IN CHARGE
Depending on your views about what we should do in Afghanistan, you may agree that Ambassador Karl Eikenberry is right or that General Stanley McChrystal is right. Either way, this is could turn out to be the whizzing contest of all whizzing contests.
Why would we expect Afghanistan to do anything different than what it has done for centuries? Why should we expect them to be eager to commit more resources from what little they have if we are willing to do their fighting for them?
Why would we expect the oppossition party to do anything else but Monday morning quarterbacking? It was their former leader who started the war in Afghanistan and then abandoned it in favor of toppling Saddam Hussein. The end result is two campaigns that are literally and figuratively bleeding us dry; killing and maiming our young men and women by the hundreds while we make little if any headway.
I cannot blame President Obama for being gun shy--Afghanistan is known as the graveyard of empires and I am certain he does not want us buried there. He must do something though because we can't just leave what we have in country to fend for itself. We either have to fish, cut bait or get out of the boat. The question is, "What and how do we do it?"
Afghanistan is not a "nation"--it is a place and people. There are numerous tribes who mostly live in remote villages in "tribal territories/districts/or whatever you want to call them" and there are some wht I chose to call "city states", much like ancient Greece--Kabul (the capital), Kandahar and Herat. There are four major languages and perhaps 30 minor languages. Pashtuns and Tajiks make up about 70% of the population while Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen, and Balochs make up about 25% and the remainder are "odds and ends."
Afghanistan is vast, some 250,000 square miles, just a little smaller than Texas; however, the terrain is very mountainous and rugged with little infrastructure once outside the cities. If we put a million troops into Afghanistan, we still could not "secure" it nor could we sustain such a force. Neither can Afghanistan--it has neither the willpower nor the resources.
Somehow, the tribal areas have to be developed to stand on their own against the Taliban and al Quaeda. We have to find a way to reassure them that we are not there to conquer them, but to help them become self-sufficient when it comes to their own defense.
If possible we have to find a way to clean up the "central" government; get rid of its corruption, which foments the distrust of the tribal leaders. So far we have not been successful. We jumped on the Karzai bandwagon only to find out it is seen as anathema to the tribal leaders with Karzain a corrupt American puppet. The recent national election debacle only reaffirmed this to Afghanis and the outside world. But we picked "our man in Kabul" and it would seem we are stuck with him.
Anyone have any answers?
George
Official: Obama wants revised Afghan war options
By BEN FELLER and ANNE GEARAN, AP
2 hours ago
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama won't accept any of the Afghanistan war options before him without changes, a senior administration official said, as concerns soar over the ability of the Afghan government to secure its own country one day.
Obama's stance comes as his own ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, is voicing strong dissent about a U.S. troop increase, according to a second administration official.
Eikenberry's misgivings center on a concern that bolstering the American presence in Afghanistan could make the country more reliant on the U.S., not less. He expressed them in forcefully worded cables to Washington just ahead of Obama's latest war meeting Wednesday.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss administration deliberations.
The developments underscore U.S. skepticism about the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose government has been dogged by corruption. The emerging administration message is that Obama will not do anything to lock in an open-ended U.S. commitment.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Thursday that she is concerned about Afghanistan's "corruption, lack of transparency, poor governance (and) absence of the rule of law."
"We're looking to President Karzai as he forms a new government to take action that will demonstrate — not just to the international community but first and foremost to his own people — that his second term will respond the needs that are so manifest," Clinton said during a news conference in Manila with Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo.
Obama is still expected to send in more troops to bolster a deteriorating war effort.
He remains close to announcing his revamped war strategy — troops are just one component — and probably will do so shortly after he returns from a trip to Asia that ends Nov. 19.
Yet in Wednesday's pivotal war council meeting, Obama wasn't satisfied with any of the Afghanistan war options presented by his national security team, one official said.
The president instead pushed for revisions to clarify how and when U.S. troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government. In turn, that could change the dynamic of both how many additional troops are sent to Afghanistan and what the timeline would be for their presence in the war zone, according to the official.
Military officials said Obama has asked for a rewrite before and resisted what one official called a one-way highway toward war commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's recommendations for more troops. The sense that he was being rushed and railroaded has stiffened Obama's resolve to seek information and options beyond military planning, officials said, though a substantial troop increase is still likely.
