One of the readers of this blog sent me a note a few days ago posing the following questions,
Do the military medical services still lack the capacity to adequately treat mental problems? As a PTSD sufferer myself I can certainly attest to this paucity of care in the past, but I had believed improvements had been made. Was I wrong?
Is he wrong? Sadly, I must say he is. There are many sides to this tale…
The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter Chiarelli told the Associated Press that the Army believes there have been 140 active duty soldiers who have taken their own life. He says that is the same as all of 2008, but the 2009 is not over yet.
The other important point here is that this is the fifth year in a row that the number of suicides has exceeded the previous year. There were 102 suicides in 2006, 115 in 2007 and 140 in 2008. And keep in mind these are deaths of active duty soldiers. While the numbers are somewhat “foggy”, the Centers for Disease Control say that there may be as many as 18 veterans a day who take their own lives—that’s 6,500 a year. What makes this number “foggy” is that it includes veterans from all wars. The Department of Veterans Affairs says that 144 veterans out of 500,000 who served between 2002 and 2005 have taken their lives.
Marines have not fared any better and, as a matter of fact, their numbers may be worse. As of September of this year, 38 Marines have taken their lives and if the continue doing so at this rate, the Marine Corps is facing a 20% increase in suicides. One Marine report noted that less than 42% of those killing themselves since 2001 had any history of a deployment to one of the war zones. But in the last two year, some 70% of the 80 Marines who have committed suicide had a history of a deployment. The rate of suicides in the Army was 61% in 2008.
While the Marines say they can’t pinpoint the cause for the increase in suicides, I strongly believe that the pressure of increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO are wreaking havoc on morale of our service personnel. Commander Aaron Werbel, the suicide prevention program manager for the Marine Corps says he believes increased operational tempo is a contributing factor. Commander Werbel is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer with a PhD in clinical psychology.
The Navy and Air Force suicides rates have been a little better, but even those rates, around 11 per 100,000, have resulted in the loss 38 airmen and 41 sailors in 2008.
There are two interesting documents found at these links.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_suicide_032309w/
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2009/03/t20090318a.html
The first is an article from a March 2009 edition of the Air Force Times. The second is the prepared testimony of Kathryn A. Power, Director of the Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services of the Department of Health and Human Services before the United States SenateCommittee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel. Her testimony concerns what the Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs and DHHS are doing to help reduce the numbers of suicides among active duty personnel and veterans.
While I cannot say all is well to the reader who asked me about the state of mental health care, I can say that the Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services are making many efforts. Of course, finding a way to honorably get out of Iraq and Afghanistan would perhaps go a long ways toward solving some of the problems.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Hasan's Supervisor Warned Army In 2007
This article cited below is by Daniel Zwerdling of National Public Radio.
It really is necessary to read the memo at the link. In particular, read paragraph 4 very carefully. It is this paragaph that lets Major Hasan off the hook as well as the author Major Scott Moran. It equivocates, back peddles, is wishy washy, waffling or whatever name you wish to assign to someone who is protecting his 6 o'clock and is obviously concerned about possible litigation--one of the biggest crimes I believe we face in our society. It keeps us from being candid just when we need to be. It would be most interesting to see what was said in Major Hasan's Officer Evaluation Reports during his residency program. If they were as damning as some parts of Major Scott's memorandum, I have ask, "How did he get promoted to major?"
Army Regulation 623-105 Officer Evaluation Reporting System, provides detailed instructions for evaluating the performance and potential for promotion of all Army officers. There is even a special appendix regarding the evaluation of medical officers. [I have tried repeatedly to download the current version of this regulation but have not been able to do so.] The bottom line here is that equivocation on the part of Hasan's supervisors has resulted in an act of terrorism that is absolutely unforgivable. Unless Major Scott's concerns showed up in Hasan's OERs, the Army was not warned--a local academic review board was warned and that simply is NOT the answer. The reason I say this is the simple fact that Captain Hasan became MAJOR Hasan. And as many readers know, even if degorgatory comments were made, it is not unusual for senior reviewers to gloss over these comments or direct that they be rewritten.
Promoting and transferring Hasan were major leadership failures. I have said it before and I will say it again, physicians don't like to "rat out" other physicians. It is much like the Blue Wall of Silence found among police officers--fellow police officer don't "rat out" fellow police officers and physicians don't "rat out" other physicians. Does anyone remember Commander Donal (not misspelled) Billig?
There is plenty of room for blame here and I, for one, hope that is spread around on those responsible that they are appropriately disciplined. But I'm not making any bets on it--our leaders have become candy asses--always concerned about litigation and their public persona. Where are the George Pattons, Chesty Pullers, and Bull Halseys when we need them? Gone to grave yards everyone.
Read a transcript of the May 2007 memo obtained by NPR in which Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlines his concerns about Hasan:
http://www.npr.org/documents/2009/nov/hasanletter.pdf
November 18, 2009
In May of 2007 Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlined his concerns about Hasan in a memo.
Two years ago, a top psychiatrist at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was so concerned about what he saw as Nidal Hasan's incompetence and reckless behavior that he put those concerns in writing. NPR has obtained a copy of the memo, the first evaluation that has surfaced from Hasan's file.
Officials at Walter Reed sent that memo to Fort Hood this year when Hasan was transferred there.
Nevertheless, commanders still assigned Hasan — accused of killing 13 people in a mass shooting at Fort Hood on Nov. 5 — to work with some of the Army's most troubled and vulnerable soldiers.
The Damning Memo
On May 17, 2007, Hasan's supervisor at Walter Reed sent the memo to the Walter Reed credentials committee. It reads, "Memorandum for: Credentials Committee. Subject: CPT Nidal Hasan." More than a page long, the document warns that: "The Faculty has serious concerns about CPT Hasan's professionalism and work ethic. ... He demonstrates a pattern of poor judgment and a lack of professionalism." It is signed by the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, Maj. Scott Moran.
When shown the memo, two leading psychiatrists said it was so damning, it might have sunk Hasan's career if he had applied for a job outside the Army.
"Even if we were desperate for a psychiatrist, we would not even get him to the point where we would invite him for an interview," says Dr. Steven Sharfstein, who runs Sheppard Pratt's psychiatric medical center, based just outside Baltimore.
Sharfstein says it's a little hard to read the evaluation now and pretend that he doesn't know that Hasan is accused of shooting dozens of people. But he says if he had seen a memo like this about an applicant, Sharfstein would have avoided him like the plague.
The memo ticks off numerous problems over the course of Hasan's training, including proselytizing to his patients. It says he mistreated a homicidal patient and allowed her to escape from the emergency room, and that he blew off an important exam.
According to the memo, Hasan hardly did any work: He saw only 30 patients in 38 weeks. Sources at Walter Reed say most psychiatrists see at least 10 times that many patients. When Hasan was supposed to be on call for emergencies, he didn't even answer the phone.
Enlarge U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
Warning Signs
Sharfstein says the memo doesn't suggest that Hasan would end up shooting people, but it warns that Hasan was "somebody who could potentially put patients in danger."
"There are all kinds of warning signs, flashing red lights, that, in terms of just this paragraph, you'd say, 'Oh, no, this is not somebody that we would take a chance on.' "
Sharfstein says that in the 25 years he has been supervising and hiring psychiatrists, he has seen only a half-dozen evaluations this bad.
The memo does have a couple of qualifications that say something positive about Hasan. It says, "He is able to self-correct with supervision." And Moran writes, "I am not able to say he is not competent to graduate." [My emphasis]
Officials at Walter Reed told NPR that those statements were very carefully worded. What they convey is that when Hasan's supervisors read him the riot act — when they gave him intensive supervision — he would improve just enough so that they had to tell their commanders: "Hasan is capable of doing better."
But officials say nobody has the time to supervise a doctor that closely.
Alerting Fort Hood
"I would never, ever hire a physician with this kind of a record," says Judith Broder, who runs the Soldiers Project, an award-winning private therapy program for troops in Southern California.
Broder says that soldiers seeking therapy may be falling apart, filled with rage and a distrust of authority. What those soldiers need, she says, is a psychiatrist they can trust completely — not a therapist who fails to show up and abandons his patients.
"This kind of behavior could, in fact, set off a stress reaction" in a patient, she says. "It could be a trigger to a post-traumatic stress reaction."
Moran and Pentagon spokesmen declined NPR's requests for interviews for this story. Officials at Fort Hood would not comment, either.
But sources say that when the Army sent Hasan to Fort Hood earlier this year, Walter Reed sent the damning evaluation there, too. So commanders at Fort Hood would know exactly what they were getting.
It really is necessary to read the memo at the link. In particular, read paragraph 4 very carefully. It is this paragaph that lets Major Hasan off the hook as well as the author Major Scott Moran. It equivocates, back peddles, is wishy washy, waffling or whatever name you wish to assign to someone who is protecting his 6 o'clock and is obviously concerned about possible litigation--one of the biggest crimes I believe we face in our society. It keeps us from being candid just when we need to be. It would be most interesting to see what was said in Major Hasan's Officer Evaluation Reports during his residency program. If they were as damning as some parts of Major Scott's memorandum, I have ask, "How did he get promoted to major?"
Army Regulation 623-105 Officer Evaluation Reporting System, provides detailed instructions for evaluating the performance and potential for promotion of all Army officers. There is even a special appendix regarding the evaluation of medical officers. [I have tried repeatedly to download the current version of this regulation but have not been able to do so.] The bottom line here is that equivocation on the part of Hasan's supervisors has resulted in an act of terrorism that is absolutely unforgivable. Unless Major Scott's concerns showed up in Hasan's OERs, the Army was not warned--a local academic review board was warned and that simply is NOT the answer. The reason I say this is the simple fact that Captain Hasan became MAJOR Hasan. And as many readers know, even if degorgatory comments were made, it is not unusual for senior reviewers to gloss over these comments or direct that they be rewritten.
Promoting and transferring Hasan were major leadership failures. I have said it before and I will say it again, physicians don't like to "rat out" other physicians. It is much like the Blue Wall of Silence found among police officers--fellow police officer don't "rat out" fellow police officers and physicians don't "rat out" other physicians. Does anyone remember Commander Donal (not misspelled) Billig?
There is plenty of room for blame here and I, for one, hope that is spread around on those responsible that they are appropriately disciplined. But I'm not making any bets on it--our leaders have become candy asses--always concerned about litigation and their public persona. Where are the George Pattons, Chesty Pullers, and Bull Halseys when we need them? Gone to grave yards everyone.
Read a transcript of the May 2007 memo obtained by NPR in which Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlines his concerns about Hasan:
http://www.npr.org/documents/2009/nov/hasanletter.pdf
November 18, 2009
In May of 2007 Dr. Scott Moran, the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, outlined his concerns about Hasan in a memo.
Two years ago, a top psychiatrist at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was so concerned about what he saw as Nidal Hasan's incompetence and reckless behavior that he put those concerns in writing. NPR has obtained a copy of the memo, the first evaluation that has surfaced from Hasan's file.
Officials at Walter Reed sent that memo to Fort Hood this year when Hasan was transferred there.
Nevertheless, commanders still assigned Hasan — accused of killing 13 people in a mass shooting at Fort Hood on Nov. 5 — to work with some of the Army's most troubled and vulnerable soldiers.
The Damning Memo
On May 17, 2007, Hasan's supervisor at Walter Reed sent the memo to the Walter Reed credentials committee. It reads, "Memorandum for: Credentials Committee. Subject: CPT Nidal Hasan." More than a page long, the document warns that: "The Faculty has serious concerns about CPT Hasan's professionalism and work ethic. ... He demonstrates a pattern of poor judgment and a lack of professionalism." It is signed by the chief of psychiatric residents at Walter Reed, Maj. Scott Moran.
When shown the memo, two leading psychiatrists said it was so damning, it might have sunk Hasan's career if he had applied for a job outside the Army.
"Even if we were desperate for a psychiatrist, we would not even get him to the point where we would invite him for an interview," says Dr. Steven Sharfstein, who runs Sheppard Pratt's psychiatric medical center, based just outside Baltimore.
Sharfstein says it's a little hard to read the evaluation now and pretend that he doesn't know that Hasan is accused of shooting dozens of people. But he says if he had seen a memo like this about an applicant, Sharfstein would have avoided him like the plague.
The memo ticks off numerous problems over the course of Hasan's training, including proselytizing to his patients. It says he mistreated a homicidal patient and allowed her to escape from the emergency room, and that he blew off an important exam.
According to the memo, Hasan hardly did any work: He saw only 30 patients in 38 weeks. Sources at Walter Reed say most psychiatrists see at least 10 times that many patients. When Hasan was supposed to be on call for emergencies, he didn't even answer the phone.
Enlarge U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
U.S. Government Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Getty ImagesAn undated handout photo of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, earlier this month.
Warning Signs
Sharfstein says the memo doesn't suggest that Hasan would end up shooting people, but it warns that Hasan was "somebody who could potentially put patients in danger."
"There are all kinds of warning signs, flashing red lights, that, in terms of just this paragraph, you'd say, 'Oh, no, this is not somebody that we would take a chance on.' "
Sharfstein says that in the 25 years he has been supervising and hiring psychiatrists, he has seen only a half-dozen evaluations this bad.
The memo does have a couple of qualifications that say something positive about Hasan. It says, "He is able to self-correct with supervision." And Moran writes, "I am not able to say he is not competent to graduate." [My emphasis]
Officials at Walter Reed told NPR that those statements were very carefully worded. What they convey is that when Hasan's supervisors read him the riot act — when they gave him intensive supervision — he would improve just enough so that they had to tell their commanders: "Hasan is capable of doing better."
But officials say nobody has the time to supervise a doctor that closely.
Alerting Fort Hood
"I would never, ever hire a physician with this kind of a record," says Judith Broder, who runs the Soldiers Project, an award-winning private therapy program for troops in Southern California.
Broder says that soldiers seeking therapy may be falling apart, filled with rage and a distrust of authority. What those soldiers need, she says, is a psychiatrist they can trust completely — not a therapist who fails to show up and abandons his patients.
"This kind of behavior could, in fact, set off a stress reaction" in a patient, she says. "It could be a trigger to a post-traumatic stress reaction."
Moran and Pentagon spokesmen declined NPR's requests for interviews for this story. Officials at Fort Hood would not comment, either.
But sources say that when the Army sent Hasan to Fort Hood earlier this year, Walter Reed sent the damning evaluation there, too. So commanders at Fort Hood would know exactly what they were getting.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
The High Cost of War
This is a very interesting read from The New York Times. This is the very same problem the British faced in the years between World War I and World War II when they had a million-man army in the Middle East. The British finally decided it was just not possible to sustain this effort—they were out of money, out of men to send and the public and the military were tired of the effort. We have already spent over $230 billion in Afghanistan and over $700 billion in Iraq. As we approach the trillion-dollar mark, we don’t seem to be any closer to the end that President Obama says he is seeking. We are talking about spending roughly $1 million per year for each soldier, sailor, airman and Marine we have in these two countries. And we are doing this in one country that is corrupt beyond belief. President Hamid Karzai's election was an absolute fraud and just in the past day or so it has been reported that the Minister of Mines has taken a $30 million bribe from the Chinese for copper mining rights.
Stop and think about that for a moment—this would cover health care for every uninsured American with money left over. We could provide funding for projects in our own country that would help raise this nation out of this recession and perhaps, just perhaps, we could find a way to reduce our indebtedness to China by producing more goods here at home. Perhaps we could fund more research into making us less dependent on foreign oil. And perhaps, just perhaps, not near as many Americans would go to bed hungry each night.
