America and Afghanistan--A Different View

This article points you to a very excellent paper by Gilles Dorronboro of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I highly recommend you click on the CEIP link and read his article. It is long but may help to explain why we are having problems and why the Pakistan Army is having trouble with their latest efforts. (Not to detract from the CEIP article, but if you want to see what is happening with the latest Pakistani effort against the Taliban, go here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/77472.html )

We have way underestimated the Taliban and their abilities and determination. They ain't a bunch of "ragheads" or "Hadjies" (today's replacement for Gook and other disparaging remarks for indigenous folks). The Taliban is ruthless and has killed many tribal leaders in order to gain control of much of Afghanistan. It is no wonder that locals don't want to oppose them. They know we will leave eventually, but the Taliban will still be around and will return to seek their revenge.

BTW "Hadji" is an honorific used to address someone who has made the Hadj to Mecca.

Think Tank Nation — America and Afghanistan

1 Reviews
2009/10/16 00:00:00
By Dr. Alan L. Gropman
Review of U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is all over the news and very much on President Obama’s mind. U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and operations are currently widely debated. A relevant essay by Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan,” is available from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), complete with a highly useful bibliography. The CEIP, arguably the most venerable think tank in the world, has influenced public policy for a year short of a century. Visit http://www.ceip.org/ and click on publications to call up Dorronsoro’s essay. (His well-informed views on this critical issue also can be found in a short essay in the most recent The National Interest titled “Afghanization” which also is well worth the MOAA reader’s time.) Dorronsoro writes: “A misunderstanding of the insurgency [in Afghanistan] is at the heart of the difficulties facing the international coalition in Afghanistan. The Taliban are often described as an umbrella movement comprising loosely connected groups that are essentially local and unorganized. On the contrary, this report … reveals a resilient adversary, engaged in strategic planning and coordinated action.” Dorronsoro further advises: “The Taliban are a revolutionary movement, deeply opposed to the Afghan tribal system and focused on the rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate. Their propaganda and intelligence are efficient, and the local autonomy of their commanders in the field allow them both flexibility and cohesion. They have made clever use of ethnic tensions, the rejection of foreign forces by the Afghan people, and the lack of local administration to gain support in the population. … [T]he Taliban have achieved their objectives in the South and East of the country, isolating the Coalition, marginalizing the local Afghan administration, and establishing a parallel administration (mainly to dispense Sharia justice and collect taxes).” In other words, Dorrononsoro tells Americans we are losing in this graveyard of empires in large part because we have flunked Sun Tzu’s critical requirement of understanding our adversary and have not taken the Taliban “seriously.” Dorronsoro emphasizes: The Taliban “are often characterized as ‘backward,’ ‘medieval,’ and ‘reactionary,’ and as an association of loosely organized groups. The insurgency is perceived as a local problem to be solved locally; the national and dynamic dimension of the struggle is not taken into account. In fact, the Taliban are quite capable of strategic planning and coordinated action. This means that they will adapt to and counter any moves by the International Coalition [IC]. On-the-ground observations and reliable evidence suggest … the Taliban have an efficient leadership, are learning from their mistakes, and are quick to exploit the weaknesses of their adversaries. They are building a parallel administration, have nationwide logistics, and already manage an impressive intelligence network. Based on the analysis of the insurgency, I argue that the Taliban organization and goals call for a different IC strategy.” The author, therefore, advises us to “know our enemy” and also makes several cogent suggestions such as: “Stop focusing on the local leadership of the Taliban in Afghanistan and focus more on the central command in Quetta while pressuring Pakistan directly to take action there. … Focus new resources in places where the Taliban are still relatively weak: around Kabul and in the North to counter their strategy of geographical and ethnic extension of the war. … The current strategy of focusing the reinforcements in two provinces (Helmand and Kandahar) is risky. The lack of Afghan institutions condemns the IC forces to stay there indefinitely to prevent the return of the Taliban, especially since the Pakistani sanctuary enables them to conduct hit-and-run operations. In addition, the insurgency could rapidly redirect its resources to the North. Finally, more reinforcements will be needed in 2010 if this ‘clean and hold’ strategy is to be expanded to other provinces.” Dorronsoro ends this way: “NATO mistakenly views the insurgency as a local or regional phenomenon and has organized its forces accordingly, thereby failing to develop an integrated, coherent national response. The current offensive in Helmand, with its very local focus, is the latest example of this misguided strategy.” All good advice!
About the author: Dr. Alan Gropman teaches a course at the National Defense University called Public Policy Formulation: Think Tanks. He is a Life Member of MOAA and served 27 years in the U.S. Air Force. His ideas are his own.

Copyright Alan Gropman and Military Officers Association of America. All rights reserved.
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Captain Harris
10/21/2009 7:25:38 AM
This is an excellent article. Dorronsoro's article is riveting and is a must read. It will help explain our problems as well as the news today that the Pakistan army is not doing well in their battle--see McClatchy news today here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/77472.html