The president is considering options that include adding 30,000 or more U.S. forces to take on the Taliban in key areas of Afghanistan and to buy time for the Afghan government's small and ill-equipped fighting forces to take over. The other three options on the table are ranges of troop increases, from a relatively small addition of forces to the roughly 40,000 that McChrystal prefers, according to military and other officials.
The war is now in its ninth year and is claiming U.S. lives at a record pace as military leaders say the Taliban has the upper hand in many parts of the country.
Eikenberry, the top U.S. envoy to Kabul and a former commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, is a prominent voice among those advising Obama, and his sharp dissent is sure to affect the equation.
The options given to Obama will now be altered, although not overhauled.
Military officials say one approach is a compromise battle plan that would add 30,000or more U.S. forces atop a record 68,000 in the country now. They described it as "half and half," meaning half fighting and half training and holding ground so the Afghans can regroup.
"The government of Afghanistan has to accept greater responsibility for its own defense," Clinton said Thursday. She had no comment on the Eikenberry memos.
The White House says Obama has not made a final choice, though military and other officials have said he appears near to approving a slightly smaller increase than McChrystal wants at the outset.
Among the options for Obama would be ways to phase in additional troops, perhaps eventually equaling McChrystal's full request, based on security or other conditions in Afghanistan and troop levels by U.S. allies there.
The White House has chafed under criticism from Republicans and some outside critics that Obama is dragging his feet to make a decision.
Obama's top military advisers have said they are comfortable with the pace of the process, and senior military officials have pointed out that the president still has time since no additional forces could begin flowing into Afghanistan until early next year.
Under the scenario featuring about 30,000 more troops, that number most likely would be assembled from three Army brigades and a Marine Corps contingent, plus a new headquarters operation that would be staffed by 7,000 or more troops, a senior military official said. There would be a heavy emphasis on the training of Afghan forces, and the reinforcements Obama sends could include thousands of U.S. military trainers.
___
Associated Press writers Matthew Lee in Manila, Philippines, and Pamela Hess in Washington contributed to this report.
Why would we expect Afghanistan to do anything different than what it has done for centuries? Why should we expect them to be eager to commit more resources from what little they have if we are willing to do their fighting for them?
Why would we expect the oppossition party to do anything else but Monday morning quarterbacking? It was their former leader who started the war in Afghanistan and then abandoned it in favor of toppling Saddam Hussein. The end result is two campaigns that are literally and figuratively bleeding us dry; killing and maiming our young men and women by the hundreds while we make little if any headway.
I cannot blame President Obama for being gun shy--Afghanistan is known as the graveyard of empires and I am certain he does not want us buried there. He must do something though because we can't just leave what we have in country to fend for itself. We either have to fish, cut bait or get out of the boat. The question is, "What and how do we do it?"
Afghanistan is not a "nation"--it is a place and people. There are numerous tribes who mostly live in remote villages in "tribal territories/districts/or whatever you want to call them" and there are some wht I chose to call "city states", much like ancient Greece--Kabul (the capital), Kandahar and Herat. There are four major languages and perhaps 30 minor languages. Pashtuns and Tajiks make up about 70% of the population while Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen, and Balochs make up about 25% and the remainder are "odds and ends."
Afghanistan is vast, some 250,000 square miles, just a little smaller than Texas; however, the terrain is very mountainous and rugged with little infrastructure once outside the cities. If we put a million troops into Afghanistan, we still could not "secure" it nor could we sustain such a force. Neither can Afghanistan--it has neither the willpower nor the resources.
Somehow, the tribal areas have to be developed to stand on their own against the Taliban and al Quaeda. We have to find a way to reassure them that we are not there to conquer them, but to help them become self-sufficient when it comes to their own defense.
If possible we have to find a way to clean up the "central" government; get rid of its corruption, which foments the distrust of the tribal leaders. So far we have not been successful. We jumped on the Karzai bandwagon only to find out it is seen as anathema to the tribal leaders with Karzain a corrupt American puppet. The recent national election debacle only reaffirmed this to Afghanis and the outside world. But we picked "our man in Kabul" and it would seem we are stuck with him.
Anyone have any answers?
George
Official: Obama wants revised Afghan war options
By BEN FELLER and ANNE GEARAN, AP
2 hours ago
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama won't accept any of the Afghanistan war options before him without changes, a senior administration official said, as concerns soar over the ability of the Afghan government to secure its own country one day.
Obama's stance comes as his own ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, is voicing strong dissent about a U.S. troop increase, according to a second administration official.