Just think about it…
High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War
By CHRISTOPHER DREW
A version of this article appeared in print on November 15, 2009, on page A1 of the New York edition of The New York Times.
The latest internal government estimates place the cost of adding 40,000 American troops and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces, as favored by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan, at $40 billion to $54 billion a year, the officials said.
Even if fewer troops are sent, or their mission is modified, the rough formula used by the White House, of about $1 million per soldier a year, appears almost constant.
So even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.
Such an escalation in military spending would be a politically volatile issue for Mr. Obama at a time when the government budget deficit is soaring, the economy is weak and he is trying to pass a costly health care plan.
Senior members of the House Appropriations Committee have already expressed reservations about the potential long-term costs of expanding the war in Afghanistan. And Mr. Obama could find it difficult to win approval for the additional spending in Congress, where he would have to depend on Republicans to counter defections from liberal Democrats.
One senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to discuss the details of confidential deliberations, said these concerns had added to the president’s insistence at a White House meeting on Wednesday that each military option include the quickest possible exit strategy.
“The president focused a lot on ensuring that we were asking the difficult questions about getting to an end game here,” the official said. “He knows we cannot sustain this indefinitely.”
Sending fewer troops would lower the costs but would also place limitations on the buildup strategy. Sending 30,000 more troops, for example, would cost $25 billion to $30 billion a year while limiting how widely American forces could range. Deploying 20,000 troops would cost about $21 billion annually but would expand mainly the training of Afghans, the officials said.
The estimated $1 million a year it costs per soldier is higher than the $390,000 congressional researchers estimated in 2006.
Military analysts said the increase reflects a surge in costs for mine-resistant troop carriers and surveillance equipment that would apply to troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But some costs are unique to Afghanistan, where it can cost as much as $400 a gallon to deliver fuel to the troops through mountainous terrain.
Some administration estimates suggest it could also cost up to $50 billion over five years to more than double the size of the Afghan army and police force, to a total of 400,000. That includes recruiting, training and equipment.
At a stop at a military base in Alaska on Thursday, Mr. Obama told a gathering of soldiers that he would not risk more lives “unless it is necessary to America’s vital interests.” He added during his visit to Tokyo on Friday that he wanted to avoid taking any step that could be seen as an “open-ended commitment.”
The administration said Friday that it planned to cut up to 5 percent at domestic agencies in fiscal 2011 as part of an effort to reduce the federal budget deficit, which rose to $1.4 trillion with the economic stimulus and financial bailouts.
Several leading Republicans have criticized Mr. Obama’s willingness to spend more freely on domestic programs and urged him to provide General McChrystal with the resources he is seeking in Afghanistan.
“Keeping our country safe: Isn’t that the first job of government?” said Senator Christopher S. Bond, a Republican from Missouri and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If we have just a minimalist counterterrorism strategy, the Taliban will come back over the mountains from Pakistan, and they will be followed by their co-conspirators from the Al Qaeda organization.”
Cost is far from the only concern about escalating the war. The debate intensified last week amid disclosures that the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl W. Eikenberry, had sent cables to Washington expressing his reservations about deploying additional troops, citing weak Afghan leadership and widening corruption.
That kind of doubt could also make some in Congress hesitant to support an expansion of the war, especially with the midterm elections coming next year.
Representative David R. Obey, a Democrat from Wisconsin who heads the House Appropriations Committee, said recently that sending more troops to Afghanistan could drain the Treasury and “devour virtually any other priorities that the president or anyone in Congress had.”
Representative John Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of a subcommittee on defense appropriations, said in an interview that because of concerns about President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, he thought a majority of the 258 Democrats in the House would vote against any bill to pay for more troops. “A month ago, I would have said 60 to 70,” he said.
“Can you pass one?” Mr. Murtha said. “It depends on the Republicans.”
Mr. Murtha said he opposed sending more troops, though he would support any decision Mr. Obama made. He said he was concerned that even without a supplemental bill, total spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would surge past $1 trillion next year, which could hamper the economy for years to come.
Others said some Republicans could find it hard to justify a yes vote on troops after criticizing Mr. Obama for his spending. Some liberal Democrats said voters who had been drawn to Mr. Obama for his early opposition to the Iraq war could become disenchanted if he approved a major expansion in Afghanistan.
“In the times we’re in right now, I just totally believe that the public that elected President Obama really wants to see something different,” said Representative Lynn Woolsey, Democrat of California.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama was careful to say that he would not cut military spending while the nation was engaged in two wars. He also said it was important to shore up the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. And shortly after he took office, he approved sending an additional 21,000 soldiers there, bringing the total American force to 68,000.
Still, many of his supporters assumed that his pledges to withdraw from Iraq, and to rein in the cost overruns on high-tech weapons programs, would still produce significant savings.
But even though Mr. Obama has won battles to cancel the F-22 fighter plane and other advanced programs, the immediate savings have been offset by increased spending on the surveillance drones and mine-resistant vehicles needed in the field now.
And he recently signed a $680 billion military authorization bill for fiscal 2010 that represented a 2.7 percent increase over the 2009 spending level and a 1.9 percent increase over President Bush’s peak budget in fiscal 2008.
The administration has projected that spending on Iraq would drop by $25.8 billion in fiscal 2010, to $60.8 billion, as most of the troops withdraw.
It also expected spending on the Afghanistan war to increase by $18.5 billion in fiscal 2010, to $65.4 billion, for a net savings on the two wars of $7.3 billion, if no more troops were added.
Stop and think about that for a moment—this would cover health care for every uninsured American with money left over. We could provide funding for projects in our own country that would help raise this nation out of this recession and perhaps, just perhaps, we could find a way to reduce our indebtedness to China by producing more goods here at home. Perhaps we could fund more research into making us less dependent on foreign oil. And perhaps, just perhaps, not near as many Americans would go to bed hungry each night.
Just think about it…
High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War
By CHRISTOPHER DREW
A version of this article appeared in print on November 15, 2009, on page A1 of the New York edition of The New York Times.
The latest internal government estimates place the cost of adding 40,000 American troops and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces, as favored by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan, at $40 billion to $54 billion a year, the officials said.
Even if fewer troops are sent, or their mission is modified, the rough formula used by the White House, of about $1 million per soldier a year, appears almost constant.
So even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.
Such an escalation in military spending would be a politically volatile issue for Mr. Obama at a time when the government budget deficit is soaring, the economy is weak and he is trying to pass a costly health care plan.
Senior members of the House Appropriations Committee have already expressed reservations about the potential long-term costs of expanding the war in Afghanistan. And Mr. Obama could find it difficult to win approval for the additional spending in Congress, where he would have to depend on Republicans to counter defections from liberal Democrats.
One senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to discuss the details of confidential deliberations, said these concerns had added to the president’s insistence at a White House meeting on Wednesday that each military option include the quickest possible exit strategy.
“The president focused a lot on ensuring that we were asking the difficult questions about getting to an end game here,” the official said. “He knows we cannot sustain this indefinitely.”
Sending fewer troops would lower the costs but would also place limitations on the buildup strategy. Sending 30,000 more troops, for example, would cost $25 billion to $30 billion a year while limiting how widely American forces could range. Deploying 20,000 troops would cost about $21 billion annually but would expand mainly the training of Afghans, the officials said.
The estimated $1 million a year it costs per soldier is higher than the $390,000 congressional researchers estimated in 2006.
Military analysts said the increase reflects a surge in costs for mine-resistant troop carriers and surveillance equipment that would apply to troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But some costs are unique to Afghanistan, where it can cost as much as $400 a gallon to deliver fuel to the troops through mountainous terrain.
Some administration estimates suggest it could also cost up to $50 billion over five years to more than double the size of the Afghan army and police force, to a total of 400,000. That includes recruiting, training and equipment.
At a stop at a military base in Alaska on Thursday, Mr. Obama told a gathering of soldiers that he would not risk more lives “unless it is necessary to America’s vital interests.” He added during his visit to Tokyo on Friday that he wanted to avoid taking any step that could be seen as an “open-ended commitment.”
The administration said Friday that it planned to cut up to 5 percent at domestic agencies in fiscal 2011 as part of an effort to reduce the federal budget deficit, which rose to $1.4 trillion with the economic stimulus and financial bailouts.
Several leading Republicans have criticized Mr. Obama’s willingness to spend more freely on domestic programs and urged him to provide General McChrystal with the resources he is seeking in Afghanistan.
“Keeping our country safe: Isn’t that the first job of government?” said Senator Christopher S. Bond, a Republican from Missouri and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If we have just a minimalist counterterrorism strategy, the Taliban will come back over the mountains from Pakistan, and they will be followed by their co-conspirators from the Al Qaeda organization.”
Cost is far from the only concern about escalating the war. The debate intensified last week amid disclosures that the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl W. Eikenberry, had sent cables to Washington expressing his reservations about deploying additional troops, citing weak Afghan leadership and widening corruption.
That kind of doubt could also make some in Congress hesitant to support an expansion of the war, especially with the midterm elections coming next year.
Representative David R. Obey, a Democrat from Wisconsin who heads the House Appropriations Committee, said recently that sending more troops to Afghanistan could drain the Treasury and “devour virtually any other priorities that the president or anyone in Congress had.”
Representative John Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of a subcommittee on defense appropriations, said in an interview that because of concerns about President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, he thought a majority of the 258 Democrats in the House would vote against any bill to pay for more troops. “A month ago, I would have said 60 to 70,” he said.
“Can you pass one?” Mr. Murtha said. “It depends on the Republicans.”
Mr. Murtha said he opposed sending more troops, though he would support any decision Mr. Obama made. He said he was concerned that even without a supplemental bill, total spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would surge past $1 trillion next year, which could hamper the economy for years to come.
Others said some Republicans could find it hard to justify a yes vote on troops after criticizing Mr. Obama for his spending. Some liberal Democrats said voters who had been drawn to Mr. Obama for his early opposition to the Iraq war could become disenchanted if he approved a major expansion in Afghanistan.
“In the times we’re in right now, I just totally believe that the public that elected President Obama really wants to see something different,” said Representative Lynn Woolsey, Democrat of California.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama was careful to say that he would not cut military spending while the nation was engaged in two wars. He also said it was important to shore up the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. And shortly after he took office, he approved sending an additional 21,000 soldiers there, bringing the total American force to 68,000.
Still, many of his supporters assumed that his pledges to withdraw from Iraq, and to rein in the cost overruns on high-tech weapons programs, would still produce significant savings.
But even though Mr. Obama has won battles to cancel the F-22 fighter plane and other advanced programs, the immediate savings have been offset by increased spending on the surveillance drones and mine-resistant vehicles needed in the field now.
And he recently signed a $680 billion military authorization bill for fiscal 2010 that represented a 2.7 percent increase over the 2009 spending level and a 1.9 percent increase over President Bush’s peak budget in fiscal 2008.
The administration has projected that spending on Iraq would drop by $25.8 billion in fiscal 2010, to $60.8 billion, as most of the troops withdraw.
It also expected spending on the Afghanistan war to increase by $18.5 billion in fiscal 2010, to $65.4 billion, for a net savings on the two wars of $7.3 billion, if no more troops were added.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Hasan—Premeditated Murder, A Terrorist Act or Insanity?
Hasan—Premeditated Murder, A Terrorist Act or Insanity?
On November 12, 2009, military prosecutors charged the Army psychiatrist with 13 counts of premeditated murder in last week's rampage at Fort Hood, Tex.
In an article published in The Washington Post on Friday, November 13, 2009, Christopher Grey, a spokesman for the Armys Criminal Investigation Division stated, “We're looking at every reason for this shooting." He further stated, "We're aggressively following every possible lead."
The same article went on to say, “Investigators say they think he was the only gunman. Grey, however, left open the possibility that someone else may have helped instigate the attack. He said military prosecutors may charge Hasan with additional crimes.”
And finally,
In the same article, William Cassara, a former Army captain and lawyer who is now in private practice in Augusta, Ga., "I would fully anticipate that the charge sheet in this case will get much longer."
I would presume from this chit-chat, that the Army has not ruled out charging Major Hasan with conducting a terrorist attack. However, in the same Friday the 13th Post article, Guy Womack, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who practices military law in Houston, speculated that Hasan's defense counsel, retired Colonel John Galligan, probably will argue that Hasan was mentally unstable at the time of the shootings.
Womack postulated that, "The defense argument will be that Major Hasan knew that he would be identified, he knew that he would be captured, and he did it anyway, so clearly he was insane, that his mental defect was so severe that he couldn't control his actions from right and wrong," [My emphasis]
There is no doubt in my mind that Lieutenant Colonel Womack’s assessment as to the possible insanity plea is right on the mark.
Why?
Because we just aren’t able to wrap our mind around the idea that an individual, particularly a follower of Islam, could/would commit an act of terrorism without being part of a larger radical Islamic plot. Unless, of course, the individual was insane. Why else would someone do something as horrendous as this?
In a previous posting, I had listed an article the Scott Stewart and Fred Burton who reported that Nasir al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called on jihadists, "…to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West.” Stewart and Burton also noted “… how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.”
On November 7, 2009, The New York Times reported in an article by Nicole Bengiveno, that, “After two days of inquiry into the mass shooting at Fort Hood, investigators have tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist plot.” Ms. Bengiveno went on to report, “… the investigators, working with behavioral experts, suggested that he might have long suffered from emotional problems that were exacerbated by the tensions of his work with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who returned home with serious psychiatric problems.”
As I noted above, we just can’t get our head wrapped around the idea that Major Hasan intentionally or unintentionally followed al-Wahayshi’s advice to, “conduct simple attacks…” In this case a lone gunman, a fellow soldier, gunned down and killed 13 people and wounded another 30. This was an act of terrorism by a radical Islamist, not the act of someone who did not know what he was doing and could not distinguish right from wrong. Major Hasan thought about this; he bought two guns, he bought ammunition, he bought a laser pistol sight and, according to reports, spent time at a shooting range familiarizing himself with his newly acquired capability. And the idea that you must belong to some terrorist group like al Qaeda or some terrorist cell to commit terrorist acts is passé. Groups or cells are much easier to track; a lone terrorist is invisible to the untrained eye. The sooner we figure this out, the better off we will be.
The act of terrorist or an insane person? The line may be fine. A radical Islamist may certain seem insane to we “non-believers”, yet in at least one instance his act has been proclaimed to be the act of a hero. Surely if Major Hasan had been killed that day, he would have been proclaimed a martyr by radical Islamists.
On November 12, 2009, military prosecutors charged the Army psychiatrist with 13 counts of premeditated murder in last week's rampage at Fort Hood, Tex.
In an article published in The Washington Post on Friday, November 13, 2009, Christopher Grey, a spokesman for the Armys Criminal Investigation Division stated, “We're looking at every reason for this shooting." He further stated, "We're aggressively following every possible lead."
The same article went on to say, “Investigators say they think he was the only gunman. Grey, however, left open the possibility that someone else may have helped instigate the attack. He said military prosecutors may charge Hasan with additional crimes.”
And finally,
In the same article, William Cassara, a former Army captain and lawyer who is now in private practice in Augusta, Ga., "I would fully anticipate that the charge sheet in this case will get much longer."
I would presume from this chit-chat, that the Army has not ruled out charging Major Hasan with conducting a terrorist attack. However, in the same Friday the 13th Post article, Guy Womack, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who practices military law in Houston, speculated that Hasan's defense counsel, retired Colonel John Galligan, probably will argue that Hasan was mentally unstable at the time of the shootings.
Womack postulated that, "The defense argument will be that Major Hasan knew that he would be identified, he knew that he would be captured, and he did it anyway, so clearly he was insane, that his mental defect was so severe that he couldn't control his actions from right and wrong," [My emphasis]
There is no doubt in my mind that Lieutenant Colonel Womack’s assessment as to the possible insanity plea is right on the mark.
Why?
Because we just aren’t able to wrap our mind around the idea that an individual, particularly a follower of Islam, could/would commit an act of terrorism without being part of a larger radical Islamic plot. Unless, of course, the individual was insane. Why else would someone do something as horrendous as this?
In a previous posting, I had listed an article the Scott Stewart and Fred Burton who reported that Nasir al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called on jihadists, "…to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West.” Stewart and Burton also noted “… how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.”
On November 7, 2009, The New York Times reported in an article by Nicole Bengiveno, that, “After two days of inquiry into the mass shooting at Fort Hood, investigators have tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist plot.” Ms. Bengiveno went on to report, “… the investigators, working with behavioral experts, suggested that he might have long suffered from emotional problems that were exacerbated by the tensions of his work with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who returned home with serious psychiatric problems.”
As I noted above, we just can’t get our head wrapped around the idea that Major Hasan intentionally or unintentionally followed al-Wahayshi’s advice to, “conduct simple attacks…” In this case a lone gunman, a fellow soldier, gunned down and killed 13 people and wounded another 30. This was an act of terrorism by a radical Islamist, not the act of someone who did not know what he was doing and could not distinguish right from wrong. Major Hasan thought about this; he bought two guns, he bought ammunition, he bought a laser pistol sight and, according to reports, spent time at a shooting range familiarizing himself with his newly acquired capability. And the idea that you must belong to some terrorist group like al Qaeda or some terrorist cell to commit terrorist acts is passé. Groups or cells are much easier to track; a lone terrorist is invisible to the untrained eye. The sooner we figure this out, the better off we will be.
The act of terrorist or an insane person? The line may be fine. A radical Islamist may certain seem insane to we “non-believers”, yet in at least one instance his act has been proclaimed to be the act of a hero. Surely if Major Hasan had been killed that day, he would have been proclaimed a martyr by radical Islamists.
Friday, November 13, 2009
A look back at the Tomb of the Unknowns
I found this on the Military.com website and thought is was appropriate considering our recent celebration of Veterans' Day (Armistice Day to those of us who are old enough to remember). As Ms. Miriam Felt describes the events of the day, it certainly was one that a person would remember for the rest of their life.
The tomb and the nearby crypts contain the remains of an Unknown from World War I, World War II, and Korea. An additional crypt did hold the remains of an Unknown from Vietnam, but the remains of the Vietnam Unknown were exhumed May 14, 1998. Based on mitochondrial DNA testing, Department of Defense scientists identified the remains as those of Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie, who was shot down near An Loc, Vietnam, in 1972. The identification was announced on June 30, 1998 and on July 10, Blassie's remains arrived home to his family in St. Louis, Missouri; he was reinterred at Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery.
Interestingly enough, my great-great grandfather Lemuel Purteet is buried in this same cemetery. He was a civilian Confederate sympathizer who became a POW after a battle near St. Louis, MO. He died while a POW and was buried in this cemetery in a section set aside for the remains of Confederate soldiers and some civilians. It is an impressive cemetery just south of St. Louis well worth seeing if you are ever in that area.
I don't know if there will ever be anymore Unknowns because of the capability of DNA tracking. It would be wonderful if there never was another Unknown because there were no more wars. But that does not seem to be the nature of man who needs to continually exercise the territorial imperative.
Tomb of the Unknowns
“Here Rests In Honored Glory An American Solider Known But To God"
These words are inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery. The Tomb of the Unknowns symbolizes those of America who gave their lives in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War in defense of the Nation’s integrity, honor, and tranquility.
Numerous ceremonies are performed annually at the Tomb to honor these soldiers and to show the nation’s respect for members of the United States Armed Forces.
The most notable of such ceremonies are wreath-laying ceremonies that take place on National holidays, such as Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day, where the President or his designee lays a wreath to mark the national observance of that day. Also, held in high esteem are wreath laying ceremonies that occur during state visits. At these ceremonies, the visiting head of state will pay formal respects to the sacrifice of America’s veterans in foreign wars by placing a wreath before the Tomb.
All ceremonies performed at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, with the exception of Tomb Guard duty performed by the Army Honor Guard, are Joint Service functions led by the Military District of Washington. Therefore, the members of the Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard serve as active participants in all Joint Service ceremonies performed at the Tomb, including the highly respected wreath laying ceremonies. During these ceremonies, each service of the Armed Forces (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) provide Ceremonial Honor Guard personnel to represent their respective service to the public and to the leaders of foreign countries. The Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard strives to prepare its members for these ceremonies through hours of practice in weapons drill, uniform maintenance, and military bearing.
In the following letter, Miriam ("Mimi") Felt describes the gravity of the first ceremony for Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery in November 1921. At that time, Mimi was 23-years-old and worked in the water sanitation division of the U.S. Health Service in Washington, DC.
Sunday (Nov. 13, 1921)
Dear Family,
Well, this last week has been quite an event in history, and I certainly do wish you all could have been in Washington. It certainly is something I shall never forget. Somehow, you can talk about it and think about it, but the realization of the whole thing struck me so much more by seeing it all, and it was so impressive. Of course, Washington is alive with foreigners of all sorts, and I am turning around all the time to see something else for fear I will miss something. The crowds have been simply enormous, and I feel considerably thinner from having wedged my way through. But leave it to Clara, we are always on the front line.
Thursday night after work, Gertie and I went up to the Capitol to see the body in state there. We went up about six o'clock , thinking the crowd would not be so large. But at that time the line (four abreast) extended over two blocks, and by the time we had reached the Capitol steps and could look back at the crowd, it extended up one side of the park, down another side, then the third side of it and on beyond around the Capitol building where we could see no farther, so I don't know how much longer it was. It was perfectly beautifully managed, and there was no crowding, and everyone, strangely enough, acted as though they really were there to pay respect to the memory which that body was to represent to the country, and not there to see out of curiosity.
There were guards, of course, all up the line and then a special guard of honor around the catafalque. The flowers were simply magnificent, each state and then different organizations sent wreaths or flowers made up in some beautiful piece. President Harding's wreath of red roses was on the bier and also a white ribbon was draped over it, which Mrs. Harding had made. It was most impressive, all told.
Friday bright and early, we arose and went down on Pennsylvania Avenue to see the funeral procession. Of course, we had hysterics over Clara trying to wedge us in amidst the crowd. I'll have to leave the details of that to tell. Something on the order of Inauguration, however. It was sort of a fitting setting all around for it, because you remember I told you the day the Olympia arrived with the body, it was very rainy and dark, and in my mind sort of typified the thing itself. Then Friday, when the procession started, it was as though it were in the "gray dawn", for the sun didn't really break through until it was about all passed. And that went with that part of it, too, to me.
There were represented in the procession about every branch of service, and all the organizations, etc. President Harding and the cabinet and the Senate all walked, and we had a chance to see them all very clearly. Only I missed finding Taft until he was passed. I am going to have to see him soon, somehow. It seems that because I am specially anxious to see him, I always miss him!
Did you know that this was the first time in History that three Presidents were seen in the same procession? Wilson had to ride, of course. He looked quite well, and people that have seen him recently seem to think he is much improved. I couldn't quite understand, however, why Mrs. Wilson had to ride by his side, for she was the only lady of that sort in it. The President and cabinet etc. dropped out at the White House and rode up to Arlington. The rest marched on. We didn't attempt to go there because there was no chance of seeing anything and we figured we could read the speech. We had seen the cemetery on Wednesday and knew about what would take place. I'm glad we didn't attempt it for most people were about five hours in all getting up and back.
Then that night was the illumination of the jeweled arch. It was wonderful! When the lights first started to come on, you could see the different lines of the search lights gradually cross each other, and then finally shine out in the most beautiful colors you have ever seen. They fired twenty-one minute guns and the lights were seen through the smoke. I just can't describe to you the effect of it all.
I declare the arch was something that you cannot conceive of man making, somehow. It seemed almost superhuman. The pillars on either side of the street were made into monument effects, the tops from about half way up being covered with sequents of some sort. This all was on a larger base, and around them, on each base, was a large eagle, and incense bowls all around too, burning. In the center of the arch was a large circle composed of smaller circles, and within each of these the picture of the various flags. Then hanging from the pillars was a straight band of vari-colored glass, I guess it must have been, which positively sparkled with more beautiful colors than I have ever seen. They threw different colored search lights on it from all sides. And that wasn't all — the Washington monument was lighted so that it looked as though there were streamers of white light from the top to the bottom, and two search lights from the top crossed and were sent out over the city. Also lights were thrown from the Capitol building so far away which were visible, too.
All along the street in front of the Pan American building where the Conference will be held for the most part, there were erected tall poles with Eagles on the top and colored, lighted box effects built about them of the different shields, that is, "flag productions" of the shields. It made the whole street lighter than day, of course, and with all the various colors it certainly was a vision to behold! Course, you will see it in the movies, and maybe not recognize my description of it all, but it's the best I can do, and I thought perhaps Mother and Dad, at least, would like to hear my own description of it!
Yours,
Daughter, Sister and sweetheart.
M
(As a postscript, Ms. Felt wrote:)
Give my love to Grandpa. Sorry he isn't feeling up to par. Tell him to be a good boy. Tell him too that some of his old "cronies" marched to Arlington Friday and they looked mighty fine, I'll tell you - and I thought a lot about what he did for his country.
The Veterans Day National Committee thanks Ms. Barbara Felt, the author's niece, for sharing this letter to relatives written by her Aunt Mimi.
The tomb and the nearby crypts contain the remains of an Unknown from World War I, World War II, and Korea. An additional crypt did hold the remains of an Unknown from Vietnam, but the remains of the Vietnam Unknown were exhumed May 14, 1998. Based on mitochondrial DNA testing, Department of Defense scientists identified the remains as those of Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie, who was shot down near An Loc, Vietnam, in 1972. The identification was announced on June 30, 1998 and on July 10, Blassie's remains arrived home to his family in St. Louis, Missouri; he was reinterred at Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery.
Interestingly enough, my great-great grandfather Lemuel Purteet is buried in this same cemetery. He was a civilian Confederate sympathizer who became a POW after a battle near St. Louis, MO. He died while a POW and was buried in this cemetery in a section set aside for the remains of Confederate soldiers and some civilians. It is an impressive cemetery just south of St. Louis well worth seeing if you are ever in that area.
I don't know if there will ever be anymore Unknowns because of the capability of DNA tracking. It would be wonderful if there never was another Unknown because there were no more wars. But that does not seem to be the nature of man who needs to continually exercise the territorial imperative.
Tomb of the Unknowns
“Here Rests In Honored Glory An American Solider Known But To God"
These words are inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery. The Tomb of the Unknowns symbolizes those of America who gave their lives in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War in defense of the Nation’s integrity, honor, and tranquility.
Numerous ceremonies are performed annually at the Tomb to honor these soldiers and to show the nation’s respect for members of the United States Armed Forces.
The most notable of such ceremonies are wreath-laying ceremonies that take place on National holidays, such as Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day, where the President or his designee lays a wreath to mark the national observance of that day. Also, held in high esteem are wreath laying ceremonies that occur during state visits. At these ceremonies, the visiting head of state will pay formal respects to the sacrifice of America’s veterans in foreign wars by placing a wreath before the Tomb.
All ceremonies performed at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, with the exception of Tomb Guard duty performed by the Army Honor Guard, are Joint Service functions led by the Military District of Washington. Therefore, the members of the Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard serve as active participants in all Joint Service ceremonies performed at the Tomb, including the highly respected wreath laying ceremonies. During these ceremonies, each service of the Armed Forces (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) provide Ceremonial Honor Guard personnel to represent their respective service to the public and to the leaders of foreign countries. The Coast Guard Ceremonial Honor Guard strives to prepare its members for these ceremonies through hours of practice in weapons drill, uniform maintenance, and military bearing.
In the following letter, Miriam ("Mimi") Felt describes the gravity of the first ceremony for Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery in November 1921. At that time, Mimi was 23-years-old and worked in the water sanitation division of the U.S. Health Service in Washington, DC.
Sunday (Nov. 13, 1921)
Dear Family,
Well, this last week has been quite an event in history, and I certainly do wish you all could have been in Washington. It certainly is something I shall never forget. Somehow, you can talk about it and think about it, but the realization of the whole thing struck me so much more by seeing it all, and it was so impressive. Of course, Washington is alive with foreigners of all sorts, and I am turning around all the time to see something else for fear I will miss something. The crowds have been simply enormous, and I feel considerably thinner from having wedged my way through. But leave it to Clara, we are always on the front line.
Thursday night after work, Gertie and I went up to the Capitol to see the body in state there. We went up about six o'clock , thinking the crowd would not be so large. But at that time the line (four abreast) extended over two blocks, and by the time we had reached the Capitol steps and could look back at the crowd, it extended up one side of the park, down another side, then the third side of it and on beyond around the Capitol building where we could see no farther, so I don't know how much longer it was. It was perfectly beautifully managed, and there was no crowding, and everyone, strangely enough, acted as though they really were there to pay respect to the memory which that body was to represent to the country, and not there to see out of curiosity.
There were guards, of course, all up the line and then a special guard of honor around the catafalque. The flowers were simply magnificent, each state and then different organizations sent wreaths or flowers made up in some beautiful piece. President Harding's wreath of red roses was on the bier and also a white ribbon was draped over it, which Mrs. Harding had made. It was most impressive, all told.
Friday bright and early, we arose and went down on Pennsylvania Avenue to see the funeral procession. Of course, we had hysterics over Clara trying to wedge us in amidst the crowd. I'll have to leave the details of that to tell. Something on the order of Inauguration, however. It was sort of a fitting setting all around for it, because you remember I told you the day the Olympia arrived with the body, it was very rainy and dark, and in my mind sort of typified the thing itself. Then Friday, when the procession started, it was as though it were in the "gray dawn", for the sun didn't really break through until it was about all passed. And that went with that part of it, too, to me.
There were represented in the procession about every branch of service, and all the organizations, etc. President Harding and the cabinet and the Senate all walked, and we had a chance to see them all very clearly. Only I missed finding Taft until he was passed. I am going to have to see him soon, somehow. It seems that because I am specially anxious to see him, I always miss him!
Did you know that this was the first time in History that three Presidents were seen in the same procession? Wilson had to ride, of course. He looked quite well, and people that have seen him recently seem to think he is much improved. I couldn't quite understand, however, why Mrs. Wilson had to ride by his side, for she was the only lady of that sort in it. The President and cabinet etc. dropped out at the White House and rode up to Arlington. The rest marched on. We didn't attempt to go there because there was no chance of seeing anything and we figured we could read the speech. We had seen the cemetery on Wednesday and knew about what would take place. I'm glad we didn't attempt it for most people were about five hours in all getting up and back.
Then that night was the illumination of the jeweled arch. It was wonderful! When the lights first started to come on, you could see the different lines of the search lights gradually cross each other, and then finally shine out in the most beautiful colors you have ever seen. They fired twenty-one minute guns and the lights were seen through the smoke. I just can't describe to you the effect of it all.