Eikenberry's misgivings center on a concern that bolstering the American presence in Afghanistan could make the country more reliant on the U.S., not less. He expressed them in forcefully worded cables to Washington just ahead of Obama's latest war meeting Wednesday.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss administration deliberations.
The developments underscore U.S. skepticism about the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose government has been dogged by corruption. The emerging administration message is that Obama will not do anything to lock in an open-ended U.S. commitment.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Thursday that she is concerned about Afghanistan's "corruption, lack of transparency, poor governance (and) absence of the rule of law."
"We're looking to President Karzai as he forms a new government to take action that will demonstrate — not just to the international community but first and foremost to his own people — that his second term will respond the needs that are so manifest," Clinton said during a news conference in Manila with Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo.
Obama is still expected to send in more troops to bolster a deteriorating war effort.
He remains close to announcing his revamped war strategy — troops are just one component — and probably will do so shortly after he returns from a trip to Asia that ends Nov. 19.
Yet in Wednesday's pivotal war council meeting, Obama wasn't satisfied with any of the Afghanistan war options presented by his national security team, one official said.
The president instead pushed for revisions to clarify how and when U.S. troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government. In turn, that could change the dynamic of both how many additional troops are sent to Afghanistan and what the timeline would be for their presence in the war zone, according to the official.
Military officials said Obama has asked for a rewrite before and resisted what one official called a one-way highway toward war commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's recommendations for more troops. The sense that he was being rushed and railroaded has stiffened Obama's resolve to seek information and options beyond military planning, officials said, though a substantial troop increase is still likely.
The president is considering options that include adding 30,000 or more U.S. forces to take on the Taliban in key areas of Afghanistan and to buy time for the Afghan government's small and ill-equipped fighting forces to take over. The other three options on the table are ranges of troop increases, from a relatively small addition of forces to the roughly 40,000 that McChrystal prefers, according to military and other officials.
The war is now in its ninth year and is claiming U.S. lives at a record pace as military leaders say the Taliban has the upper hand in many parts of the country.
Eikenberry, the top U.S. envoy to Kabul and a former commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, is a prominent voice among those advising Obama, and his sharp dissent is sure to affect the equation.
The options given to Obama will now be altered, although not overhauled.
Military officials say one approach is a compromise battle plan that would add 30,000or more U.S. forces atop a record 68,000 in the country now. They described it as "half and half," meaning half fighting and half training and holding ground so the Afghans can regroup.
"The government of Afghanistan has to accept greater responsibility for its own defense," Clinton said Thursday. She had no comment on the Eikenberry memos.
The White House says Obama has not made a final choice, though military and other officials have said he appears near to approving a slightly smaller increase than McChrystal wants at the outset.
Among the options for Obama would be ways to phase in additional troops, perhaps eventually equaling McChrystal's full request, based on security or other conditions in Afghanistan and troop levels by U.S. allies there.
The White House has chafed under criticism from Republicans and some outside critics that Obama is dragging his feet to make a decision.
Obama's top military advisers have said they are comfortable with the pace of the process, and senior military officials have pointed out that the president still has time since no additional forces could begin flowing into Afghanistan until early next year.
Under the scenario featuring about 30,000 more troops, that number most likely would be assembled from three Army brigades and a Marine Corps contingent, plus a new headquarters operation that would be staffed by 7,000 or more troops, a senior military official said. There would be a heavy emphasis on the training of Afghan forces, and the reinforcements Obama sends could include thousands of U.S. military trainers.
___
Associated Press writers Matthew Lee in Manila, Philippines, and Pamela Hess in Washington contributed to this report.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
More About Major Hasan--The Story Continues
Earlier, I put a STRATFOR piece on this blog regarding Nasir al-Wahayshi's call for individuals to conduct their own jihads. As the investigation broadens, it would appear that Major Hasan answered this call. The problem--we still can't accept that this was an act of someone who had become a radical Muslim. We want to believe he was obviously insane to do this. WRONG--he became a radical and no one picked up on it. It also seems that the leadership at Walter Reed Army Medical Center dropped the ball or perhaps purposely got Hasan transferred to get him out of their hair. The FBI and the Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Services are also to blame for not passing on their information to the Army. We have to wake up--we have to understand that, as Pogo said many years ago, "We have met the enemy and he is us."