I declare the arch was something that you cannot conceive of man making, somehow. It seemed almost superhuman. The pillars on either side of the street were made into monument effects, the tops from about half way up being covered with sequents of some sort. This all was on a larger base, and around them, on each base, was a large eagle, and incense bowls all around too, burning. In the center of the arch was a large circle composed of smaller circles, and within each of these the picture of the various flags. Then hanging from the pillars was a straight band of vari-colored glass, I guess it must have been, which positively sparkled with more beautiful colors than I have ever seen. They threw different colored search lights on it from all sides. And that wasn't all — the Washington monument was lighted so that it looked as though there were streamers of white light from the top to the bottom, and two search lights from the top crossed and were sent out over the city. Also lights were thrown from the Capitol building so far away which were visible, too.
All along the street in front of the Pan American building where the Conference will be held for the most part, there were erected tall poles with Eagles on the top and colored, lighted box effects built about them of the different shields, that is, "flag productions" of the shields. It made the whole street lighter than day, of course, and with all the various colors it certainly was a vision to behold! Course, you will see it in the movies, and maybe not recognize my description of it all, but it's the best I can do, and I thought perhaps Mother and Dad, at least, would like to hear my own description of it!
Yours,
Daughter, Sister and sweetheart.
M
(As a postscript, Ms. Felt wrote:)
Give my love to Grandpa. Sorry he isn't feeling up to par. Tell him to be a good boy. Tell him too that some of his old "cronies" marched to Arlington Friday and they looked mighty fine, I'll tell you - and I thought a lot about what he did for his country.
The Veterans Day National Committee thanks Ms. Barbara Felt, the author's niece, for sharing this letter to relatives written by her Aunt Mimi.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
THE CLASSIC STATE VS DEFENSE BATTLE--WHO IS IN CHARGE
Depending on your views about what we should do in Afghanistan, you may agree that Ambassador Karl Eikenberry is right or that General Stanley McChrystal is right. Either way, this is could turn out to be the whizzing contest of all whizzing contests.
Why would we expect Afghanistan to do anything different than what it has done for centuries? Why should we expect them to be eager to commit more resources from what little they have if we are willing to do their fighting for them?
Why would we expect the oppossition party to do anything else but Monday morning quarterbacking? It was their former leader who started the war in Afghanistan and then abandoned it in favor of toppling Saddam Hussein. The end result is two campaigns that are literally and figuratively bleeding us dry; killing and maiming our young men and women by the hundreds while we make little if any headway.
I cannot blame President Obama for being gun shy--Afghanistan is known as the graveyard of empires and I am certain he does not want us buried there. He must do something though because we can't just leave what we have in country to fend for itself. We either have to fish, cut bait or get out of the boat. The question is, "What and how do we do it?"
Afghanistan is not a "nation"--it is a place and people. There are numerous tribes who mostly live in remote villages in "tribal territories/districts/or whatever you want to call them" and there are some wht I chose to call "city states", much like ancient Greece--Kabul (the capital), Kandahar and Herat. There are four major languages and perhaps 30 minor languages. Pashtuns and Tajiks make up about 70% of the population while Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen, and Balochs make up about 25% and the remainder are "odds and ends."
Afghanistan is vast, some 250,000 square miles, just a little smaller than Texas; however, the terrain is very mountainous and rugged with little infrastructure once outside the cities. If we put a million troops into Afghanistan, we still could not "secure" it nor could we sustain such a force. Neither can Afghanistan--it has neither the willpower nor the resources.
Somehow, the tribal areas have to be developed to stand on their own against the Taliban and al Quaeda. We have to find a way to reassure them that we are not there to conquer them, but to help them become self-sufficient when it comes to their own defense.
If possible we have to find a way to clean up the "central" government; get rid of its corruption, which foments the distrust of the tribal leaders. So far we have not been successful. We jumped on the Karzai bandwagon only to find out it is seen as anathema to the tribal leaders with Karzain a corrupt American puppet. The recent national election debacle only reaffirmed this to Afghanis and the outside world. But we picked "our man in Kabul" and it would seem we are stuck with him.
Anyone have any answers?
George
Official: Obama wants revised Afghan war options
By BEN FELLER and ANNE GEARAN, AP
2 hours ago
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama won't accept any of the Afghanistan war options before him without changes, a senior administration official said, as concerns soar over the ability of the Afghan government to secure its own country one day.
Obama's stance comes as his own ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, is voicing strong dissent about a U.S. troop increase, according to a second administration official.
Eikenberry's misgivings center on a concern that bolstering the American presence in Afghanistan could make the country more reliant on the U.S., not less. He expressed them in forcefully worded cables to Washington just ahead of Obama's latest war meeting Wednesday.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss administration deliberations.
The developments underscore U.S. skepticism about the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose government has been dogged by corruption. The emerging administration message is that Obama will not do anything to lock in an open-ended U.S. commitment.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Thursday that she is concerned about Afghanistan's "corruption, lack of transparency, poor governance (and) absence of the rule of law."
"We're looking to President Karzai as he forms a new government to take action that will demonstrate — not just to the international community but first and foremost to his own people — that his second term will respond the needs that are so manifest," Clinton said during a news conference in Manila with Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo.
Obama is still expected to send in more troops to bolster a deteriorating war effort.
He remains close to announcing his revamped war strategy — troops are just one component — and probably will do so shortly after he returns from a trip to Asia that ends Nov. 19.
Yet in Wednesday's pivotal war council meeting, Obama wasn't satisfied with any of the Afghanistan war options presented by his national security team, one official said.
The president instead pushed for revisions to clarify how and when U.S. troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government. In turn, that could change the dynamic of both how many additional troops are sent to Afghanistan and what the timeline would be for their presence in the war zone, according to the official.
Military officials said Obama has asked for a rewrite before and resisted what one official called a one-way highway toward war commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's recommendations for more troops. The sense that he was being rushed and railroaded has stiffened Obama's resolve to seek information and options beyond military planning, officials said, though a substantial troop increase is still likely.
The president is considering options that include adding 30,000 or more U.S. forces to take on the Taliban in key areas of Afghanistan and to buy time for the Afghan government's small and ill-equipped fighting forces to take over. The other three options on the table are ranges of troop increases, from a relatively small addition of forces to the roughly 40,000 that McChrystal prefers, according to military and other officials.
The war is now in its ninth year and is claiming U.S. lives at a record pace as military leaders say the Taliban has the upper hand in many parts of the country.
Eikenberry, the top U.S. envoy to Kabul and a former commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, is a prominent voice among those advising Obama, and his sharp dissent is sure to affect the equation.
The options given to Obama will now be altered, although not overhauled.
Military officials say one approach is a compromise battle plan that would add 30,000or more U.S. forces atop a record 68,000 in the country now. They described it as "half and half," meaning half fighting and half training and holding ground so the Afghans can regroup.
"The government of Afghanistan has to accept greater responsibility for its own defense," Clinton said Thursday. She had no comment on the Eikenberry memos.
The White House says Obama has not made a final choice, though military and other officials have said he appears near to approving a slightly smaller increase than McChrystal wants at the outset.
Among the options for Obama would be ways to phase in additional troops, perhaps eventually equaling McChrystal's full request, based on security or other conditions in Afghanistan and troop levels by U.S. allies there.
The White House has chafed under criticism from Republicans and some outside critics that Obama is dragging his feet to make a decision.
Obama's top military advisers have said they are comfortable with the pace of the process, and senior military officials have pointed out that the president still has time since no additional forces could begin flowing into Afghanistan until early next year.
Under the scenario featuring about 30,000 more troops, that number most likely would be assembled from three Army brigades and a Marine Corps contingent, plus a new headquarters operation that would be staffed by 7,000 or more troops, a senior military official said. There would be a heavy emphasis on the training of Afghan forces, and the reinforcements Obama sends could include thousands of U.S. military trainers.
___
Associated Press writers Matthew Lee in Manila, Philippines, and Pamela Hess in Washington contributed to this report.
Why would we expect Afghanistan to do anything different than what it has done for centuries? Why should we expect them to be eager to commit more resources from what little they have if we are willing to do their fighting for them?
Why would we expect the oppossition party to do anything else but Monday morning quarterbacking? It was their former leader who started the war in Afghanistan and then abandoned it in favor of toppling Saddam Hussein. The end result is two campaigns that are literally and figuratively bleeding us dry; killing and maiming our young men and women by the hundreds while we make little if any headway.
I cannot blame President Obama for being gun shy--Afghanistan is known as the graveyard of empires and I am certain he does not want us buried there. He must do something though because we can't just leave what we have in country to fend for itself. We either have to fish, cut bait or get out of the boat. The question is, "What and how do we do it?"
Afghanistan is not a "nation"--it is a place and people. There are numerous tribes who mostly live in remote villages in "tribal territories/districts/or whatever you want to call them" and there are some wht I chose to call "city states", much like ancient Greece--Kabul (the capital), Kandahar and Herat. There are four major languages and perhaps 30 minor languages. Pashtuns and Tajiks make up about 70% of the population while Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen, and Balochs make up about 25% and the remainder are "odds and ends."
Afghanistan is vast, some 250,000 square miles, just a little smaller than Texas; however, the terrain is very mountainous and rugged with little infrastructure once outside the cities. If we put a million troops into Afghanistan, we still could not "secure" it nor could we sustain such a force. Neither can Afghanistan--it has neither the willpower nor the resources.
Somehow, the tribal areas have to be developed to stand on their own against the Taliban and al Quaeda. We have to find a way to reassure them that we are not there to conquer them, but to help them become self-sufficient when it comes to their own defense.
If possible we have to find a way to clean up the "central" government; get rid of its corruption, which foments the distrust of the tribal leaders. So far we have not been successful. We jumped on the Karzai bandwagon only to find out it is seen as anathema to the tribal leaders with Karzain a corrupt American puppet. The recent national election debacle only reaffirmed this to Afghanis and the outside world. But we picked "our man in Kabul" and it would seem we are stuck with him.
Anyone have any answers?
George
Official: Obama wants revised Afghan war options
By BEN FELLER and ANNE GEARAN, AP
2 hours ago
WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama won't accept any of the Afghanistan war options before him without changes, a senior administration official said, as concerns soar over the ability of the Afghan government to secure its own country one day.
Obama's stance comes as his own ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, is voicing strong dissent about a U.S. troop increase, according to a second administration official.
Eikenberry's misgivings center on a concern that bolstering the American presence in Afghanistan could make the country more reliant on the U.S., not less. He expressed them in forcefully worded cables to Washington just ahead of Obama's latest war meeting Wednesday.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss administration deliberations.
The developments underscore U.S. skepticism about the leadership of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose government has been dogged by corruption. The emerging administration message is that Obama will not do anything to lock in an open-ended U.S. commitment.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Thursday that she is concerned about Afghanistan's "corruption, lack of transparency, poor governance (and) absence of the rule of law."
"We're looking to President Karzai as he forms a new government to take action that will demonstrate — not just to the international community but first and foremost to his own people — that his second term will respond the needs that are so manifest," Clinton said during a news conference in Manila with Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo.
Obama is still expected to send in more troops to bolster a deteriorating war effort.
He remains close to announcing his revamped war strategy — troops are just one component — and probably will do so shortly after he returns from a trip to Asia that ends Nov. 19.
Yet in Wednesday's pivotal war council meeting, Obama wasn't satisfied with any of the Afghanistan war options presented by his national security team, one official said.
The president instead pushed for revisions to clarify how and when U.S. troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government. In turn, that could change the dynamic of both how many additional troops are sent to Afghanistan and what the timeline would be for their presence in the war zone, according to the official.
Military officials said Obama has asked for a rewrite before and resisted what one official called a one-way highway toward war commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's recommendations for more troops. The sense that he was being rushed and railroaded has stiffened Obama's resolve to seek information and options beyond military planning, officials said, though a substantial troop increase is still likely.
The president is considering options that include adding 30,000 or more U.S. forces to take on the Taliban in key areas of Afghanistan and to buy time for the Afghan government's small and ill-equipped fighting forces to take over. The other three options on the table are ranges of troop increases, from a relatively small addition of forces to the roughly 40,000 that McChrystal prefers, according to military and other officials.
The war is now in its ninth year and is claiming U.S. lives at a record pace as military leaders say the Taliban has the upper hand in many parts of the country.
Eikenberry, the top U.S. envoy to Kabul and a former commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, is a prominent voice among those advising Obama, and his sharp dissent is sure to affect the equation.
The options given to Obama will now be altered, although not overhauled.
Military officials say one approach is a compromise battle plan that would add 30,000or more U.S. forces atop a record 68,000 in the country now. They described it as "half and half," meaning half fighting and half training and holding ground so the Afghans can regroup.
"The government of Afghanistan has to accept greater responsibility for its own defense," Clinton said Thursday. She had no comment on the Eikenberry memos.
The White House says Obama has not made a final choice, though military and other officials have said he appears near to approving a slightly smaller increase than McChrystal wants at the outset.
Among the options for Obama would be ways to phase in additional troops, perhaps eventually equaling McChrystal's full request, based on security or other conditions in Afghanistan and troop levels by U.S. allies there.
The White House has chafed under criticism from Republicans and some outside critics that Obama is dragging his feet to make a decision.
Obama's top military advisers have said they are comfortable with the pace of the process, and senior military officials have pointed out that the president still has time since no additional forces could begin flowing into Afghanistan until early next year.
Under the scenario featuring about 30,000 more troops, that number most likely would be assembled from three Army brigades and a Marine Corps contingent, plus a new headquarters operation that would be staffed by 7,000 or more troops, a senior military official said. There would be a heavy emphasis on the training of Afghan forces, and the reinforcements Obama sends could include thousands of U.S. military trainers.
___
Associated Press writers Matthew Lee in Manila, Philippines, and Pamela Hess in Washington contributed to this report.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
More About Major Hasan--The Story Continues
Earlier, I put a STRATFOR piece on this blog regarding Nasir al-Wahayshi's call for individuals to conduct their own jihads. As the investigation broadens, it would appear that Major Hasan answered this call. The problem--we still can't accept that this was an act of someone who had become a radical Muslim. We want to believe he was obviously insane to do this. WRONG--he became a radical and no one picked up on it. It also seems that the leadership at Walter Reed Army Medical Center dropped the ball or perhaps purposely got Hasan transferred to get him out of their hair. The FBI and the Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Services are also to blame for not passing on their information to the Army. We have to wake up--we have to understand that, as Pogo said many years ago, "We have met the enemy and he is us."
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
November 11, 2009 1841 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. The victims were in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a facility on the base where troops are prepared for deployment and where they take care of certain processing tasks such as completing insurance paperwork and receiving medical examinations and vaccinations.
Even though the targets of Hasan’s attack were soldiers, they represented a very soft target in this environment. Most soldiers on bases inside the United States are normally not armed and are only provided weapons for training. The only personnel who regularly carry weapons are the military police and the base civilian police officers. In addition to being unarmed, the soldiers at the center were closely packed together in the facility as they waited to proceed from station to station. The unarmed, densely packed mass of people allowed Hasan to kill 13 (12 soldiers and one civilian employee of the center) and wound 42 others when he opened fire.
Hasan is a U.S.-born Muslim who, according to STRATFOR sources and media accounts, has had past contact with jihadists, including the radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is a U.S.-born imam who espouses a jihadist ideology and who was discussed at some length in the 9/11 commission report for his links to 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Al-Awlaki, who is currently living in Yemen and reportedly has contacts with al Qaeda, posted a message on his Web site Nov. 9 praising Hasan’s actions. Despite Hasan’s connections to al-Awlaki and other jihadists, it is unknown at this point if he was even aware of al-Wahayshi’s recent message calling for simple attacks, and therefore it is impossible to tell if his attack was in response to it.
However, one thing that is certain is that investigators examining Hasan’s computer hard drive, e-mail traffic and Internet history will be looking into that possibility, along with other indications that Hasan was linked to radicals.
We noted last week that by their very nature, individual actors and small cells are very difficult for the government to detect. They must somehow identify themselves by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to the authorities, attend a militant training camp or conduct correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny. In the Hasan case, it now appears that Hasan did self-identify by making radical statements to people he worked with, who reported him to the authorities. It also appears that he had correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki, whom the government was monitoring. Because of this behavior, Hasan brought himself to the attention of the Department of Defense, the FBI and the CIA.
The fact that Hasan was able to commit this attack after bringing government attention to himself could be due to a number of factors. Chief among them is the fact that it is tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring militant actor and to pre-empt every act of violence. The degree of difficulty is increased greatly if an actor does indeed act alone and does not give any overt clues through his actions or his communications of his intent to attack. Because of this, the Hasan case provides an excellent opportunity to examine national security investigations and their utility and limitations.
The Nature of Intelligence Investigations
The FBI will typically open up an intelligence investigation (usually referred to as a national security investigation) in any case where there is an indication or allegation that a person is involved in terrorist activity but there is no evidence that a specific law has been broken. Many times these investigations are opened up due to a lead passed by the CIA, National Security Agency or a foreign liaison intelligence service. Other times an FBI investigation can come as a spin-off from another FBI counterterrorism investigation already under way or be prompted by a piece of information collected by an FBI informant or even by a tip from a concerned citizen — like the flight instructors who alerted the FBI to the suspicious behavior of some foreign flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks. In such a case, the FBI case agent in charge of the investigation will open a preliminary inquiry, which gives the agent a limited window of time to look into the matter. If no indication of criminal activity is found, the preliminary inquiry must be closed unless the agent receives authorization from the special agent in charge of his division and FBI headquarters to extend it.
If, during the preliminary inquiry, the investigating agents find probable cause that a crime has been committed, the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation into the case, similar to what we saw in the case of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and his followers in Detroit.
One of the large problems in national security investigations is separating the wheat from the chaff. Many leads are based on erroneous information or a misidentification of the suspect — there is a huge issue associated with the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names and the fact that there are many people bearing the same names. Jihadists also have the tendency to use multiple names and identities. And there are many cases in which people will falsely report a person to the FBI out of malice. Because of these factors, national security investigations proceed slowly and usually do not involve much (if any) contact with the suspect and his close associates. If the suspect is a real militant planning a terrorist attack, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is innocent, they do not want to sully his reputation by showing up and overtly interviewing everyone he knows. Due to its controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, the FBI has become acutely aware of its responsibility to protect privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws.
And the rights guaranteed under the Constitution do complicate these national security investigations. It is not illegal for someone to say that Muslims should attack U.S. troops due to their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that more Muslims should conduct attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark. — things that Hasan is reported to have said. Radical statements and convictions are not illegal — although they certainly would appear to be conduct unbecoming a U.S. Army officer. (We will leave to others the discussion of the difficulties in dealing with problem officers who are minorities and doctors and who owe several years of service in return for their education.)
There are also many officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army who own personal weapons and who use them for self-defense, target shooting or hunting. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal about a U.S. Army major owning personal weapons. With no articulable violation of U.S. law, the FBI would have very little to act upon in a case like Hasan’s. Instead, even if they found cause to extend their preliminary inquiry, they would be pretty much limited to monitoring his activities (and perhaps his communications, with a court order) and waiting for a law to be violated. In the Hasan case, it would appear that the FBI did not find probable cause that a law had been violated before he opened fire at Fort Hood. Although perhaps if the FBI had been watching his activities closely and with an eye toward “the how” of terrorist attacks, they might have noticed him conducting preoperational surveillance of the readiness center and even a dry run of the attack.
Of course, in addition to just looking for violations of the law, the other main thrust of a national security investigation is to determine whom the suspect is connected to and whom he is talking to or planning with. In past cases, such investigations have uncovered networks of jihadist actors working together in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere. However, if all Hasan did in his correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki was exercise his First Amendment right to hold radical convictions, and if he did not engage in any type of conspiracy to conduct an attack, he did not break the law.
Another issue that complicates national security cases is that they are almost always classified at the secret level or above. This is understandable, considering they are often opened based upon intelligence produced by sensitive intelligence programs. However, this classification means that only those people with the proper clearance and an established need to know can be briefed on the case. It is not at all unusual for the FBI to visit a high-ranking official at another agency to brief the official on the fact that the FBI is conducting a classified national security investigation involving a person working for the official’s agency. The rub is that they will frequently tell the official that he or she is not at liberty to share details of the investigation with other individuals in the agency because they do not have a clear need to know. The FBI agent will also usually ask the person briefed not to take any action against the target of the investigation, so that the investigation is not compromised. While some people will disagree with the FBI’s determination of who really needs to know about the investigation and go on to brief a wider audience, many officials are cowed by the FBI and sit on the information.
Of course, the size of an organization is also a factor in the dissemination of information. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are large organizations, and it is possible that officials at the Pentagon or the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (still known by its old acronym CID) headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., were briefed on the case and that local officials at Fort Hood were not. The Associated Press is now reporting that the FBI had alerted a Defense Criminal Investigative Service agent assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Washington about Hasan’s contacts with al-Awlaki, and ABC reports that the Defense Department is denying the FBI notified them. It would appear that the finger-pointing and bureaucratic blame-shifting normally associated with such cases has begun.
Even more severe problems would have plagued the dissemination of information from the CIA to local commanders and CID officers at Fort Hood. Despite the intelligence reforms put in place after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government still faces large obstacles when it comes to sharing intelligence information with law enforcement personnel.
Criminal Acts vs. Terrorism
So far, the Hasan shooting investigation is being run by the Army CID, and the FBI has been noticeably — and uncharacteristically — absent from the scene. As the premier law enforcement agency in the United States, the FBI will often assume authority over investigations where there is even a hint of terrorism. Since 9/11, the number of FBI/JTTF offices across the country has been dramatically increased, and the JTTFs are specifically charged with investigating cases that may involve terrorism. Therefore, we find the FBI’s absence in this case to be quite out of the ordinary.
However, with Hasan being a member of the armed forces, the victims being soldiers or army civilian employees and the incident occurring at Fort Hood, the case would seem to fall squarely under the mantle of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From a prosecutorial perspective, a homicide trial under the UCMJ should be very tidy and could be quickly concluded. It will not involve all the potential loose ends that could pop up in a federal terrorism trial, especially when those loose ends involve what the FBI and CIA knew about Hasan, when they learned it and who they told. Also, politically, there are some who would like to see the Hasan case remain a criminal matter rather than a case of terrorism. Following the shooting death of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and considering the delicate relationship between Muslim advocacy groups and the U.S. government, some people would rather see Hasan portrayed as a mentally disturbed criminal than as an ideologically driven lone wolf.
Despite the CID taking the lead in prosecuting the case, the classified national security investigation by the CIA and FBI into Hasan and his possible connections to jihadist elements is undoubtedly continuing. Senior members of the government will certainly demand to know if Hasan had any confederates, if he was part of a bigger plot and if there are more attacks to come. Several congressmen and senators are also calling for hearings into the case, and if such hearings occur, they will certainly produce an abundance of interesting information pertaining to Hasan and the national security investigation of his activities.
The Hasan Case: Overt Clues and Tactical Challenges
November 11, 2009 1841 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. The victims were in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a facility on the base where troops are prepared for deployment and where they take care of certain processing tasks such as completing insurance paperwork and receiving medical examinations and vaccinations.
Even though the targets of Hasan’s attack were soldiers, they represented a very soft target in this environment. Most soldiers on bases inside the United States are normally not armed and are only provided weapons for training. The only personnel who regularly carry weapons are the military police and the base civilian police officers. In addition to being unarmed, the soldiers at the center were closely packed together in the facility as they waited to proceed from station to station. The unarmed, densely packed mass of people allowed Hasan to kill 13 (12 soldiers and one civilian employee of the center) and wound 42 others when he opened fire.
Hasan is a U.S.-born Muslim who, according to STRATFOR sources and media accounts, has had past contact with jihadists, including the radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki is a U.S.-born imam who espouses a jihadist ideology and who was discussed at some length in the 9/11 commission report for his links to 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Al-Awlaki, who is currently living in Yemen and reportedly has contacts with al Qaeda, posted a message on his Web site Nov. 9 praising Hasan’s actions. Despite Hasan’s connections to al-Awlaki and other jihadists, it is unknown at this point if he was even aware of al-Wahayshi’s recent message calling for simple attacks, and therefore it is impossible to tell if his attack was in response to it.
However, one thing that is certain is that investigators examining Hasan’s computer hard drive, e-mail traffic and Internet history will be looking into that possibility, along with other indications that Hasan was linked to radicals.
We noted last week that by their very nature, individual actors and small cells are very difficult for the government to detect. They must somehow identify themselves by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to the authorities, attend a militant training camp or conduct correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny. In the Hasan case, it now appears that Hasan did self-identify by making radical statements to people he worked with, who reported him to the authorities. It also appears that he had correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki, whom the government was monitoring. Because of this behavior, Hasan brought himself to the attention of the Department of Defense, the FBI and the CIA.
The fact that Hasan was able to commit this attack after bringing government attention to himself could be due to a number of factors. Chief among them is the fact that it is tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring militant actor and to pre-empt every act of violence. The degree of difficulty is increased greatly if an actor does indeed act alone and does not give any overt clues through his actions or his communications of his intent to attack. Because of this, the Hasan case provides an excellent opportunity to examine national security investigations and their utility and limitations.
The Nature of Intelligence Investigations
The FBI will typically open up an intelligence investigation (usually referred to as a national security investigation) in any case where there is an indication or allegation that a person is involved in terrorist activity but there is no evidence that a specific law has been broken. Many times these investigations are opened up due to a lead passed by the CIA, National Security Agency or a foreign liaison intelligence service. Other times an FBI investigation can come as a spin-off from another FBI counterterrorism investigation already under way or be prompted by a piece of information collected by an FBI informant or even by a tip from a concerned citizen — like the flight instructors who alerted the FBI to the suspicious behavior of some foreign flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks. In such a case, the FBI case agent in charge of the investigation will open a preliminary inquiry, which gives the agent a limited window of time to look into the matter. If no indication of criminal activity is found, the preliminary inquiry must be closed unless the agent receives authorization from the special agent in charge of his division and FBI headquarters to extend it.
If, during the preliminary inquiry, the investigating agents find probable cause that a crime has been committed, the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation into the case, similar to what we saw in the case of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and his followers in Detroit.
One of the large problems in national security investigations is separating the wheat from the chaff. Many leads are based on erroneous information or a misidentification of the suspect — there is a huge issue associated with the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names and the fact that there are many people bearing the same names. Jihadists also have the tendency to use multiple names and identities. And there are many cases in which people will falsely report a person to the FBI out of malice. Because of these factors, national security investigations proceed slowly and usually do not involve much (if any) contact with the suspect and his close associates. If the suspect is a real militant planning a terrorist attack, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is innocent, they do not want to sully his reputation by showing up and overtly interviewing everyone he knows. Due to its controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, the FBI has become acutely aware of its responsibility to protect privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws.
And the rights guaranteed under the Constitution do complicate these national security investigations. It is not illegal for someone to say that Muslims should attack U.S. troops due to their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or that more Muslims should conduct attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark. — things that Hasan is reported to have said. Radical statements and convictions are not illegal — although they certainly would appear to be conduct unbecoming a U.S. Army officer. (We will leave to others the discussion of the difficulties in dealing with problem officers who are minorities and doctors and who owe several years of service in return for their education.)
There are also many officers and enlisted soldiers in the U.S. Army who own personal weapons and who use them for self-defense, target shooting or hunting. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal about a U.S. Army major owning personal weapons. With no articulable violation of U.S. law, the FBI would have very little to act upon in a case like Hasan’s. Instead, even if they found cause to extend their preliminary inquiry, they would be pretty much limited to monitoring his activities (and perhaps his communications, with a court order) and waiting for a law to be violated. In the Hasan case, it would appear that the FBI did not find probable cause that a law had been violated before he opened fire at Fort Hood. Although perhaps if the FBI had been watching his activities closely and with an eye toward “the how” of terrorist attacks, they might have noticed him conducting preoperational surveillance of the readiness center and even a dry run of the attack.
Of course, in addition to just looking for violations of the law, the other main thrust of a national security investigation is to determine whom the suspect is connected to and whom he is talking to or planning with. In past cases, such investigations have uncovered networks of jihadist actors working together in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere. However, if all Hasan did in his correspondence with people such as al-Awlaki was exercise his First Amendment right to hold radical convictions, and if he did not engage in any type of conspiracy to conduct an attack, he did not break the law.
Another issue that complicates national security cases is that they are almost always classified at the secret level or above. This is understandable, considering they are often opened based upon intelligence produced by sensitive intelligence programs. However, this classification means that only those people with the proper clearance and an established need to know can be briefed on the case. It is not at all unusual for the FBI to visit a high-ranking official at another agency to brief the official on the fact that the FBI is conducting a classified national security investigation involving a person working for the official’s agency. The rub is that they will frequently tell the official that he or she is not at liberty to share details of the investigation with other individuals in the agency because they do not have a clear need to know. The FBI agent will also usually ask the person briefed not to take any action against the target of the investigation, so that the investigation is not compromised. While some people will disagree with the FBI’s determination of who really needs to know about the investigation and go on to brief a wider audience, many officials are cowed by the FBI and sit on the information.
Of course, the size of an organization is also a factor in the dissemination of information. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are large organizations, and it is possible that officials at the Pentagon or the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (still known by its old acronym CID) headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., were briefed on the case and that local officials at Fort Hood were not. The Associated Press is now reporting that the FBI had alerted a Defense Criminal Investigative Service agent assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Washington about Hasan’s contacts with al-Awlaki, and ABC reports that the Defense Department is denying the FBI notified them. It would appear that the finger-pointing and bureaucratic blame-shifting normally associated with such cases has begun.
Even more severe problems would have plagued the dissemination of information from the CIA to local commanders and CID officers at Fort Hood. Despite the intelligence reforms put in place after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government still faces large obstacles when it comes to sharing intelligence information with law enforcement personnel.
Criminal Acts vs. Terrorism
So far, the Hasan shooting investigation is being run by the Army CID, and the FBI has been noticeably — and uncharacteristically — absent from the scene. As the premier law enforcement agency in the United States, the FBI will often assume authority over investigations where there is even a hint of terrorism. Since 9/11, the number of FBI/JTTF offices across the country has been dramatically increased, and the JTTFs are specifically charged with investigating cases that may involve terrorism. Therefore, we find the FBI’s absence in this case to be quite out of the ordinary.