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
November 11, 2009 1841 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. The victims were in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a facility on the base where troops are prepared for deployment and where they take care of certain processing tasks such as completing insurance paperwork and receiving medical examinations and vaccinations.
Even though the targets of Hasan’s attack were soldiers, they represented a very soft target in this environment. Most soldiers on bases inside the United States are normally not armed and are only provided weapons for training. The only personnel who regularly carry weapons are the military police and the base civilian police officers. In addition to being unarmed, the soldiers at the center were closely packed together in the facility as they waited to proceed from station to station. The unarmed, densely packed mass of people allowed Hasan to kill 13 (12 soldiers and one civilian employee of the center) and wound 42 others when he opened fire.
Hasan is a U.S.-born Muslim who, according to STRATFOR sources and media accounts, has had past contact with jihadists, including the radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is a U.S.-born imam who espouses a jihadist ideology and who was discussed at some length in the 9/11 commission report for his links to 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Al-Awlaki, who is currently living in Yemen and reportedly has contacts with al Qaeda, posted a message on his Web site Nov. 9 praising Hasan’s actions. Despite Hasan’s connections to al-Awlaki and other jihadists, it is unknown at this point if he was even aware of al-Wahayshi’s recent message calling for simple attacks, and therefore it is impossible to tell if his attack was in response to it.
However, one thing that is certain is that investigators examining Hasan’s computer hard drive, e-mail traffic and Internet history will be looking into that possibility, along with other indications that Hasan was linked to radicals.
We noted last week that by their very nature, individual actors and small cells are very difficult for the government to detect. They must somehow identify themselves by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to the authorities, attend a militant training camp or conduct correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny. In the Hasan case, it now appears that Hasan did self-identify by making radical statements to people he worked with, who reported him to the authorities. It also appears that he had correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki, whom the government was monitoring. Because of this behavior, Hasan brought himself to the attention of the Department of Defense, the FBI and the CIA.
The fact that Hasan was able to commit this attack after bringing government attention to himself could be due to a number of factors. Chief among them is the fact that it is tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring militant actor and to pre-empt every act of violence. The degree of difficulty is increased greatly if an actor does indeed act alone and does not give any overt clues through his actions or his communications of his intent to attack. Because of this, the Hasan case provides an excellent opportunity to examine national security investigations and their utility and limitations.
The Nature of Intelligence Investigations
The FBI will typically open up an intelligence investigation (usually referred to as a national security investigation) in any case where there is an indication or allegation that a person is involved in terrorist activity but there is no evidence that a specific law has been broken. Many times these investigations are opened up due to a lead passed by the CIA, National Security Agency or a foreign liaison intelligence service. Other times an FBI investigation can come as a spin-off from another FBI counterterrorism investigation already under way or be prompted by a piece of information collected by an FBI informant or even by a tip from a concerned citizen — like the flight instructors who alerted the FBI to the suspicious behavior of some foreign flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks. In such a case, the FBI case agent in charge of the investigation will open a preliminary inquiry, which gives the agent a limited window of time to look into the matter. If no indication of criminal activity is found, the preliminary inquiry must be closed unless the agent receives authorization from the special agent in charge of his division and FBI headquarters to extend it.
If, during the preliminary inquiry, the investigating agents find probable cause that a crime has been committed, the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation into the case, similar to what we saw in the case of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and his followers in Detroit.
One of the large problems in national security investigations is separating the wheat from the chaff. Many leads are based on erroneous information or a misidentification of the suspect — there is a huge issue associated with the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names and the fact that there are many people bearing the same names. Jihadists also have the tendency to use multiple names and identities. And there are many cases in which people will falsely report a person to the FBI out of malice. Because of these factors, national security investigations proceed slowly and usually do not involve much (if any) contact with the suspect and his close associates. If the suspect is a real militant planning a terrorist attack, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is innocent, they do not want to sully his reputation by showing up and overtly interviewing everyone he knows. Due to its controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, the FBI has become acutely aware of its responsibility to protect privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws.
And the rights guaranteed under the Constitution do complicate these national security investigations. It is not illegal for someone to say that Muslims should attack U.S. troops due to their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that more Muslims should conduct attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark. — things that Hasan is reported to have said. Radical statements and convictions are not illegal — although they certainly would appear to be conduct unbecoming a U.S. Army officer. (We will leave to others the discussion of the difficulties in dealing with problem officers who are minorities and doctors and who owe several years of service in return for their education.)
There are also many officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army who own personal weapons and who use them for self-defense, target shooting or hunting. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal about a U.S. Army major owning personal weapons. With no articulable violation of U.S. law, the FBI would have very little to act upon in a case like Hasan’s. Instead, even if they found cause to extend their preliminary inquiry, they would be pretty much limited to monitoring his activities (and perhaps his communications, with a court order) and waiting for a law to be violated. In the Hasan case, it would appear that the FBI did not find probable cause that a law had been violated before he opened fire at Fort Hood. Although perhaps if the FBI had been watching his activities closely and with an eye toward “the how” of terrorist attacks, they might have noticed him conducting preoperational surveillance of the readiness center and even a dry run of the attack.
Of course, in addition to just looking for violations of the law, the other main thrust of a national security investigation is to determine whom the suspect is connected to and whom he is talking to or planning with. In past cases, such investigations have uncovered networks of jihadist actors working together in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere. However, if all Hasan did in his correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki was exercise his First Amendment right to hold radical convictions, and if he did not engage in any type of conspiracy to conduct an attack, he did not break the law.
Another issue that complicates national security cases is that they are almost always classified at the secret level or above. This is understandable, considering they are often opened based upon intelligence produced by sensitive intelligence programs. However, this classification means that only those people with the proper clearance and an established need to know can be briefed on the case. It is not at all unusual for the FBI to visit a high-ranking official at another agency to brief the official on the fact that the FBI is conducting a classified national security investigation involving a person working for the official’s agency. The rub is that they will frequently tell the official that he or she is not at liberty to share details of the investigation with other individuals in the agency because they do not have a clear need to know. The FBI agent will also usually ask the person briefed not to take any action against the target of the investigation, so that the investigation is not compromised. While some people will disagree with the FBI’s determination of who really needs to know about the investigation and go on to brief a wider audience, many officials are cowed by the FBI and sit on the information.
Of course, the size of an organization is also a factor in the dissemination of information. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are large organizations, and it is possible that officials at the Pentagon or the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (still known by its old acronym CID) headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., were briefed on the case and that local officials at Fort Hood were not. The Associated Press is now reporting that the FBI had alerted a Defense Criminal Investigative Service agent assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Washington about Hasan’s contacts with al-Awlaki, and ABC reports that the Defense Department is denying the FBI notified them. It would appear that the finger-pointing and bureaucratic blame-shifting normally associated with such cases has begun.
Even more severe problems would have plagued the dissemination of information from the CIA to local commanders and CID officers at Fort Hood. Despite the intelligence reforms put in place after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government still faces large obstacles when it comes to sharing intelligence information with law enforcement personnel.
Criminal Acts vs. Terrorism
So far, the Hasan shooting investigation is being run by the Army CID, and the FBI has been noticeably — and uncharacteristically — absent from the scene. As the premier law enforcement agency in the United States, the FBI will often assume authority over investigations where there is even a hint of terrorism. Since 9/11, the number of FBI/JTTF offices across the country has been dramatically increased, and the JTTFs are specifically charged with investigating cases that may involve terrorism. Therefore, we find the FBI’s absence in this case to be quite out of the ordinary.
However, with Hasan being a member of the armed forces, the victims being soldiers or army civilian employees and the incident occurring at Fort Hood, the case would seem to fall squarely under the mantle of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From a prosecutorial perspective, a homicide trial under the UCMJ should be very tidy and could be quickly concluded. It will not involve all the potential loose ends that could pop up in a federal terrorism trial, especially when those loose ends involve what the FBI and CIA knew about Hasan, when they learned it and who they told. Also, politically, there are some who would like to see the Hasan case remain a criminal matter rather than a case of terrorism. Following the shooting death of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and considering the delicate relationship between Muslim advocacy groups and the U.S. government, some people would rather see Hasan portrayed as a mentally disturbed criminal than as an ideologically driven lone wolf.
Despite the CID taking the lead in prosecuting the case, the classified national security investigation by the CIA and FBI into Hasan and his possible connections to jihadist elements is undoubtedly continuing. Senior members of the government will certainly demand to know if Hasan had any confederates, if he was part of a bigger plot and if there are more attacks to come. Several congressmen and senators are also calling for hearings into the case, and if such hearings occur, they will certainly produce an abundance of interesting information pertaining to Hasan and the national security investigation of his activities.