However, with Hasan being a member of the armed forces, the victims being soldiers or army civilian employees and the incident occurring at Fort Hood, the case would seem to fall squarely under the mantle of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From a prosecutorial perspective, a homicide trial under the UCMJ should be very tidy and could be quickly concluded. It will not involve all the potential loose ends that could pop up in a federal terrorism trial, especially when those loose ends involve what the FBI and CIA knew about Hasan, when they learned it and who they told. Also, politically, there are some who would like to see the Hasan case remain a criminal matter rather than a case of terrorism. Following the shooting death of Luqman Ameen Abdullah and considering the delicate relationship between Muslim advocacy groups and the U.S. government, some people would rather see Hasan portrayed as a mentally disturbed criminal than as an ideologically driven lone wolf.
Despite the CID taking the lead in prosecuting the case, the classified national security investigation by the CIA and FBI into Hasan and his possible connections to jihadist elements is undoubtedly continuing. Senior members of the government will certainly demand to know if Hasan had any confederates, if he was part of a bigger plot and if there are more attacks to come. Several congressmen and senators are also calling for hearings into the case, and if such hearings occur, they will certainly produce an abundance of interesting information pertaining to Hasan and the national security investigation of his activities.
All is Quiet on the Western Front
All is Quiet on the Western Front
They're all gone now, those young American doughboys who sailed off to far away France to fight the mighty Hun. The strains of "Over There" and "Lily Marlene" are distant memories. These young soldiers, sailors and Marines put down their plows and pencils and went off to face murderous machinegun fire, choking, blinding mustard gas and the cold, killing reality of trench warfare. Then on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, 1918, the victors and the vanquished gathered in a small railroad car in Compiègne, France to bring to a close the "war to end all wars." All was quiet on the Western Front.
Day is done ...
Gone the sun ...
From the lakes ...
From the hills ...
From the sky ...
All is well ...
Safely rest ...
God is nigh...
Fading light ...
Dims the sight ...
And a star ...
Gems the sky...
Gleaming bright ...
From afar...
Drawing nigh ...
Falls the night ..
Thanks and praise ...
For our days ...
Neath the sun ...
Neath the stars ...
Neath the sky ...
As we go ...
This we know ...
God is nigh ...
Sleep well you warriors of so long ago, the new breed has assumed the watch.
Very respectfully,
George S. Harris
Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired)
They're all gone now, those young American doughboys who sailed off to far away France to fight the mighty Hun. The strains of "Over There" and "Lily Marlene" are distant memories. These young soldiers, sailors and Marines put down their plows and pencils and went off to face murderous machinegun fire, choking, blinding mustard gas and the cold, killing reality of trench warfare. Then on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, 1918, the victors and the vanquished gathered in a small railroad car in Compiègne, France to bring to a close the "war to end all wars." All was quiet on the Western Front.
Day is done ...
Gone the sun ...
From the lakes ...
From the hills ...
From the sky ...
All is well ...
Safely rest ...
God is nigh...
Fading light ...
Dims the sight ...
And a star ...
Gems the sky...
Gleaming bright ...
From afar...
Drawing nigh ...
Falls the night ..
Thanks and praise ...
For our days ...
Neath the sun ...
Neath the stars ...
Neath the sky ...
As we go ...
This we know ...
God is nigh ...
Sleep well you warriors of so long ago, the new breed has assumed the watch.
Very respectfully,
George S. Harris
Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Hasan Communicated with Radical Imam
This article was published in the New York Times yesterday. The imam in question is an American born of Yemeni immigrants in New Mexico. He has become an extremely militant Islamist and as you may have already read, has praised Major Hasan for his actions. Apparently in an outbreak of political correctness authorities decided to bring Major Hasan's communications with Anwar al-Awlaki to the attention of the Department of Defense or the Army.
Like others, I am guilty of Monday morning quarterbacking on this. But the more I read about what we knew and didn't do anything about, the more I wonder what the various intelligence agencies are doing.
As I have already written, we Judeo-Christians think Hasan must have been out of his mind, but I think he was on a one-man jihad and knew exactly what he was doing.
Will we ever know the truth? I doubt it. We will have to see just how close to their chest the "intelligence agencies" want to play their cards. I am sure more will be revealed in the following days.
U.S. Knew of Suspect’s Tie to Radical Cleric
JOHNSTON and SCOTT SHANE
Published: November 9, 2009
WASHINGTON — Intelligence agencies intercepted communications last year and this year between the military psychiatrist accused of shooting to death 13 people at Fort Hood, Tex., and a radical cleric in Yemen known for his incendiary anti-American teachings.
But the federal authorities dropped an inquiry into the matter after deciding that the messages from the psychiatrist, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, did not suggest any threat of violence and concluding that no further action was warranted, government officials said Monday.
Major Hasan’s 10 to 20 messages to Anwar al-Awlaki, once a spiritual leader at a mosque in suburban Virginia where Major Hasan worshiped, indicate that the troubled military psychiatrist came to the attention of the authorities long before last Thursday’s shooting rampage at Fort Hood, but that the authorities left him in his post.
Counterterrorism and military officials said Monday night that the communications, first intercepted last December as part of an unrelated investigation, were consistent with a research project the psychiatrist was then conducting at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington on post-traumatic stress disorder.
“There was no indication that Major Hasan was planning an imminent attack at all, or that he was directed to do anything,” one senior investigator said. He and the other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity, saying the case was under investigation.
The officials said the Departments of Defense and Justice had decided Major Hasan would be prosecuted in a military court, an indication that investigators believe he acted alone. Government lawyers had said his case might be tried in civilian court if he were believed to have conspired with nonmilitary defendants.
In a statement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation said, “At this point, there is no information to indicate Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan had any co-conspirators or was part of a broader terrorist plot.” The statement concluded that “because the content of the communications was explainable by his research and nothing else was found,” investigators decided “that Major Hasan was not involved in terrorist activities or terrorist planning.”
Officials said the F.B.I. and the Defense Department would be reviewing their earlier assessment of Major Hasan to determine whether it was handled correctly.
Given the radical views of Mr. Awlaki, however, the conduct of the F.B.I. and the military is likely to come under intense scrutiny from Congress. Representative Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, on Monday asked intelligence and law enforcement officials to preserve all records of their dealings with Major Hasan.
The communications provide the first indication that Major Hasan was in direct communication with anyone who espoused militant views. On Monday, Mr. Awlaki praised Major Hasan on his Web site, saying that he “did the right thing” in attacking soldiers preparing to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq.
The officials said the communications did not alter the prevailing theory that Major Hasan acted by himself, lashing out as a result of combination of factors, including his outspoken opposition to American policy in Iraq and Afghanistan and his deepening religious fervor as a Muslim.
Major Hasan, who was shot by a police officer, has regained consciousness at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio and is able to talk, though he declined on Sunday to speak to federal investigators about the shooting rampage. “He is critical but stable,” said a hospital spokeswoman, Maria Gallegos.
Ms. Gallegos added that Major Hasan had come out of a coma on Saturday and had been conversing with his doctors ever since. A lawyer for Major Hasan told The Associated Press on Monday that he had asked investigators not to question his client and expressed doubt that he could get a fair trial. The lawyer, John P. Galligan, a retired Army colonel, said he was contacted by Major Hasan’s family on Monday and was traveling to San Antonio to consult with him.
The imam whom Major Hasan made contact with is an American citizen born in New Mexico to Yemeni parents. He wrote on Monday on his English-language Web site that Major Hasan was “a hero.” The cleric said, “He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people.”
Mr. Awlaki added, “The only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the U.S. Army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal.”
After the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Awlaki was quoted as disapproving of such violence and was portrayed as a moderate figure who might provide a bridge between Islam and Western democracies. But since leaving the United States in 2002 for London and later Yemen, Mr. Awlaki has become, through his Web site, www.anwar-alawlaki.com, a prominent proponent of militant Islam.
“He’s one of the most popular figures among hard-line, English-speaking jihadis around the world,” said Jarret Brachman, the author of “Global Jihadism” and a terrorism consultant to the government.
Mr. Brachman said Mr. Awlaki was especially appealing to young Muslims who are curious about radical ideas but not yet committed. “He’s American, he’s funny, and he speaks in a very understandable way,” Mr. Brachman said.
In 2000 and 2001, Mr. Awlaki served as an imam at two mosques in the United States frequented by three future Sept. 11 hijackers. Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi attended the Rabat mosque in San Diego, where Mr. Awlaki later admitted meeting Mr. Hazmi several times but “claimed not to remember any specifics of what they discussed,” according to the report of the national Sept. 11 commission.
Both Mr. Hazmi and another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, later attended the Dar al Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Va., after Mr. Awlaki had moved there in early 2001. The Sept. 11 commission report expressed “suspicion” about the coincidence, but said its investigators were unable to find Mr. Awlaki to question him.
Major Hasan attended the same Virginia mosque, but it is not known whether they met there.
Mr. Awlaki, who is in his late 30s, had returned to Yemen with his family as a child. He received a religious education in Yemen and later earned degrees in engineering at Colorado State and in education leadership at San Diego State, according to his Web site.
His writings urge Muslims to dedicate themselves to defending Islam, including pursuing “arms training,” in such works as “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad.”
At Fort Hood, the Army erected walls of gray containers around the headquarters of III Corps in advance of a memorial service Tuesday for the 13 people killed when, the authorities say, Major Hasan opened fire in a center where soldiers get vaccinated before being sent abroad.
President Obama and his wife, Michelle, are expected to attend the ceremony, and the president will speak to a crowd that will include the survivors of the attack and the families of the victims.
James C. McKinley Jr. contributed reporting from Killeen, Tex.
Like others, I am guilty of Monday morning quarterbacking on this. But the more I read about what we knew and didn't do anything about, the more I wonder what the various intelligence agencies are doing.
As I have already written, we Judeo-Christians think Hasan must have been out of his mind, but I think he was on a one-man jihad and knew exactly what he was doing.
Will we ever know the truth? I doubt it. We will have to see just how close to their chest the "intelligence agencies" want to play their cards. I am sure more will be revealed in the following days.
U.S. Knew of Suspect’s Tie to Radical Cleric
JOHNSTON and SCOTT SHANE
Published: November 9, 2009
WASHINGTON — Intelligence agencies intercepted communications last year and this year between the military psychiatrist accused of shooting to death 13 people at Fort Hood, Tex., and a radical cleric in Yemen known for his incendiary anti-American teachings.
But the federal authorities dropped an inquiry into the matter after deciding that the messages from the psychiatrist, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, did not suggest any threat of violence and concluding that no further action was warranted, government officials said Monday.
Major Hasan’s 10 to 20 messages to Anwar al-Awlaki, once a spiritual leader at a mosque in suburban Virginia where Major Hasan worshiped, indicate that the troubled military psychiatrist came to the attention of the authorities long before last Thursday’s shooting rampage at Fort Hood, but that the authorities left him in his post.
Counterterrorism and military officials said Monday night that the communications, first intercepted last December as part of an unrelated investigation, were consistent with a research project the psychiatrist was then conducting at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington on post-traumatic stress disorder.
“There was no indication that Major Hasan was planning an imminent attack at all, or that he was directed to do anything,” one senior investigator said. He and the other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity, saying the case was under investigation.
The officials said the Departments of Defense and Justice had decided Major Hasan would be prosecuted in a military court, an indication that investigators believe he acted alone. Government lawyers had said his case might be tried in civilian court if he were believed to have conspired with nonmilitary defendants.
In a statement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation said, “At this point, there is no information to indicate Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan had any co-conspirators or was part of a broader terrorist plot.” The statement concluded that “because the content of the communications was explainable by his research and nothing else was found,” investigators decided “that Major Hasan was not involved in terrorist activities or terrorist planning.”
Officials said the F.B.I. and the Defense Department would be reviewing their earlier assessment of Major Hasan to determine whether it was handled correctly.
Given the radical views of Mr. Awlaki, however, the conduct of the F.B.I. and the military is likely to come under intense scrutiny from Congress. Representative Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, on Monday asked intelligence and law enforcement officials to preserve all records of their dealings with Major Hasan.
The communications provide the first indication that Major Hasan was in direct communication with anyone who espoused militant views. On Monday, Mr. Awlaki praised Major Hasan on his Web site, saying that he “did the right thing” in attacking soldiers preparing to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq.
The officials said the communications did not alter the prevailing theory that Major Hasan acted by himself, lashing out as a result of combination of factors, including his outspoken opposition to American policy in Iraq and Afghanistan and his deepening religious fervor as a Muslim.
Major Hasan, who was shot by a police officer, has regained consciousness at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio and is able to talk, though he declined on Sunday to speak to federal investigators about the shooting rampage. “He is critical but stable,” said a hospital spokeswoman, Maria Gallegos.
Ms. Gallegos added that Major Hasan had come out of a coma on Saturday and had been conversing with his doctors ever since. A lawyer for Major Hasan told The Associated Press on Monday that he had asked investigators not to question his client and expressed doubt that he could get a fair trial. The lawyer, John P. Galligan, a retired Army colonel, said he was contacted by Major Hasan’s family on Monday and was traveling to San Antonio to consult with him.
The imam whom Major Hasan made contact with is an American citizen born in New Mexico to Yemeni parents. He wrote on Monday on his English-language Web site that Major Hasan was “a hero.” The cleric said, “He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people.”
Mr. Awlaki added, “The only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the U.S. Army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal.”
After the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Awlaki was quoted as disapproving of such violence and was portrayed as a moderate figure who might provide a bridge between Islam and Western democracies. But since leaving the United States in 2002 for London and later Yemen, Mr. Awlaki has become, through his Web site, www.anwar-alawlaki.com, a prominent proponent of militant Islam.
“He’s one of the most popular figures among hard-line, English-speaking jihadis around the world,” said Jarret Brachman, the author of “Global Jihadism” and a terrorism consultant to the government.
Mr. Brachman said Mr. Awlaki was especially appealing to young Muslims who are curious about radical ideas but not yet committed. “He’s American, he’s funny, and he speaks in a very understandable way,” Mr. Brachman said.
In 2000 and 2001, Mr. Awlaki served as an imam at two mosques in the United States frequented by three future Sept. 11 hijackers. Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi attended the Rabat mosque in San Diego, where Mr. Awlaki later admitted meeting Mr. Hazmi several times but “claimed not to remember any specifics of what they discussed,” according to the report of the national Sept. 11 commission.
Both Mr. Hazmi and another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, later attended the Dar al Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Va., after Mr. Awlaki had moved there in early 2001. The Sept. 11 commission report expressed “suspicion” about the coincidence, but said its investigators were unable to find Mr. Awlaki to question him.
Major Hasan attended the same Virginia mosque, but it is not known whether they met there.
Mr. Awlaki, who is in his late 30s, had returned to Yemen with his family as a child. He received a religious education in Yemen and later earned degrees in engineering at Colorado State and in education leadership at San Diego State, according to his Web site.
His writings urge Muslims to dedicate themselves to defending Islam, including pursuing “arms training,” in such works as “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad.”
At Fort Hood, the Army erected walls of gray containers around the headquarters of III Corps in advance of a memorial service Tuesday for the 13 people killed when, the authorities say, Major Hasan opened fire in a center where soldiers get vaccinated before being sent abroad.
President Obama and his wife, Michelle, are expected to attend the ceremony, and the president will speak to a crowd that will include the survivors of the attack and the families of the victims.
James C. McKinley Jr. contributed reporting from Killeen, Tex.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Little Evidence of Terror Plot in Base Killings
This article appeared in the New York Times. As usual, folks are looking for some large terrorist plot, when what they probably will not discover is that this was a one man jihad--see my previous posting. There seems to be sufficient evidence that Major Hassan did not simply "snap"; he deliberately planned to kill and wound his fellow soldiers hoping that he would be martyred in the process--a sort of martyrdom by cop. He apparently believed he would go on to paradise and his share of virgins supposedly reserved for martyrs. I think not. I am not prepared to believe he was harrased as alleged. If that was the case, why did he not report it to authorities? Where is the proof?
I cannot help but wonder why the leadership at Walter Reed Army Medical Center did not take action to remove Major Hassan from the military. Much of that decision may have to do with the amount of service he owed for his medical education at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Rather someone chose to let him be transferred to an operational unit preparing for deployment to the Middle East.
George Harris
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Little Evidence of Terror Plot in Base Killings
Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times
Published: November 7, 2009
WASHINGTON — After two days of inquiry into the mass shooting at Fort Hood, investigators have tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist plot.
Army Concludes Shootings Involved Only One Gunman (November 8, 2009) Rather, they have come to believe that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused in the shootings, acted out under a welter of emotional, ideological and religious pressures, according to interviews with federal officials who have been briefed on the inquiry.
Investigators have not ruled out the possibility that Major Hasan believed he was carrying out an extremist’s suicide mission.
But the investigators, working with behavioral experts, suggested that he might have long suffered from emotional problems that were exacerbated by the tensions of his work with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who returned home with serious psychiatric problems.
They said his counseling activities with the veterans appear to have further fueled his anger and hardened his increasingly militant views as he was seeming to move toward more extreme religious beliefs — all of which boiled over as he faced being shipped overseas, an assignment he bitterly opposed.
Investigators have gleaned most of their findings from Major Hasan’s computer use and from interviews with his family members, co-workers and neighbors. One significant investigative thrust has involved determining whether Major Hasan had contact with extremists who preyed on his increasingly angry and outspoken opposition to American policies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But so far, investigators have unearthed no evidence that he was directed or steered into violence or ever traveled overseas to meet with extremist groups, as defendants in some recent terrorism cases are accused of doing, the officials said.
The officials emphasized that their findings were preliminary and that the investigation was fluid. New information could alter their perceptions of Major Hasan’s motives. But the early conclusions are already influencing the course of the inquiry, including which law enforcement agencies lead it.
“It’s early, but it looks like there are a number of factors going on here,” said a senior government official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because the findings do not represent the government’s formal investigative and legal views of the case.
The officials said a continuing search of Major Hasan’s computer indicates that he had logged on to Web sites that celebrated radical Islamic ideologies and that he had exchanged e-mail messages with like-minded people, some possibly overseas. In addition, they believe that he may have written inflammatory Internet postings that justified suicide attacks, though that has not been concretely established.
Still, investigators have found no evidence that Major Hasan sent e-mail messages to known terrorists or anyone else who encouraged or helped him to orchestrate the shootings.
Representative Jane Harman, a California Democrat who is head of the House Homeland Security intelligence subcommittee, confirmed in a phone interview on Saturday that investigators had thus far not found any evidence suggesting that Major Hasan had been in contact with extremist or terrorist organizations. “I don’t know of that link,” Ms. Harman said, adding that the investigation was seeking to answer that question. The committee oversees some of the agencies involved in domestic counterterrorism inquiries.
The officials said it was increasingly unlikely that co-conspirators might still be found and charged. Based on this preliminary view, the officials said they were leaning toward charging Major Hasan in a military court rather than a civilian court. Though that decision was not official, they said he was more likely to be prosecuted in a civilian court if other nonmilitary defendants were involved.
Confirming the law enforcement view, a senior American intelligence official said on Saturday that there were no known co-conspirators at this point. “Hasan is the only name that’s emerged so far,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity when discussing intelligence matters.
The possibility that the Fort Hood attack involved terrorism arose for a number of reasons. For one, early reports from the chaotic scene indicated that there might have been more than one gunman. Investigators have now said publicly that there was only one shooter. Also, friends and work associates of Major Hasan have described his increasing doubts about the American military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In interviews in recent days, friends and others have portrayed Major Hasan as a troubled man, deeply concerned about being deployed to the war zones.
Investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command are moving deliberately through their search of Major Hasan’s computers. They suspect that he might have used multiple e-mail accounts and fictitious identities, and might have destroyed documents in advance of the attack, perhaps in an effort to conceal his activities in the days leading up to the shootings.
Such steps could be revealing and potentially legally significant as evidence that the killings were premeditated and not the spontaneous outburst of a mentally impaired malcontent.
Neighbors in the run-down two-story apartment building were Major Hasan has lived since arriving in Killeen, Tex., said that federal agents had seized a computer belonging to his next-door neighbor. Major Hasan had used the computer frequently, they said, paying the neighbor for its use.
Federal agents also took away a large trash bin in which the psychiatrist had dumped a shredder and a plastic bag full of shredded documents on the morning before the shooting, neighbors said.
Over all, the inquiry is somewhat more subtle than many criminal cases in which investigators try to piece together a timeline of a suspect’s activities. The inquiry into the Fort Hood shootings is turning into a deep psychological exploration of the mind of a suspect in a mass killing.
James C. McKinley Jr. contributed reporting from Killeen, Tex.
I cannot help but wonder why the leadership at Walter Reed Army Medical Center did not take action to remove Major Hassan from the military. Much of that decision may have to do with the amount of service he owed for his medical education at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Rather someone chose to let him be transferred to an operational unit preparing for deployment to the Middle East.
George Harris
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Little Evidence of Terror Plot in Base Killings
Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times
Published: November 7, 2009
WASHINGTON — After two days of inquiry into the mass shooting at Fort Hood, investigators have tentatively concluded that it was not part of a terrorist plot.
Army Concludes Shootings Involved Only One Gunman (November 8, 2009) Rather, they have come to believe that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused in the shootings, acted out under a welter of emotional, ideological and religious pressures, according to interviews with federal officials who have been briefed on the inquiry.
Investigators have not ruled out the possibility that Major Hasan believed he was carrying out an extremist’s suicide mission.
But the investigators, working with behavioral experts, suggested that he might have long suffered from emotional problems that were exacerbated by the tensions of his work with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who returned home with serious psychiatric problems.
They said his counseling activities with the veterans appear to have further fueled his anger and hardened his increasingly militant views as he was seeming to move toward more extreme religious beliefs — all of which boiled over as he faced being shipped overseas, an assignment he bitterly opposed.
Investigators have gleaned most of their findings from Major Hasan’s computer use and from interviews with his family members, co-workers and neighbors. One significant investigative thrust has involved determining whether Major Hasan had contact with extremists who preyed on his increasingly angry and outspoken opposition to American policies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But so far, investigators have unearthed no evidence that he was directed or steered into violence or ever traveled overseas to meet with extremist groups, as defendants in some recent terrorism cases are accused of doing, the officials said.
The officials emphasized that their findings were preliminary and that the investigation was fluid. New information could alter their perceptions of Major Hasan’s motives. But the early conclusions are already influencing the course of the inquiry, including which law enforcement agencies lead it.
“It’s early, but it looks like there are a number of factors going on here,” said a senior government official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because the findings do not represent the government’s formal investigative and legal views of the case.
The officials said a continuing search of Major Hasan’s computer indicates that he had logged on to Web sites that celebrated radical Islamic ideologies and that he had exchanged e-mail messages with like-minded people, some possibly overseas. In addition, they believe that he may have written inflammatory Internet postings that justified suicide attacks, though that has not been concretely established.
Still, investigators have found no evidence that Major Hasan sent e-mail messages to known terrorists or anyone else who encouraged or helped him to orchestrate the shootings.
Representative Jane Harman, a California Democrat who is head of the House Homeland Security intelligence subcommittee, confirmed in a phone interview on Saturday that investigators had thus far not found any evidence suggesting that Major Hasan had been in contact with extremist or terrorist organizations. “I don’t know of that link,” Ms. Harman said, adding that the investigation was seeking to answer that question. The committee oversees some of the agencies involved in domestic counterterrorism inquiries.
The officials said it was increasingly unlikely that co-conspirators might still be found and charged. Based on this preliminary view, the officials said they were leaning toward charging Major Hasan in a military court rather than a civilian court. Though that decision was not official, they said he was more likely to be prosecuted in a civilian court if other nonmilitary defendants were involved.
Confirming the law enforcement view, a senior American intelligence official said on Saturday that there were no known co-conspirators at this point. “Hasan is the only name that’s emerged so far,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity when discussing intelligence matters.
The possibility that the Fort Hood attack involved terrorism arose for a number of reasons. For one, early reports from the chaotic scene indicated that there might have been more than one gunman. Investigators have now said publicly that there was only one shooter. Also, friends and work associates of Major Hasan have described his increasing doubts about the American military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In interviews in recent days, friends and others have portrayed Major Hasan as a troubled man, deeply concerned about being deployed to the war zones.
Investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command are moving deliberately through their search of Major Hasan’s computers. They suspect that he might have used multiple e-mail accounts and fictitious identities, and might have destroyed documents in advance of the attack, perhaps in an effort to conceal his activities in the days leading up to the shootings.
Such steps could be revealing and potentially legally significant as evidence that the killings were premeditated and not the spontaneous outburst of a mentally impaired malcontent.
Neighbors in the run-down two-story apartment building were Major Hasan has lived since arriving in Killeen, Tex., said that federal agents had seized a computer belonging to his next-door neighbor. Major Hasan had used the computer frequently, they said, paying the neighbor for its use.
Federal agents also took away a large trash bin in which the psychiatrist had dumped a shredder and a plastic bag full of shredded documents on the morning before the shooting, neighbors said.
Over all, the inquiry is somewhat more subtle than many criminal cases in which investigators try to piece together a timeline of a suspect’s activities. The inquiry into the Fort Hood shootings is turning into a deep psychological exploration of the mind of a suspect in a mass killing.
James C. McKinley Jr. contributed reporting from Killeen, Tex.
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Counterterrorism: Shifting from 'Who' to 'How'
VERY THOUGHT PROVOKING ARTICLE THAT MAY MAKE YOU LOOK AT THINGS AND PEOPLE MUCH DIFFERENTLY.
GEORGE
From www.stratfor.com
Counterterrorism: Shifting from 'Who' to 'How'
November 4, 2009 | 1918 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In the 11th edition of the online magazine Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battle), which was released to jihadist Web sites last week, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Nasir al-Wahayshi wrote an article that called for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets. The targets included "any tyrant, intelligence den, prince" or "minister" (referring to the governments in the Muslim world like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen), and "any crusaders whenever you find one of them, like at the airports of the crusader Western countries that participate in the wars against Islam, or their living compounds, trains etc.," (an obvious reference to the United States and Europe and Westerners living in Muslim countries).
Related Special Topic Pages
Surveillance and Countersurveillance
Terrorist Attack Cycle
Al-Wahayshi, an ethnic Yemeni who spent time in Afghanistan serving as a lieutenant under Osama bin Laden, noted these simple attacks could be conducted with readily available weapons such as knives, clubs or small improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to al-Wahayshi, jihadists "don't need to conduct a big effort or spend a lot of money to manufacture 10 grams of explosive material" and that they should not "waste a long time finding the materials, because you can find all these in your mother's kitchen, or readily at hand or in any city you are in."
That al-Wahayshi gave these instructions in an Internet magazine distributed via jihadist chat rooms, not in some secret meeting with his operational staff, demonstrates that they are clearly intended to reach grassroots jihadists -- and are not intended as some sort of internal guidance for AQAP members. In fact, al-Wahayshi was encouraging grassroots jihadists to "do what Abu al-Khair did" referring to AQAP member Abdullah Hassan Taleh al-Asiri, the Saudi suicide bomber who attempted to kill Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef with a small IED on Aug. 28.
The most concerning aspect of al-Wahayshi's statement is that it is largely true. Improvised explosive mixtures are in fact relatively easy to make from readily available chemicals -- if a person has the proper training -- and attacks using small IEDs or other readily attainable weapons such as knives or clubs (or firearms in the United States) are indeed quite simple to conduct.
As STRATFOR has noted for several years now, with al Qaeda's structure under continual attack and no regional al Qaeda franchise groups in the Western Hemisphere, the most pressing jihadist threat to the U.S. homeland at present stems from grassroots jihadists, not the al Qaeda core. This trend has been borne out by the large number of plots and arrests over the past several years, to include several so far in 2009. The grassroots have likewise proven to pose a critical threat to Europe (although it is important to note that the threat posed by grassroots operatives is more widespread, but normally involves smaller, less strategic attacks than those conducted by the al Qaeda core).
From a counterterrorism perspective, the problem posed by grassroots operatives is that unless they somehow self-identify by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to authorities, attend a militant training camp, or conduct electronic correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny, they are very difficult to detect.
The threat posed by grassroots operatives, and the difficulty identifying them, highlight the need for counterterrorism programs to adopt a proactive, protective intelligence approach to the problem -- an approach that focuses on "the how" of militant attacks instead of just "the who."
The How
In the traditional, reactive approach to counterterrorism, where authorities respond to a crime scene after a terrorist attack to find and arrest the militants responsible for the attack, it is customary to focus on the who, or on the individual or group behind the attack. Indeed, in this approach, the only time much emphasis is placed on the how is either in an effort to identify a suspect when an unknown actor carried out the attack, or to prove that a particular suspect was responsible for the attack during a trial. Beyond these limited purposes, not much attention is paid to the how.
In large part, this focus on the who is a legacy of the fact that for many years, the primary philosophy of the U.S. government was to treat counterterrorism as a law-enforcement program, with a focus on prosecution rather than on disrupting plots.
Certainly, catching and prosecuting those who commit terrorist attacks is necessary, but from our perspective, preventing attacks is more important, and prevention requires a proactive approach. To pursue such a proactive approach to counterterrorism, the how becomes a critical question. By studying and understanding how attacks are conducted -- i.e., the exact steps and actions required for a successful attack -- authorities can establish systems to proactively identify early indicators that planning for an attack is under way. People involved in planning the attack can then be focused on, identified, and action can be taken prevent them from conducting the attack or attacks they are plotting. This means that focusing on the how can lead to previously unidentified suspects, e.g., those who do not self-identify.
"How was the attack conducted?" is the primary question addressed by protective intelligence, which is, at its core, a process for proactively identifying and assessing potential threats. Focusing on the how, then, requires protective intelligence practitioners to carefully study the tactics, tradecraft and behavior associated with militant actors involved in terrorist attacks. This allows them to search for and identify those behaviors before an attack takes place. Many of these behaviors are not by themselves criminal in nature; visiting a public building and observing security measures or standing on the street to watch the arrival of a VIP at their office are not illegal, but they can be indicators that an attack is being plotted. Such legal activities ultimately could be overt actions in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy to conduct the attack, but even where conspiracy cannot be proved, steps can still be taken to identify possible assailants and prevent a potential attack -- or at the very least, to mitigate the risk posed by the people involved.
Protective intelligence is based on the fact that successful attacks don't just happen out of the blue. Rather, terrorist attacks follow a discernable attack cycle. There are critical points during that cycle where a plot is most likely to be detected by an outside observer. Some of the points during the attack cycle when potential attackers are most vulnerable to detection are while surveillance is being conducted and weapons are being acquired. However, there are other, less obvious points where people on the lookout can spot preparations for an attack.