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
November 11, 2009 1841 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. The victims were in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a facility on the base where troops are prepared for deployment and where they take care of certain processing tasks such as completing insurance paperwork and receiving medical examinations and vaccinations.
Even though the targets of Hasan’s attack were soldiers, they represented a very soft target in this environment. Most soldiers on bases inside the United States are normally not armed and are only provided weapons for training. The only personnel who regularly carry weapons are the military police and the base civilian police officers. In addition to being unarmed, the soldiers at the center were closely packed together in the facility as they waited to proceed from station to station. The unarmed, densely packed mass of people allowed Hasan to kill 13 (12 soldiers and one civilian employee of the center) and wound 42 others when he opened fire.
Hasan is a U.S.-born Muslim who, according to STRATFOR sources and media accounts, has had past contact with jihadists, including the radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is a U.S.-born imam who espouses a jihadist ideology and who was discussed at some length in the 9/11 commission report for his links to 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Al-Awlaki, who is currently living in Yemen and reportedly has contacts with al Qaeda, posted a message on his Web site Nov. 9 praising Hasan’s actions. Despite Hasan’s connections to al-Awlaki and other jihadists, it is unknown at this point if he was even aware of al-Wahayshi’s recent message calling for simple attacks, and therefore it is impossible to tell if his attack was in response to it.
However, one thing that is certain is that investigators examining Hasan’s computer hard drive, e-mail traffic and Internet history will be looking into that possibility, along with other indications that Hasan was linked to radicals.
We noted last week that by their very nature, individual actors and small cells are very difficult for the government to detect. They must somehow identify themselves by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to the authorities, attend a militant training camp or conduct correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny. In the Hasan case, it now appears that Hasan did self-identify by making radical statements to people he worked with, who reported him to the authorities. It also appears that he had correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki, whom the government was monitoring. Because of this behavior, Hasan brought himself to the attention of the Department of Defense, the FBI and the CIA.
The fact that Hasan was able to commit this attack after bringing government attention to himself could be due to a number of factors. Chief among them is the fact that it is tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring militant actor and to pre-empt every act of violence. The degree of difficulty is increased greatly if an actor does indeed act alone and does not give any overt clues through his actions or his communications of his intent to attack. Because of this, the Hasan case provides an excellent opportunity to examine national security investigations and their utility and limitations.
The Nature of Intelligence Investigations
The FBI will typically open up an intelligence investigation (usually referred to as a national security investigation) in any case where there is an indication or allegation that a person is involved in terrorist activity but there is no evidence that a specific law has been broken. Many times these investigations are opened up due to a lead passed by the CIA, National Security Agency or a foreign liaison intelligence service. Other times an FBI investigation can come as a spin-off from another FBI counterterrorism investigation already under way or be prompted by a piece of information collected by an FBI informant or even by a tip from a concerned citizen — like the flight instructors who alerted the FBI to the suspicious behavior of some foreign flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks. In such a case, the FBI case agent in charge of the investigation will open a preliminary inquiry, which gives the agent a limited window of time to look into the matter. If no indication of criminal activity is found, the preliminary inquiry must be closed unless the agent receives authorization from the special agent in charge of his division and FBI headquarters to extend it.
If, during the preliminary inquiry, the investigating agents find probable cause that a crime has been committed, the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation into the case, similar to what we saw in the case of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and his followers in Detroit.
One of the large problems in national security investigations is separating the wheat from the chaff. Many leads are based on erroneous information or a misidentification of the suspect — there is a huge issue associated with the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names and the fact that there are many people bearing the same names. Jihadists also have the tendency to use multiple names and identities. And there are many cases in which people will falsely report a person to the FBI out of malice. Because of these factors, national security investigations proceed slowly and usually do not involve much (if any) contact with the suspect and his close associates. If the suspect is a real militant planning a terrorist attack, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is innocent, they do not want to sully his reputation by showing up and overtly interviewing everyone he knows. Due to its controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, the FBI has become acutely aware of its responsibility to protect privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws.
And the rights guaranteed under the Constitution do complicate these national security investigations. It is not illegal for someone to say that Muslims should attack U.S. troops due to their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that more Muslims should conduct attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark. — things that Hasan is reported to have said. Radical statements and convictions are not illegal — although they certainly would appear to be conduct unbecoming a U.S. Army officer. (We will leave to others the discussion of the difficulties in dealing with problem officers who are minorities and doctors and who owe several years of service in return for their education.)