It is true that sometimes individuals do conduct ill-conceived, poorly executed attacks that involve shortcuts in the planning process. But this type of spur-of-the-moment attack is usually associated with mentally disturbed individuals and it is extremely rare for a militant actor to conduct a spontaneous terrorist attack without first following the steps of the attack cycle.
To really understand the how, protective intelligence practitioners cannot simply acknowledge that something like surveillance occurs. Rather, they must turn a powerful lens on steps like preoperational surveillance to gain an in-depth understanding of them. Dissecting an activity like preoperational surveillance requires not only examining subjects such as the demeanor demonstrated by those conducting surveillance prior to an attack and the specific methods and cover for action and status used. It also requires identifying particular times where surveillance is most likely and certain optimal vantage points (called perches in surveillance jargon) from where a surveillant is most likely to operate when seeking to surveil a specific facility or event. This type of complex understanding of surveillance can then be used to help focus human or technological countersurveillance efforts where they can be most effective.
Unfortunately, many counterterrorism investigators are so focused on the who that they do not focus on collecting this type of granular how information. When we have spoken with law enforcement officers responsible for investigating recent grassroots plots, they gave us blank stares in response to questions about how the suspects had conducted surveillance on the intended targets. They simply had not paid attention to this type of detail -- but this oversight is not really the investigators' fault. No one had ever explained to them why paying attention to, and recording, this type of detail was important. Moreover, it takes specific training and a practiced eye to observe and record these details without glossing over them. For example, it is quite useful if a protective intelligence officer has first conducted a lot of surveillance, because conducting surveillance allows one to understand what a surveillant must do and where he must be in order to effectively observe surveillance of a specific person or place.
Similarly, to truly understand the tradecraft required to build an IED and the specific steps a militant needs to complete to do so, it helps to go to an IED school where the investigator learns the tradecraft firsthand. Militant actors can and do change over time. New groups, causes and ideologies emerge, and specific militants can be killed, captured or retire. But the tactical steps a militant must complete to conduct a successful attack are constant. It doesn't matter if the person planning an attack is a radical environmentalist, a grassroots jihadist or a member of the al Qaeda core, for while these diverse actors will exhibit different levels of professionalism in regard to terrorist tradecraft, they still must follow essentially the same steps, accomplish the same tasks and operate in the same areas. Knowing this allows protective intelligence to guard against different levels of threats.
Of course, tactics can be changed and perfected and new tactics can be developed (often in response to changes in security and law enforcement operations). Additionally, new technologies can emerge (like cell phones and Google Earth) -- which can alter the way some of these activities are conducted, or reduce the time it takes to complete them. Studying the tradecraft and behaviors needed to execute evolving tactics, however, allows protective intelligence practitioners to respond to such changes and even alter how they operate in order to more effectively search for potential hostile activity.
Technology does not only aid those seeking to conduct attacks. There are a variety of new tools, such as Trapwire, a software system designed to work with camera systems to help detect patterns of preoperational surveillance, that can be focused on critical areas to help cut through the fog of noise and activity and draw attention to potential threats. These technological tools can help turn the tables on unknown plotters because they are designed to focus on the how. They will likely never replace human observation and experience, but they can serve as valuable aids to human perception.
Of course, protective intelligence does not have to be the sole responsibility of federal authorities specifically charged with counterterrorism. Corporate security managers and private security contractors should also apply these principles to protecting the people and facilities in their charge, as should local and state police agencies. In a world full of soft targets -- and limited resources to protect those targets from attack -- the more eyes looking for such activity the better. Even the general public has an important role to play in practicing situational awareness and spotting potential terrorist activity.
Keeping it Simple?
Al-Wahayshi is right that it is not difficult to construct improvised explosives from a wide range of household chemicals like peroxide and acetone or chlorine and brake fluid. He is also correct that some of those explosive mixtures can be concealed in objects ranging from electronic items to picture frames, or can be employed in forms ranging from hand grenades to suicide vests. Likewise, low-level attacks can also be conducted using knives, clubs and guns.
Furthermore, when grassroots jihadists plan and carry out attacks acting as lone wolves or in small compartmentalized cells without inadvertently betraying their mission by conspiring with people known to the authorities, they are not able to be detected by the who-focused systems, and it becomes far more difficult to discover and thwart these plots. This focus on the how absolutely does not mean that who-centered programs must be abandoned. Surveillance on known militants, their associates and communications should continue, efforts to identify people attending militant training camps or fighting in places like Afghanistan or Somalia must be increased, and people who conduct terrorist attacks should be identified and prosecuted.
However -- and this is an important however -- if an unknown militant is going to conduct even a simple attack against some of the targets al-Wahayshi suggests, such as an airport, train, or specific leader or media personality, complexity creeps into the picture, and the planning cycle must be followed if an attack is going to be successful. The prospective attacker must observe and quantify the target, construct a plan for the attack and then execute that plan. The demands of this process will force even an attacker previously unknown to the authorities into a position where he is vulnerable to discovery. If the attacker does this while there are people watching for such activity, he will likely be seen. But if he does this while there are no watchers, there is little chance that he will become a who until after the attack has been completed.
GEORGE
From www.stratfor.com
Counterterrorism: Shifting from 'Who' to 'How'
November 4, 2009 | 1918 GMT
By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
In the 11th edition of the online magazine Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battle), which was released to jihadist Web sites last week, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Nasir al-Wahayshi wrote an article that called for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets. The targets included "any tyrant, intelligence den, prince" or "minister" (referring to the governments in the Muslim world like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen), and "any crusaders whenever you find one of them, like at the airports of the crusader Western countries that participate in the wars against Islam, or their living compounds, trains etc.," (an obvious reference to the United States and Europe and Westerners living in Muslim countries).
Related Special Topic Pages
Surveillance and Countersurveillance
Terrorist Attack Cycle
Al-Wahayshi, an ethnic Yemeni who spent time in Afghanistan serving as a lieutenant under Osama bin Laden, noted these simple attacks could be conducted with readily available weapons such as knives, clubs or small improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to al-Wahayshi, jihadists "don't need to conduct a big effort or spend a lot of money to manufacture 10 grams of explosive material" and that they should not "waste a long time finding the materials, because you can find all these in your mother's kitchen, or readily at hand or in any city you are in."
That al-Wahayshi gave these instructions in an Internet magazine distributed via jihadist chat rooms, not in some secret meeting with his operational staff, demonstrates that they are clearly intended to reach grassroots jihadists -- and are not intended as some sort of internal guidance for AQAP members. In fact, al-Wahayshi was encouraging grassroots jihadists to "do what Abu al-Khair did" referring to AQAP member Abdullah Hassan Taleh al-Asiri, the Saudi suicide bomber who attempted to kill Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef with a small IED on Aug. 28.
The most concerning aspect of al-Wahayshi's statement is that it is largely true. Improvised explosive mixtures are in fact relatively easy to make from readily available chemicals -- if a person has the proper training -- and attacks using small IEDs or other readily attainable weapons such as knives or clubs (or firearms in the United States) are indeed quite simple to conduct.
As STRATFOR has noted for several years now, with al Qaeda's structure under continual attack and no regional al Qaeda franchise groups in the Western Hemisphere, the most pressing jihadist threat to the U.S. homeland at present stems from grassroots jihadists, not the al Qaeda core. This trend has been borne out by the large number of plots and arrests over the past several years, to include several so far in 2009. The grassroots have likewise proven to pose a critical threat to Europe (although it is important to note that the threat posed by grassroots operatives is more widespread, but normally involves smaller, less strategic attacks than those conducted by the al Qaeda core).
From a counterterrorism perspective, the problem posed by grassroots operatives is that unless they somehow self-identify by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to authorities, attend a militant training camp, or conduct electronic correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny, they are very difficult to detect.
The threat posed by grassroots operatives, and the difficulty identifying them, highlight the need for counterterrorism programs to adopt a proactive, protective intelligence approach to the problem -- an approach that focuses on "the how" of militant attacks instead of just "the who."
The How
In the traditional, reactive approach to counterterrorism, where authorities respond to a crime scene after a terrorist attack to find and arrest the militants responsible for the attack, it is customary to focus on the who, or on the individual or group behind the attack. Indeed, in this approach, the only time much emphasis is placed on the how is either in an effort to identify a suspect when an unknown actor carried out the attack, or to prove that a particular suspect was responsible for the attack during a trial. Beyond these limited purposes, not much attention is paid to the how.
In large part, this focus on the who is a legacy of the fact that for many years, the primary philosophy of the U.S. government was to treat counterterrorism as a law-enforcement program, with a focus on prosecution rather than on disrupting plots.
Certainly, catching and prosecuting those who commit terrorist attacks is necessary, but from our perspective, preventing attacks is more important, and prevention requires a proactive approach. To pursue such a proactive approach to counterterrorism, the how becomes a critical question. By studying and understanding how attacks are conducted -- i.e., the exact steps and actions required for a successful attack -- authorities can establish systems to proactively identify early indicators that planning for an attack is under way. People involved in planning the attack can then be focused on, identified, and action can be taken prevent them from conducting the attack or attacks they are plotting. This means that focusing on the how can lead to previously unidentified suspects, e.g., those who do not self-identify.
"How was the attack conducted?" is the primary question addressed by protective intelligence, which is, at its core, a process for proactively identifying and assessing potential threats. Focusing on the how, then, requires protective intelligence practitioners to carefully study the tactics, tradecraft and behavior associated with militant actors involved in terrorist attacks. This allows them to search for and identify those behaviors before an attack takes place. Many of these behaviors are not by themselves criminal in nature; visiting a public building and observing security measures or standing on the street to watch the arrival of a VIP at their office are not illegal, but they can be indicators that an attack is being plotted. Such legal activities ultimately could be overt actions in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy to conduct the attack, but even where conspiracy cannot be proved, steps can still be taken to identify possible assailants and prevent a potential attack -- or at the very least, to mitigate the risk posed by the people involved.
Protective intelligence is based on the fact that successful attacks don't just happen out of the blue. Rather, terrorist attacks follow a discernable attack cycle. There are critical points during that cycle where a plot is most likely to be detected by an outside observer. Some of the points during the attack cycle when potential attackers are most vulnerable to detection are while surveillance is being conducted and weapons are being acquired. However, there are other, less obvious points where people on the lookout can spot preparations for an attack.
It is true that sometimes individuals do conduct ill-conceived, poorly executed attacks that involve shortcuts in the planning process. But this type of spur-of-the-moment attack is usually associated with mentally disturbed individuals and it is extremely rare for a militant actor to conduct a spontaneous terrorist attack without first following the steps of the attack cycle.
To really understand the how, protective intelligence practitioners cannot simply acknowledge that something like surveillance occurs. Rather, they must turn a powerful lens on steps like preoperational surveillance to gain an in-depth understanding of them. Dissecting an activity like preoperational surveillance requires not only examining subjects such as the demeanor demonstrated by those conducting surveillance prior to an attack and the specific methods and cover for action and status used. It also requires identifying particular times where surveillance is most likely and certain optimal vantage points (called perches in surveillance jargon) from where a surveillant is most likely to operate when seeking to surveil a specific facility or event. This type of complex understanding of surveillance can then be used to help focus human or technological countersurveillance efforts where they can be most effective.
Unfortunately, many counterterrorism investigators are so focused on the who that they do not focus on collecting this type of granular how information. When we have spoken with law enforcement officers responsible for investigating recent grassroots plots, they gave us blank stares in response to questions about how the suspects had conducted surveillance on the intended targets. They simply had not paid attention to this type of detail -- but this oversight is not really the investigators' fault. No one had ever explained to them why paying attention to, and recording, this type of detail was important. Moreover, it takes specific training and a practiced eye to observe and record these details without glossing over them. For example, it is quite useful if a protective intelligence officer has first conducted a lot of surveillance, because conducting surveillance allows one to understand what a surveillant must do and where he must be in order to effectively observe surveillance of a specific person or place.
Similarly, to truly understand the tradecraft required to build an IED and the specific steps a militant needs to complete to do so, it helps to go to an IED school where the investigator learns the tradecraft firsthand. Militant actors can and do change over time. New groups, causes and ideologies emerge, and specific militants can be killed, captured or retire. But the tactical steps a militant must complete to conduct a successful attack are constant. It doesn't matter if the person planning an attack is a radical environmentalist, a grassroots jihadist or a member of the al Qaeda core, for while these diverse actors will exhibit different levels of professionalism in regard to terrorist tradecraft, they still must follow essentially the same steps, accomplish the same tasks and operate in the same areas. Knowing this allows protective intelligence to guard against different levels of threats.
Of course, tactics can be changed and perfected and new tactics can be developed (often in response to changes in security and law enforcement operations). Additionally, new technologies can emerge (like cell phones and Google Earth) -- which can alter the way some of these activities are conducted, or reduce the time it takes to complete them. Studying the tradecraft and behaviors needed to execute evolving tactics, however, allows protective intelligence practitioners to respond to such changes and even alter how they operate in order to more effectively search for potential hostile activity.
Technology does not only aid those seeking to conduct attacks. There are a variety of new tools, such as Trapwire, a software system designed to work with camera systems to help detect patterns of preoperational surveillance, that can be focused on critical areas to help cut through the fog of noise and activity and draw attention to potential threats. These technological tools can help turn the tables on unknown plotters because they are designed to focus on the how. They will likely never replace human observation and experience, but they can serve as valuable aids to human perception.
Of course, protective intelligence does not have to be the sole responsibility of federal authorities specifically charged with counterterrorism. Corporate security managers and private security contractors should also apply these principles to protecting the people and facilities in their charge, as should local and state police agencies. In a world full of soft targets -- and limited resources to protect those targets from attack -- the more eyes looking for such activity the better. Even the general public has an important role to play in practicing situational awareness and spotting potential terrorist activity.
Keeping it Simple?
Al-Wahayshi is right that it is not difficult to construct improvised explosives from a wide range of household chemicals like peroxide and acetone or chlorine and brake fluid. He is also correct that some of those explosive mixtures can be concealed in objects ranging from electronic items to picture frames, or can be employed in forms ranging from hand grenades to suicide vests. Likewise, low-level attacks can also be conducted using knives, clubs and guns.
Furthermore, when grassroots jihadists plan and carry out attacks acting as lone wolves or in small compartmentalized cells without inadvertently betraying their mission by conspiring with people known to the authorities, they are not able to be detected by the who-focused systems, and it becomes far more difficult to discover and thwart these plots. This focus on the how absolutely does not mean that who-centered programs must be abandoned. Surveillance on known militants, their associates and communications should continue, efforts to identify people attending militant training camps or fighting in places like Afghanistan or Somalia must be increased, and people who conduct terrorist attacks should be identified and prosecuted.
However -- and this is an important however -- if an unknown militant is going to conduct even a simple attack against some of the targets al-Wahayshi suggests, such as an airport, train, or specific leader or media personality, complexity creeps into the picture, and the planning cycle must be followed if an attack is going to be successful. The prospective attacker must observe and quantify the target, construct a plan for the attack and then execute that plan. The demands of this process will force even an attacker previously unknown to the authorities into a position where he is vulnerable to discovery. If the attacker does this while there are people watching for such activity, he will likely be seen. But if he does this while there are no watchers, there is little chance that he will become a who until after the attack has been completed.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
The CBO/TRICARE Email That Won’t Die
The CBO/TRICARE Email That Won’t Die
Here is the current facts about this rumor that keeps going around.
George
Here is the current facts about this rumor that keeps going around.
George
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