There are also many officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army who own personal weapons and who use them for self-defense, target shooting or hunting. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal about a U.S. Army major owning personal weapons. With no articulable violation of U.S. law, the FBI would have very little to act upon in a case like Hasan’s. Instead, even if they found cause to extend their preliminary inquiry, they would be pretty much limited to monitoring his activities (and perhaps his communications, with a court order) and waiting for a law to be violated. In the Hasan case, it would appear that the FBI did not find probable cause that a law had been violated before he opened fire at Fort Hood. Although perhaps if the FBI had been watching his activities closely and with an eye toward “the how” of terrorist attacks, they might have noticed him conducting preoperational surveillance of the readiness center and even a dry run of the attack.
Of course, in addition to just looking for violations of the law, the other main thrust of a national security investigation is to determine whom the suspect is connected to and whom he is talking to or planning with. In past cases, such investigations have uncovered networks of jihadist actors working together in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere. However, if all Hasan did in his correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki was exercise his First Amendment right to hold radical convictions, and if he did not engage in any type of conspiracy to conduct an attack, he did not break the law.
Another issue that complicates national security cases is that they are almost always classified at the secret level or above. This is understandable, considering they are often opened based upon intelligence produced by sensitive intelligence programs. However, this classification means that only those people with the proper clearance and an established need to know can be briefed on the case. It is not at all unusual for the FBI to visit a high-ranking official at another agency to brief the official on the fact that the FBI is conducting a classified national security investigation involving a person working for the official’s agency. The rub is that they will frequently tell the official that he or she is not at liberty to share details of the investigation with other individuals in the agency because they do not have a clear need to know. The FBI agent will also usually ask the person briefed not to take any action against the target of the investigation, so that the investigation is not compromised. While some people will disagree with the FBI’s determination of who really needs to know about the investigation and go on to brief a wider audience, many officials are cowed by the FBI and sit on the information.
Of course, the size of an organization is also a factor in the dissemination of information. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are large organizations, and it is possible that officials at the Pentagon or the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (still known by its old acronym CID) headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., were briefed on the case and that local officials at Fort Hood were not. The Associated Press is now reporting that the FBI had alerted a Defense Criminal Investigative Service agent assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Washington about Hasan’s contacts with al-Awlaki, and ABC reports that the Defense Department is denying the FBI notified them. It would appear that the finger-pointing and bureaucratic blame-shifting normally associated with such cases has begun.
Even more severe problems would have plagued the dissemination of information from the CIA to local commanders and CID officers at Fort Hood. Despite the intelligence reforms put in place after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government still faces large obstacles when it comes to sharing intelligence information with law enforcement personnel.
Criminal Acts vs. Terrorism
So far, the Hasan shooting investigation is being run by the Army CID, and the FBI has been noticeably — and uncharacteristically — absent from the scene. As the premier law enforcement agency in the United States, the FBI will often assume authority over investigations where there is even a hint of terrorism. Since 9/11, the number of FBI/JTTF offices across the country has been dramatically increased, and the JTTFs are specifically charged with investigating cases that may involve terrorism. Therefore, we find the FBI’s absence in this case to be quite out of the ordinary.
However, with Hasan being a member of the armed forces, the victims being soldiers or army civilian employees and the incident occurring at Fort Hood, the case would seem to fall squarely under the mantle of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From a prosecutorial perspective, a homicide trial under the UCMJ should be very tidy and could be quickly concluded. It will not involve all the potential loose ends that could pop up in a federal terrorism trial, especially when those loose ends involve what the FBI and CIA knew about Hasan, when they learned it and who they told. Also, politically, there are some who would like to see the Hasan case remain a criminal matter rather than a case of terrorism. Following the shooting death of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and considering the delicate relationship between Muslim advocacy groups and the U.S. government, some people would rather see Hasan portrayed as a mentally disturbed criminal than as an ideologically driven lone wolf.
Despite the CID taking the lead in prosecuting the case, the classified national security investigation by the CIA and FBI into Hasan and his possible connections to jihadist elements is undoubtedly continuing. Senior members of the government will certainly demand to know if Hasan had any confederates, if he was part of a bigger plot and if there are more attacks to come. Several congressmen and senators are also calling for hearings into the case, and if such hearings occur, they will certainly produce an abundance of interesting information pertaining to Hasan and the national security investigation of his activities.
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